June 22, 1941 War began. The day when the war began. Summit

Today's lecture theme is a battle in the sky on June 22, 1941, the opposition of the Red Army and Luftwaffe. Today we will talk both directly about the battle and about the prehistory.

I want to note that in Soviet times this issue was given little attention in the literature. Special publications on this topic were not at all, and in some studies that covered the development of the Soviet Armed Forces and in particular the Air Force, several paragraphs were devoted to this problem or at best chapter.

Everything led to the fact that stereotypes were formed by the beginning of the 90s, a completely definite picture of this day and previous events, which can be characterized by such moments: the defeat of the Red Army Air Force was due to the suddenness of the German attack, as a rule, was also always added that More than 60 Soviet airfields were attacked by more than 1,200 aircraft. In almost all publications, it was added that the Luftwaffe had a numerical superiority over the Soviet Air Forces and that most of the Soviet aircraft were obsolete or technically faulty. Airplanes of new types, Yak-1, MiG-3, Lagg-3, PE-2, IL-2 was around 2 thousand. Luftwaffe, together with allies, all publications were given about 5 thousand aircraft, so they were superior to the RPC Air Force in the technical plan and numerically.

This information was nominated from the book in the book, and the variations were a bit. Basically, people who were interested in this topic could learn information from the memories of eyewitnesses or participants. By the beginning of the 90s, certain myths were formed. It had negative consequences: due to the so-called. "Freedom of the Words" appeared pseudoteoria, who tried to answer who was to blame. It turned out that in fact whether the generals betrayed, and this catastrophe occurred, whether de Soviet soldiers were not going to fight. In particular, such a theory put forward a well-known Mark Solonin, who devoted several books to this topic. In them, he is trying to prove that the alleged battle in the air did not occur, and the Russian pilots just fled, threw the technique and retreated far to the east. It started in the early 2000s. The first publication was called: "Where did Stalin's falcons flew away?". Briefly I would like to dispel doubts: with the enemy fought, as soon as they could, using all the forces and funds that were at that moment, simply the lack of documentary material made it possible to operate with unverified facts.

The first thing that is wrong is the same Solonin - that he is repelled from incorrect tasks. He could not even determine the composition of the grouping of the Soviet Air Force on June 22 in the Western border districts, since he did not have information about the real composition and dislocation of the Air Force in Western districts. And further, using operational reports, operational documentation, combat reports, makes incorrect conclusions. He believes that if, let's say, some regiment had 50 aircraft, and the next day it was said in a summary that there were 20 aircraft left, and 10 aircraft were written in the same operational summary, he says on this background: "And where Did the remaining cars? " And expresses some abstracts, absolutely not responding with reality, because the operational reports were very different from the reports of losses, and often what was written in the Morning Operational Summary, for example, on June 22, 1941, did not fit the fact that later In a few days, the superior command was given as a loss. That is, the man initially asked the wrong direction, then "posted" under its version of certain documents that do not meet the format of the study. Roughly speaking, he begins to talk about quantity, and in the end operates with operational documents, which did not have any relationship to this amount. Thus, a person incomprehensible conclusions and put forward crazy theories. The strangest thing is picked up by many on the Internet, and some kind of conspiracy discussion begins practically.

How were things really?

The state of the Red Army Air Force by the beginning of World War II, by September 1, 1939, by June 22, 1941, was far from optimal. Why? There were quite objective reasons. First, the geography of our country played against the Red Army, which implied the presence of a very powerful grouping in the Far East, including the Air Force, and in the Transcaucasus. The forces that the Soviet Union had to have at that time was impossible to transfer quickly. Let's say aviation from Central Russia to the Far East. There were no route flights, so the plane had to first disassemble, take the echelons. It took a long time, so the Soviet leadership was forced to keep very powerful groupings in the Far East and the Transcaucasia. That is, originally, the Soviet Union was required to have much more strength to have in peacetime, respectively, to produce more aircraft, produce more pilots, spend more resources, fuel, motors and so on.

The second aspect: The Soviet Union was only at the beginning of the 20s began industrialization. To develop this industry as an aircraft industry for 10-15 years - a very difficult task, if we consider that in Tsarist Russia, as such, no release, nor the development was made. Used purchased motors and aircraft designs. Although there were outstanding constructors, the Sikorsky is the same, but mostly what was used on the front - it was an allied technique, which, at best, was produced under license. In general, to overcome the problem of creating its own high-quality air industry and samples of technology by the beginning of World War II failed.

Card construction of operational airfields

Bright example: Luftwaffe by September 1 received several motors with capacity above 1000 hp Unfortunately, the Red Army Air Force did not have and lag almost for a whole period.

Thus, in technical terms, Soviet aircraft lost German. Another reason for this was the release of aluminum, which in the USSR was 3-4 times lagged behind German. Accordingly, the Germans could afford to build all-metal airplanes from Durala, which, naturally, easier, and the USSR was forced to build airplanes mixed structures, it is harder that in the presence of weak engines created a difficult situation.

The second question, which, as a rule, was not covered and not covered, is organizational and mobilization activities conducted from 1938 and at the beginning of the war. The Soviet Union, as is known, although fully and did not enter the war on September 1, but the preparation began to spend long. There was a "skew" towards quantitative parameters. For this there were causes, including the territory. They went along the path of more aircraft, pilots, compounds, parts, to the detriment of quality. Preparation of a flying composition, which was not in the 30s not at the height, completely fell to an unacceptable minimum in the 38-40s, and produced pilots, as a rule, the maximum that could master on battle plane - it takes off and landing . There were cases when the cadets produced were literally 20-30 flights on a combat aircraft. They even take off and hit almost no. At the beginning of 1939, the Red Army Air Force had about 150 aviation regiments, in 1940 she added another 100, in 1941 they began to form 100 more regiments. Thus, in the quantitative characteristics of the Red Army Air Force, there were perfect Armadas - 350 aviation regiments, 20 with more than thousands of combat aircraft, 23 thousand pilots in combat parts plus 7 thousand instructing pilots in military schools and 34 thousand simultaneously trained cadets. With such indicators, no matter how the quality of the preparation was discussed. This is another reason that events have been pretty tragically.

Many countries, the same Japan, have observed a return trend. They paid too much attention to the quality of the preparation of pilots and due to this very much lost in quantity. When, in 1942-44, the Americans knocked them the main mass of experienced pilots - probably everyone knows this story - it turned out that the Japanese simply there are simply no frames. Skotes and in that, and in the other side is not very good, and it was possible to find the golden middle of the Americans, and only due to the fact that they had the richest country. They had the opportunity to prepare good pilots in huge quantities and at the same time produce wonderful aircraft and motors.

In view of the so-called organizational and mobilization measures, the composition of personnel parts is strongly "drank". Even those parts that were formed in the 30s and were reformed in 1938 in the shelves, of which over the 40-41st years regularly took experienced pilots, commanders and sent them as a command formulation to newly formed parts. It led to negative consequences, because the personnel composition of the personnel parts was strongly weakened.

Let us turn to the preparation for war. Both Germany and the Soviet Union were preparing to conduct fighting in the air rather decisively. And the one, and the other parties assumed to conduct the first operations precisely on the conquest of domination in the air and were preparing to act on the airfields in the first place. However, approaches differed. The German Air Force approached this issue in more detail. An important factor here was that the Germans were conducted less orgery, less formated parts, retaining pre-war in very good personnel. Of course, they had losses in the campaign in the West, the campaigns of 1940, but in general the back remained. If the Germans have had a 23-fighter group by the beginning of World War II, then on June 22 they had about 40 fighter groups, i.e. The composition increased, but rustling. And the Soviet Air Force, which had 55 fighter regiments as of September 1, 1939, had already had about 150, and the number of personnel and equipment in them was more than that of Luftwaffe. The quality of preparation suffered because of this, but there were other reasons related to intelligence activities. Germans at one time created a powerful intelligence aircraft before the war, which included parts at all levels of subordination, ranging from the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, which had eyes in the form of a specialized part, or rather, the compounds, the Ober-Rovel groups, which included as an intelligence aviation units And infrastructure, laboratories, airfields that allowed them to intelligence at the highest level. The Germans began preparation for combat actions against the Soviet Union immediately after the final approval of the Barbaross Plan, which was adopted in December 1940, respectively, the Germans began to prepare since the beginning of January. Airplanes were specially built, or rather, allegedly converted from existing samples: high-altitude engines were put on them, they received camouflage in the form of civil identification signs, all weapons were removed from them. In addition, several Yu-86 aircraft were constructed with hermocabines that allowed them to act from heights of 12-13 km. At that time, for interceptors, it was an extreme height, and effectively use the interceptor fighters was difficult. Plus played the role that no radar field over the Soviet-German border was not. The Soviet Union had several radar, but they were all in the area of \u200b\u200bLeningrad and Moscow, so the activities of German intelligence officers were absolutely unpunished. You can see the map, a real card from TsAMO, which gives an idea of \u200b\u200bthe activities of German intelligence aircraft.

This is the area of \u200b\u200bEastern Prussia and Baltic States. One of the squadrons based in the Königsberg area, the 2nd squadron of the Ober-group of Rovel, carried out intelligence flights on the route: took off from the airfield Zeerappen on Königsberg, further over the Baltic Sea, came around in the area of \u200b\u200bLibava, further in the Riga area, were intelligent flights Over the entire territory of the Baltic States, Belarus and went to their territory in the Brest area, sat down at the airfield in the area of \u200b\u200bWarsaw, refused and performed the reverse intelligence flight along the same route in the opposite direction. Soviet VNSO posts, that is, observations and detection, very rarely fixed these flights, because they were produced at a high height. How many such flights are produced, unfortunately, we do not know. Soviet data speaks about 200 flights, but in fact they were much more. There are no German data, but there is actual confirmation of these German actions: the Germans at the time were able to extract almost all the main Soviet airfields, railway stations, clusters of troops. For example, aerial photograph made from German scout April 10, 1941.

Aerial photography. Kaunas, 10 Demredes 1941

On him Kaunas, the famous Kaunas fortress, airfield, is already visible, more precisely, the southern part of the airfield, in which the 15th Fighter Regiment of the 8th Mixed Division was based. Visible hangars, parking aircraft. The detailing of such pictures was awesome, everything is visible, including each aircraft. The players of the Luftwaffe, for which such tablets were preparing, had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with future goals. This activity was carried out every day, not stopping almost until June 22, until the moment of invasion, and we have some possibilities in retrospective see how the situation changed.

For example, here is a later picture made on June 9, the entire Kaunas airfield is already visible, including what we have seen in the previous picture - Angara 15 JEP, airplanes in three rows before hangars are, you can even recount every aircraft. In the northern part of the airfield of the 31st JEP, you can recalculate all the aircraft, plan approaches for bombing and with that, and on the other hand.

Aerophotus. June 9, 1941.

What could oppose the red army in terms of intelligence? Many noticed that recently there was a reservoir of publications devoted to the intelligence activities of various structures. She, of course, was very important, but, unfortunately, did not provide materials like Nemtsim. Here, by the way, the aircraft Yu-86 with the Hermokabina, civil registration signs are visible. This is the only car lost during these intelligence flights. Unique snapshot. The crew landed in the Rivne area - he refused the engines. The Germans managed to blow up the aircraft before they were captivated, but, nevertheless, Soviet experts managed to extract several remnants from cameras, including film, where it was seen that the Germans were photographed railway distillations in the Korosten region.

Downed Yu-86

Soviet Air Force could count on intelligence information, collected, as a rule, in the 30s, because reconnaissance permission was not received, at least before the beginning of June. There are several notes that chosen the heads of the Red Army Air Force - first levers, then Zhigarev who asked for Tymoshenko and Stalin to start exploration over the German territory, but until mid-June such a decision was not. Soviet pilots were forced to count on less relevant data that were collected in the 30s. According to some objects, they were quite high-quality - here, for example, the Königsberg plan is quite good, there are cardsteries, even some photographic materials, which are marked by the Devau airfield. But the bulk of the data was presented at approximately such schemes on which at best there were goal coordinates, a small description and the simplest scheme, which, of course, can be used as a visual manual, but it was almost impossible to find the airfield on it.

Soviet pilots were forced to act in such situations often at random. The difference in the intelligence was roughly understood, which the Germans and the Red Army Air Force had. According to the plans (we do not take political issues, the first one was going to step, who was not going), the Soviet plans of the cover of the Red Army should act aggressively, applying a number of shots in German airfields. But the problem was that due to the lack of current reconnaissance information, part of the strikes, even on these plans, would be carried out on empty airfields, where there were no fighting parts, and vice versa, those airfields where combat part were, according to plan were not to be attacked .

The Germans, respectively, could correct their plans until June 22 and have topical information, seeing the movement of the Red Army Air Force as it were in online. And when individual comrades doubt that the Germans had such successes on June 22, it was rather strange. Because, having information where it was necessary to strike, the Germans did not even need to spend their strength for this, only highlighting small groups of aircraft that applied accurate blows.

Interesting the aspect of technical preparation for combat actions. In Luftwaffe, conducted studies even after Polish, French events and especially during the "Battle of Britain". The tactics of action against the airfields of the enemy was worked out, which included both tactical techniques and the use of specialized ammunition. The purpose of the armament nomenclature was developed, which includes the fragmentation bombs, which should have become the know-how, an effective method for the destruction of aviation at airfields. This is a small SD-2 bomb, weighing 2.5 kg, the smallest bomb at that time, intended for the fighting. Next, it was in the SD-10 nomenclature, then the SD-50 bomb, fragant, and the last, SD-250, this is a very heavy bomb, but it was rarely applied. The main bombs that were used were precisely SD-2 and SD-50.

Aviation bombs SD-2 and SD-50

What was their advantage? German aircraft received holders for these bombs that allowed to hang a lot of their number. Suppose the usual fighter Messerschmita had the opportunity to suspend 96 such bombs. Despite the fact that the bomb is small at first glance, it had an effectiveness equal to 82 mm min, that is, very serious: the aircraft hit almost always took posed it. In addition, some of these ammunition was provided with hourly mechanisms, which made them even greater challenge for airfields. They could explode in an hour, two after they were reset.

This is how the aircraft from the second group of the fighter source, equipped with bombs looked in the field.

The real picture of June 41 in the area of \u200b\u200bSledgeVok. SD-2 suspension for a heavy fighter BF 110, he has under each wing under 48 bombs, a total load - 96 bombs. Also practiced the suspension 4 SD-50 bombs, which, in principle, is also effective. Please note that, for example, a typical Sat, the main bomber by 1941 in the Red Army Air Force, as a rule, was loading just from 6 bombs Fab-100, that is, the fighter Mi-109 was actually equivalent to Sat.

Interestingly video attack SD-2 bombs, which shows what airfields could sing them. These are the first shots, it is the SD-50 bombing, by the way. But SD-2 bombat. That is, even a small group of German fighters, equipped with such bombs, could with a high degree of confidence to guarantee the destruction of the match, which was not covered.

German bombers were also prepared for action on airfields. They, as a rule, carried (Junckers-88 and Dorne-17) on 360 such bombs, what we have now seen. A group of three aircraft could reset 1000 such bombs. In addition, even larger ammunition were used, mostly bombs SD-50. In the nomenclature of German bombers Yu-88 and Dorne-17, 20 such bombs could be suspended, without overload, and Heinkel-111 bomber could hang up without overload 32 such bombs. That is, the attack of Junckers-88 was equivalent to the attack of the Sat Group of 9 aircraft.

Accordingly, the Haykel-111 link could relieve almost 100 such bombs, and this is equivalent to the actions of the squadron of the DB-3 aircraft, which were suspended at 10 "acres". In addition, all German fighters at that time have already carried on cannon weapons, two guns or one, if we talk about Me-109 F. Soviet aircraft were armed in the main machine guns, there was a very small number of aircraft I-16 with cannon weapons, and Just went to the series of aircraft Yak-1.

An important factor was the enemy's organization itself. Luftwaffe is definitely a genus of troops in Germany, who submitted directly to Reichs Marshal and then Führer and had his own fully built structure. In addition to actually aviation parts, it was still a rear and anti-aircraft artillery, very powerful. The Air Force of the Red Army was not fully native of troops, it was rather a view that was subordinate to the ground forces. An interesting fact: until June 30, 1941 there was no position of the Commander of the Red Army Air Force, was the head of department. Commanders of the front Air Force reported directly to the commander of the fronts, and this played a negative role subsequently. In addition to mobilization and organizational events, Soviet Air Force in 1939-40. Moved to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltic States, so they were forced to build a new network of airfields throughout the border. For example, this is part of the map of the construction of airfields in the Baltic States. Accordingly, the subordination system of the land forces made a very serious problem: the Soviet Air Force stretched throughout the front from Murmansk to the Black Sea with a thin layer. Part of the forces, because the construction of airfields was only conducted, the Red Army Air Force was forced to keep much east, about Meridian Smolensk-Kiev-Zaporizhia. It turned out that the air force was divided into at least two echelon removed from about 400-500 kilometers from each other. Parts located in the area of \u200b\u200bTallinn, Smolensk, Orsha, Mogileva, Kiev, Proskurovo, Krivoy Rog could not help the parts of the first echelon in the first battles. And the construction of aerodromes in the 39th, or in the 40th year was properly conducted. The 41st was the year when they tried to close these cutters. It began to build 800 operational airfields at once, in addition, such concreted typical bands began to build on 240 airfields, which also did not add optimism, because even a person who is not familiar with construction, it is clear that such a gigantic number of construction sites is simply impossible for six months Build.

Local location scheme at the airfield

Accordingly, here is one of the photos like redarmeys mounted a mesh under the fill of the concrete strip.

Laying the mesh under the fill of the concrete strip

Distribution of forces. In the Baltic States, the first aircraft building is located about Konigsberg to the border, and according to the Red Army Air Force, the 6th Division is located here, here is the 7th division, here the 8th, here is the 57th, and the fourth, for example, is already located In the area of \u200b\u200bTallinn, Tartu, and in such a construction, it cannot start the fighting. It can not be effective fighting, even bomber. That is, the Germans could use all the forces in the first strike, the Soviet Air Force - no. Moreover, even according to the cover plan, part of the forces still had to be located along the Western Dvina line, that is, at a distance somewhere 250 km from the border, and, accordingly, I can not imagine how they could participate in the border battle in such angle. This happened everywhere, not only in the Baltic States, throughout and the Western Front, and the South-Western, and the Air Force of the 9th Army in Moldova. The Soviet Air Force entered far from the optimal composition, having a division into several echelons. Even the first echelon was divided into two echelon along the border, and at a distance somewhere 250 km, and the third echelon was at a distance of 400-500 km from the border. Everyone knows the shittomatic data that the Luftwaffe had about 2.5 thousand combat aircraft somewhere, the Red Army Air Forces had somewhere 7.5 thousand combat aircraft in Western districts, but it is impossible to actually use most of the forces on the above reasons. In addition, the Red Army Air Force was in the deployment stage, and if the Germans could put all their 20 fighter groups in the optimal composition of June 22, then 69 fighter regiments presented in Western districts, the real combat value was represented by 24, 7 of which were in the second-third echelons. Use the notorious numerical advantage was simply impossible. The Soviet Air Force should have come into battle in parts, which gave the Germans a great opportunity to defeat them, which subsequently happened.

The preselection, unfortunately, is not so rainbow, but, nevertheless, it really was. Being in such a building, in such a state, with such forces and preparation, to win in the preliminary battle, I must say honestly, the Soviet Air Force did not have the slightest chance. They could only delay the inevitable defeat of the first echelon and wait for the approach of the second and third echelons to continue the battle of a more powerful composition.

Let's go to war. For example, the results of the first strike. The Western and North-West direction was planned at 4 am, that is, German aircraft were supposed to cross the Soviet-German border with the first volley offensive offensive, after 15-20 minutes they had a blow to advanced airfields. In the southwestern and southern direction it was an hour later, apparently, from light conditions.

Here is the kaunas airfield, the southern part of it. The very parking lots that we have seen in the first series are visible funnels from bombs. Not everything is, because a little bit had to trim the picture.

Kaunas. The result of bombing

People who say that it was impossible to destroy such a large number of aircraft on June 22, sin against truth, because it is confirmed by objective data from German control. Shooting on June 23, this is a photocontrol. And this is how it looked on the ground. This is the same parking, hangars, here are the three rows of planes. It can be seen that the second row is completely destroyed, the rear row is completely destroyed, but something more or less living remains in the first row. The shooting was conducted by these two aircraft, strictly speaking, too, burned down.

Kaunas. The result of bombing

This gives an idea of \u200b\u200bthe effectiveness of German strikes. In fact, on June 22, the RKKA Air Force faced with an incredibly strong enemy, persistent in achieving the Object Council, and there was no one chance to win this confrontation, at least the first operation.

These photos from the "Signal" magazine are the same group of aircraft, but from another angle. Here is a turn of this "signal." Here all photos from the Baltic states are Kaunas, Kedanya, Alitus, a visual German report on combat actions.

Magazine "Signal"

As for the very first moment: another negative factor was the fact that on the morning of June 22 there was no agreement with the military-political leadership, and a clear order was not given to the beginning of the fighting. In fact, surprise as such, because the troops of the Soviet border districts still began to rise on June 22 on the alarm, and in the Baltic States, another 19-20 numbers are dispersed where it was possible due to airfield construction, on field airfields And one squadron was constantly in readiness number two, that is, ready to take off for 5-10 minutes. But this completely normal condition was for some reason broken on the night of June 21-22, the infamous "Directive No. 1", which was transferred to the troops at around one hour on June 22. There were made such postulates that when attacking the battle, not to get involved in the opening of fire by the opponent's opponent's fire, do not open fire. It was very shot down the mood of Soviet commanders and pilots. In the films of the Soviet pore, they saw where, roughly speaking, Pavlov, commander of the Western Front or some more characters call Tymoshenko, the addict of defense, and they say: "Well, see the Germans attack." And they in response they say not to succumb to provocations, keep calm and so on. Instead of going to clearly and clearly tell the commanders, how to act, they were put in front of the choice: whether he was attacked, whether he would fight, or not lead, wait, maybe this is a provocation. And in the context of the Air Force, it played a negative role, because if the land forces on June 22 not everywhere in the battle joined, then the Air Force was entered into battle in almost full. This moment, when the first shot was not reflected, a completely negative effect on the future. Even Kaunas, crushed airfields that we saw - this was done during the first raid, although the Germans in this first tax did not put such a goal of destruction. They were more likely to have a targeting, mostly they set the task to conduct a deferment, once again clarify the goals. However, where they had excellent reconnaissance documents, they acted with powerful groups. Several airfields were defeated in the Baltic States, and our Air Force suffered serious losses. In Ukraine, in Belarus was the same situation. Even the very first blows were very effective. But I emphasize once again, it was not the main task, the main thing was the deferment. The next happens like this: some Soviet military leaders who were supplied to such a puzzle, decided it normally: for example, in the Baltic States, the Air Force of the Air Force was Alecia Ivanovich, Major General Aviation.

Ion A.I., Major General Aviation

Here he is still a community, in pre-war rank. He, most likely, received an order from the headquarters of the North-West Front of Clain to conduct hostilities, and in response to the first blow was raised (I, honestly, I do not know whether the work plan was introduced, but at least orders, Which were given to the connections, clearly corresponded to the cover plan), the bomber shelves were raised into the air, which went bombing German airfields and other goals. For example, a person, at that time, Captain, Krivtsov Mikhail Antonovich, he was the commander of the first Soviet squadron, which in the morning of June 22 dropped the bombs on Tilzit.

Krivtsov Mikhail Antonovich

There is an interesting fact associated with this person who, again, speaks of the role of personality: the directive in front of people was given a choice, and the most decisive commanders were strongly accepted, as, for example, ions, Cryptions, a number of other commanders, and others simply sat on Earth And they did not succumb to provocations, some shelves did not even fly into the air. And those that took off, complied with the order of the first fire not to open, and the German Air Force in the first tax is very small losses suffered because of this. Not only did the directive regulate these actions, and when the airplanes of the North-West Front were already on the approach to German airfields, bases, etc., from the People's Commissariat of Defense or from the General Staff, it's now difficult to say, I received a radio order to turn around, bombardment German territory do not produce. One squadron of the 46th Sbap returned from the combat course. But such people as Krivtsov showed a decisiveness, their own opinion and still dropped bombs, thanks to which the Germans received at least some kind of retaliatory hit at that moment. Further more.

They returned all the aircraft, allowed to act only before the border. At about 7 pm, the so-called "Directive number 2" was the so-called "Directive No. 2", which again did not allow to introduce an action plan, she spoke "interesting" language, put local tasks. There was a completely incomprehensible phrase bombed Koenigsberg and Memel - it is not clear what is said. The rest was allowed to shoot down the opponent's airplanes, act in the tail, that is, after hitting the aircraft of the enemy and bomb it, but she, unfortunately, entered the county by 9 am. What is 9 in the morning? The Germans performed the first series of shocks in 4-5 am, the next series was at 7-8 in the morning. The goal of the latter was not only a reconnaissance mussia, but also the destruction of aviation at the airfields. The second raid of German aircraft was focused on the matchmakers, improved, that is, German pilots have already visited once above the German airfields, they had no questions, they were clearly acted. Several regiments in Belarus were simply destroyed completely as a result of these nails. Really completely, they did not act at all. For example, the 113th and 16th bombarding shelves were completely destroyed, none of their plane after that did not participate in any actions. This is not a single case. When the directive reached, because of these morning stop orders, apparently, the comrades were a little on the platoon and were already afraid to produce some independent things, and they also called questions. Interesting fact: in the documents of the 125th high-speed bombarding regiment of the Western District, the division commander is persistently, a few hours after receiving the directive, trying to force the regiment commander to fly to the combat task, he in the end, somewhere in 11.45 agree to do this, and asks for He has a radiogram on board every 5 minutes, did the order not canceled. That's what people were brought to such nonsense. As a result, he had the last doubts disappeared when they in the air in 12 were listened to the speech of Molotov about the announcement of the war. Such actions before lunch, aviation was put into the role of the manager: whether we fight, whether we are not fighting. Many said and wrote that the connection was interrupted. Here are many parts whose relationship with the higher bosses was interrupted, as once and worked better, because, without communicating, they began to conduct fighting, without looking around at anyone, having decided on their own. Before the lunch, the Germans managed to perform three, if you take the Baltic States and the West Front, and two departures, if you take the South-West Front, according to our airfields. The effect was destroying.

Here, if you take a Tilzit, there were the results of the first departure of the nine of the 9th Lamb Mikhail Krivtsov, which the first was dropped at the Tilsit Bomb railway station.

Tilsit. The result of bombing

These are the results of SD-2 strikes at the Vilnius airfield. The burnt seagull is visible and, perhaps, her "killer", it can be seen that the pylon for SD-2 is suspended.

The result of shocks SD-2 at the Vilnius airfield

Accordingly, the Western Front was attacked by advanced airfields of three divisions, on which by 10.00, after the second tax, were completely defeated, for example, in the 10th division - 74 regiment, the 33rd regiment, 123rd shelves. In the 10th mixed division, 124 and 126th shelves were defeated. Really, the shelves remained: in a 33rd - not a single aircraft, in 74th - not a single aircraft, the 123rd JEAP was able to withdraw 13 fighters, the 126th IAP was able to withdraw 6 fighters, 124th - 1.

I have one interesting companion from Poland, who spoke and wrote several times: "Mikhail, it is impossible, only a nuclear strike ..." Here, everything was possible, these documents are confirmed, not German, these are the documents of the Red Army Air Force. LOSS. At the airfield, which was 50-60 aircraft, for 2-3 departures, the Germans could destroy almost all the technique. Well, of course, these were both destroyed and damaged machines. But a damaged aircraft, if you break through the car carrier or even the tires are stuck, you can't fix it soon.

The 13th SBAP was completely destroyed, the 16th chapter of the neighboring 11th division, heavily defeat received the 122th JEAP. Thus, by 10 am, the position was completely unbearable. There is such a telegram intercepted by the Germans, the commander from Bialystok, black, which almost open text asked for help. Ultimately, the only thing that was allowed to be a departure to the line of Pinsk-Baranovichi-Volkovysk-Lida, that is, kilometers per 100. And for 12 o'clock, these compounds are almost in full force, one fighter regiment was only left, redesigned to the second line. But here it came into force that the Red Army only unfolded, that is, there was no mobilization, so the rear services were in a state of peacetime, so to retreat and quickly translate the materials that were: bombs, the supply of fuel and securities, on the airfields of the second strip, for which Recommended, it was difficult. The airfields were in the process of construction, there were not even garrisons, and there were builders mainly, the parts that the construction of the runway was held. But even this waste did not guarantee anything: the Germans were bombarded by the Lida airfield in the afternoon, Pinsk. Interestingly, parts from Belostok speakers first moved to the Belostok district, they were chosen from there for 2-3 departures, and they also had to travel further after lunch. Moving to the second line, the guard shelves did not lead due to the lack of material resources and became passive witnesses. The same approximately the situation was in the Baltic States, but with the addition that the energetic commander of the Air Force tried to act in its plans all the time. He was one of the few leaders of the Red Army Air Force, who understood that it was necessary to fight for domination until the very end, but, unfortunately, on June 22, it did not allow him to certain circumstances. Why? I have already spoken, the subordination of the Air Force by the land forces, the land commander. In 8-9 o'clock in the morning, there were breakthroughs of German groups on Tauragu and at Alitus, so the commander of the front or head of the headquarters - it's hard to establish it, who really led to this, - I ordered an order to strike on these advanced tank wedges, respectively, all North-West Air Force The front was focused on fighting these parts. That is, German aircraft continued to attack the new Soviet airfields or repeat the attacks on the old ones, they acted throughout the day without stopping, albeit even small groups. The Soviet Air Force did not meet them in principle, acting on the motorized parts of the Wehrmacht.

The late reaction of the Western Front, what I described already, the commander of one of the regiments requested a radiogram to give him every 5 minutes on board, whether the departure was canceled. A little later, General Pavlov gave an order about active hostilities against the enemy, somewhere in 5.30. An order was issued on the actions in German airfields, but in 6-7 banned "amateurness", the Air Force stood for a few more hours under the hail of shocks. Boots of the Western Front Air Force are belated, but were. By the way, what is interesting, one of the regiments, the 125th Sbapa, as I said, attacked in the Suvalka ledge of the Berzhniki airfield. The nine attacked, bombed, even damaged one German plane and returned completely without loss. Another airfield was a Biala Podlaska, it was even later: from the 130th Sbap, too, one nine attacked, there are losses in Germans. The most interesting, Sat bombed from a height of 5 kilometers and nevertheless hit. According to German airfields, if there are objective, only two strikes were applied: one airfield in the Suvalksky protrusion, barriers, and one in the Biala Podlaska, it is in the Brest area, west.

Plan for the disposable part of the Air Force in the Baltic States

Despite these timid attacks, on June 22, the morning in the Baltic States and the meal in the area of \u200b\u200bSalkock and Brest, they were practical not effective (the loss of three aircraft cost nothing). However, the Germans have not used fighter aircraft after that in repeated attacks, but used it for the barrage and even produced an airfield maneuver, that is, the fighter shelves were transferred to their airfields so as not to be under the blow. This again says that the RKKA Airfield Airfield Airfields are acting in terms of covering the German airfield, we now understand, most airfields would attack empty, as there would be no German aircraft. Nevertheless, the actions themselves would attract German airplanes, respectively, did not give them the opportunity to attack Soviet airfields. And it happened: the shelves of the advanced Western Front were thrown away from the border before dinner on June 22, in the Baltic States the same process occurred after 2 hours. As soon as the departures were run out of German columns, most of the parts were moved to the Riga area, in the Daugavpils area, Mitava, that is, most airfields, and most of the airfields of the district were in a 20 km long, they were left and parts moved to distance 200- 250 km from the border. Accordingly, advanced divisions soviet troopswho still led the battles on the borders, completely lost support from the fighters. That is, if the bombers could still fly well with a bomb load, then fighters could not actually act from such a distance. The departure from the Baltic was asked before, and the commanders of all levels were asked about this, but there was a task to bomb the tank columns, and they still fulfilled these departures and only after that they were redesigned.

Approximately the same situation was in the Kiev Military District. The Germans also attacked throughout the period of the border actually advanced airfields, ranging from Covel to Lviv, along the border to Chernivtsi. The Germans had arrogance in confrontation with the Kiev Military District, having a limited amount of forces, even bomb Kiev. Neither Minsk was bombed on June 22, nor Riga bombed, but for some reason Kiev, although the Germans had very limited forces in the lane in the Kiev district. Kovbo himself had the most powerful Air Force, more than 2,000 aircraft, and most importantly, most of the fighter airlines of the Kiev district were precisely personnel, that is, they could resist German aircraft, which was done. The greatest losses of Luftwaffe suffered precisely in the lane of the Kiev Military District. For example, the 3rd group of the 51st bombarding squadron lost in the area of \u200b\u200bStanislav and Lviv, that is, they are 15 airplanes. 7 squadron of the 3rd group of the 55th squadron, which in the first departure 6 airplanes bombed the airfield in the Brody and Dubno area, from 6 flew planes 2 lost over the goal, 2 burned down (one fell in Soviet territory, one there landed on the airfield But burned), and two were damaged with the wounded arrows landed at the airfield in Klitentsy. That is, the Soviet Air Force also gave a fully defined answer in case the commanders have grabbed the determination to perform without the order from above. But, nevertheless, all the airfields were practically attacked, some airfields were simply defeated, for example, the airfield of the 62nd Shap Lysychic was attacked several times, and literally 50 aircraft were destroyed in the first departure. The Chernivtsi airfield was attacked twice, but even after the first combat departure, most of the 149th was destroyed. The next airfield was also attacked, most of the 247th JaP was destroyed, and the total losses somewhere reaching 100 aircraft.

It has been such an opinion that in Moldova, through some incredible tricks, the community of the district managed to avoid defeat due to the fact that they were dispersed on operational airfields. I want to say that this is a myth. The fact is that the Germans had a division with Romanians somewhere on the Meridian of Chisinau, and, accordingly, the German 4th Aviakorpus, which was based in Romania, he acted on airfields in the Chernivts region. A little west of Chisinau was the airfield of the 55th JaP, Balti, was several times attacked on June 22, and also suffered large losses that did not affect the reports, which gave the opportunity to write the officers of this district in memoirs, to piano themselves that they did it . Although, in fact, if their opponents were not Romanians, and the Germans most likely, the fate of the District Air Force would also be sad.

In the Kiev Military District, the Soviet parts practically did not move on airfields, only some divisions were departed on June 22, including from Chernivtsi. Why did this happen? In fact, the strip from Covel to Stanislav (from the Ukrainian side) is a rather undeveloped strip, and there was a problem with the airfields. Therefore, the Germans had airfields rather far from the border, and our nearest airfields in the Lviv area were somewhere 100 kilometers from the border. Accordingly, German aircraft were forced to act in some places on the full range of actions and it was not possible to achieve a decisive success on all airfields to the bombing. They suffered great losses.

The command of the Air Force, apparently, did not even try to make some conclusions. In addition, according to some reports, the commander of the FRONT FRONT PTUUhin was removed from the leadership, and, apparently, did not even participate in combat planning on June 22. At least there is no serious combat register.

Distribution Distribution Scheme on Western Front

If you take the Baltintians and the West Front, which at least attempted to act in German airfields in response, then there was no 9th Army in the South Front, although reconnaissance activities were conducted. If someone read the MEMUAR Tryshankina, there he describes the intelligence to Romanian airfields somewhere at lunch on June 22, when he flew, reported command, and he was told: "Sorry, we will have other goals." And the Air Force of the 9th Army after dinner received an order to bomb crossings on the prude, and from the Air Force of the South-Western Front 2, the regiment received the task of bombing German tank parts, which forced the Bug and attacked Vladimir-Volynsky. That's all.

That is, on June 22, by 18 o'clock, the Soviet Airfields in the Baltic States and Belarus were knocked out on the rear line of airfields, no practically fighting after 18.00 was already already, and the only thing that could, to barrage, patrol over their own airfields, cover it. Luftwaffe his deposits on the airfields somewhere later finished, in the area of \u200b\u200b20 hours, but it was already "in terms of" when the German scouts found that bypass on the rear line and tried to improve the next day to continue the operation. The same thing is in the strip of the southwestern front, the southern front. The enemy fully controlled the sky over the advanced lines, the RPC Air Force practically did not participate in patrolling over the boundaries, advanced parts, and the only thing that was - a blow to the German troops, which were transported through the Bug in the region of Vladimir Volynsky.

The Germans by their actions on June 22, especially in the first half of the day, provided their domination in the lane of the North-West and Western fronts somewhere at a distance of 200-250 km from the border, knocking out completely Soviet parts from there. They have not yet defeated completely, but defeated, and the territory remained behind the opponent. In the strip of the south-western front, many parts were also bouncer from their airfields, not all, but very many. When on June 23, the leadership of the South-Western Front was resumed, almost all parts were redeployed on, deep into the territory, 50-100 km, that is, in the area of \u200b\u200bTernopol, Rivne. There was a situation where somewhere 200 km from the borders of Soviet airlines was not. For a fighter 200 km at the time, it's just to fly and return back, there is no time for the air combat. Parts that were along the border have already lost their finishes. Conclusion: Due to its unique preparation, its technical capabilities, perseverance in achieving the goals, a competent plan, tactically competent actions of the Luftwaffe, unfortunately, managed to apply on June 22, the defeat of the RPC Air Force.

Loading ammunition

What can be positive aspects? The first: there was no affected mood, despite the fact that many are now trying to create some kind of drapet pilots running out generals. All this is obvious nonsense. Part of the North-West Air Force, and part of the Western Front Air Force retreated, having strictly receiving orders, but if they had retreated before without an order, they could save part of the forces, part of the funds. Soviet pilots did, as I think, everything is possible. There are confirmed episodes 4 or even 5 shots. Enough fierce battles occurred over the entire front line. However, the Germans were not "whipping boys," they received a very serious experience in Western Europe, and besides, if they tried to avoid serious combat clashes. As an example, these are the actions of the 1st German bombarding squadron against the airfield Liepaja. The 148th Fighter Aviation Regiment was based. Germans per day, applying such a simple reception as an occasion from the sea, destroyed and damaged the aircraft of this shelf in the day. German fighters were not there at all. Some serious air fights were not carried out for the reason that the Germans came, bombed and in the dive of the sea left. On and-153, it was very problematic to catch up with Yu-88. This was, at one time, one of theories of Solonin, when he found an operational summary of the North-Western Front, where it was written that the loss of 14 aircraft per day, and in the morning of the 23rd in Riga, there were 27 regiment aircraft. And he says: "Where did you share 30 cars?". In fact, due to the inconsistency of operational documents at the headquarters of the front, only the very first operational summary of the regiment or combat report came to the headquarters. After that, the battles began for Liepaja, respectively, the headquarters of the regiment began to move towards Riga, try to move away. Apparently, the data was not transferred, so that the headquarters of the front only the first encryption reached, which 14 destroyed aircraft mentioned. Then there were still losses, and the last loss was in the area of \u200b\u200b8 pm, when the Germans, apparently, got, at that moment, when the aircraft refuel was made, and destroyed almost a squadron. But this again says that the Germans did not cease to act. They had the success of the morning, they did not cease to develop him and, that was characteristic, attacked even the goals that were already abandoned by the Soviet units. Some airfields, for example, Vilnius, Kaunas, there were no other combat vehicles, there were no rear services, there were airplanes on which there were no pilots, or they were faulty, old and were subject to transfers to other parts. However, the Germans continued to dragging until the evening, thus losing pilots that could from other airfields to move there and pick up the match, such an opportunity. Luftwaffe did not assembled on June 22 to finish the struggle for dominance in the air, and what they managed, they were happy to continue on June 23, and began even earlier, about 3 am.

Part of the Soviet commanders understood this perfectly. Alexey Ivanovich ions, for example, as soon as he was allowed the possibility as soon as they completed the battle with the German mechanized parts, he left the regiment on the Dvina line. Even before the appearance of Directive No. 3, which implied the Soviet attack on Lublin, he already gave an order from the morning on June 23 to act according to the cover plan. Like pilots, regiments, squadrons were trying to counteract all day, as they could, the enemy, and at the level of the Commanders of the Air Force, people who perfectly understood in the situation were understood and tried to adequately react. Unfortunately, the toolkit, which was then there, did not allow it to be fully made. That is, fighting with the Luftwaffe, which was at that moment, it was almost impossible. Another point: from the first blows could be secure, to a certain extent, anti-aircraft artillery. Why did this happen? The Red Army was in the stage of reorganization, most of the anti-aircraft parts in the territory of Western Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States were in the formation stage. Many people remember the Soviet films, especially when accusations are prosecuted and say: why were your anti-aircraft divisions somewhere at the landfill? The answer is obvious: the zenithors spent combat skimming, because for most of the redarmers these parts it was the first year of service, and they still had to train. Again, the Red Army was not unmobilized, so regular divisions of anti-aircraft gunners, which were on each airfield, were not enough that they were not equipped and instead of 9 machine guns had only 3, well, the tightened plants "Maxim", but also felt the lack of personnel And to introduce many machine guns to actions simply had no one. Unlike again the Germans. The Luftwaffe had a completely different organization, and the anti-aircraft parts were in submission at the Wehrmacht, and less, most of the anti-aircraft parts and anti-aircraft guns were precisely subordinate to the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe command could build an umbrella over the location that they considered fit. Accordingly, the anti-aircraft divisions of the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht were in a combatic condition for the beginning of the war, had a huge number of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. If in the Soviet Union, about 1.5 thousand small-caliber anti-aircraft guns 25 and 37 mm, which practically did not have time to learn in the troops, because they were mostly released at the end of the 40th beginning of the 41st And just started to enter the troops. In addition, there was a very big problem, because there were very little ammunition to these anti-aircraft guns. All the documents that we looked are 1 BC in the part, and there were no 37-mm shells in the warehouses of the districts at all, as 85 mm - to severe anti-aircraft guns.

What could be done from this and why he was not done? Probably, the defeat was morally hard, therefore there was no serious analysis. Some Commanders of the compounds wrote the hottest figures of the reports, but they could not climb the situation, respectively, everyone had their own opinion, no one had previously analyzed, did not collected, but reports on combat actions of the South-Western Front, North-Western and Western They were made: southwestern - in August 1941, the Western Front - in general at the beginning of the 42nd. By this time, there were no people in the headquarters of the Western Front, which participated in all these events, that is, the reports are half, to be honest, nothing. The situation was not analyzed, the conclusions were not even closely made, why it happened this annoying cruel defeat. The in the afternoon, in 42-43 the Soviet Air Force fell on the same rake. There are no examples when the offensive to German airfields could end here this is the effect like a Luftwaffe. Throw, for example, parts of the Luftavaff from these airfields and conquer domination in the air over some area, even if local. That is, neither the tool was created, it seems to me even, he was not created all the war, some kind of adequate tool, nor technically prepared bombs some specialized. This lecture was intended in many respects to say that the story does not teach anyone. The fact that conclusions could be made and effectively follow the fighting - unfortunately, was not analyzed, did not materialize in the conclusions, instructions. The Red Army later, unfortunately, almost the entire war fell on the same rake. And such a serious operation, similar to those led by Luftwaffe, is not even remembered. The events of the Kursk battle are often quoted, allegedly there was something, but recent studies show that preparatory items, when attempts were attempts to destroy, and there were akin to crash, for example, attempts on June 25, 1941 to choose Finnish aviation fighting. The same: the lack of serious targeted intelligence, specialized ammunition, strike tactics. The Germans must be given due: they continued this operation, expanded, that is, on June 23-24-25, they chose Soviet aviation in this lane, somewhere 200-250 km. It was the last line, because, as we saw, the configuration of the border was new, the airfields were mainly built on these attached territories. And after that, in fact, the Soviet Air Force there was a paradoxical situation, they were forced to retreat to the Pskov district, Smolensk, Mogileva, Proskurovo, Kiev, and so on. The retreat was irreversible, huge spaces were no longer covered, and the Germans could do anything there. Soviet aviation was no longer there. Literally on the 26th, it began to relocate on an even more rear line for 400-500 km from the border, and the battles, in general, were still conducted. Lviv took on June 30, the fights for Riga were 27-28-29 June, Minsk, respectively, they also know everything when the ring of the environment was closed in late June. They lost air support, and everything because of the actions of Luftwaffe. This is not related to the affected moods, with reluctance to fight, with the lack of combat spirit, patriotism. In no case. People in the field did everything they could. They beat to the last opportunity, having that technique, that preparation. Many died heroic death. Most of the heroes we do not even know - the same Krivtsov himself, who first dropped the bombs into the German territory. He died in the 44th commander of the regiment, he was not even a hero of the Soviet Union. The same ions - it, unfortunately, was arrested on June 24 in a large group of aviation commanders. Completely unique fate in humans. He was a pilot in the first world war, then all the steps of the military career were held, commanded a squadron, a brigade for a very long time, the Academy graduated, participated in the Finnish campaign by the head of the 14th Army Air Force, adequately acted in the border battle. This person had a clear focus, a clear understanding of the essence of the first operation and in general, many processes. His talent lay even in the field of knowledge, but in the field of military art. Nevertheless, he was arrested and February 42, he was shot with a large group of commanders, although I believe that this man was worthy of becoming a marshal aviation and the Commander of the Red Army Air Force.

In conclusion, maybe I will add a spoonful of honey to our unbearable history. The only place where the Soviet Airfields managed to defend their airfields, and the whole month is Moldova. Moldova acted Romanians who were completely not such professionals as their colleagues in the Luftwaffe, plus they did not have such tools like the Luftwaffe, that is, technical training, ammunition, intelligence and so on. The first departures of Romanians were akin to Soviet. The Romanian Air Force, allocated for hostilities, all rushed into the Bulgarian airfield, it in the area of \u200b\u200bIzmail, just one Soviet fighter regiment 67th was based, and all day Romanians tried to bomb this regiment, attack, and eventually lost more than a dozen aircraft, Really confirmed by shot down. At the same time, the regiment himself lost Mizere: in the air of one pilot with an airplane, 5 aircraft damaged and two more pilots injured. That is, the entire day the regiment was fighting from all Romanian Air Force, in fact, and did not give the slightest opportunities to descend to the Roman patrician at least to do something. That is, all the groups were scattered, broken, suffered losses with minimal losses of the Red Army. In many ways - the role of personality. The head of the regiment headquarters has developed tactics, this is confirmed in documents and memoirs - patrolling by large groups over the airfield. He constantly kept over the airfield of one or two squadrons fully equipped, they replaced each other, and only single groups of aircraft could break through to the airfield, completely randomly, which could slip between patrols. Here is a story. If the 4th Aviakorpus Luftwaffe was acted not in parts of the south-western front in the area of \u200b\u200bChernivtsi, and came to Chisinau, Odessa, I think the outcome would be different. And so it allowed the Soviet units in the area of \u200b\u200bIzmail, Chisinau, Odessa to make their post on the beginning of victory action.

At 7 am on June 22, 1941, the German radio was read by the appeal of Adolf Hitler to the people of Germany:

"Burdened with heavy worries, doomed for the months of silence, I finally can speak freely. Hermann people! At this moment there is an offensive, on its scale comparable to the greatest who have ever seen the world. Today I decided to give the fate and the future of Reich and our people to our soldiers. May God help us in this struggle. "

A few hours before this statement, Hitler was reported that everything goes according to plan. Exactly at 3-30 am on Sunday on June 22, fascist Germany without declaring war attacked the Soviet Union.

June 22, 1941 ...

What do we know about this terrible day in the history of Russia?

"The first day of the Great Patriotic War", "Day of Mourning and Grief" is one of the saddest and saddes in the history of Russia. It was on this day that the Manic Adolf Hitler led to the execution of the ruthless and comprehensive plan for the destruction of the Soviet Union.

On June 22, 1941, at the dawn of the troops of fascist Germany without declaring the war attacked the borders of the Soviet Union and caused bombing air strikes on Soviet cities and military joints.

The invasion army according to some data numbered 5.5 million people, about 4,300 tanks and assault guns, 4980 combat aircraft, 47,200 guns and mortars.

The Great Leader of Peoples Joseph Stalin. Aggression agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union - in history is better known as molotov Pact - Ribbentrop, as well as a number of secret agreements and agreements with Germany lasted only 2 years. Sad and ambitious Hitler was cunning and far from Stalin, and at the first stages of the war, this advantage turned out to be a real catastrophe for the Soviet Union. To the attack and even more so for the war, the country was not ready.

It is difficult to accept the fact that Stalin, even after numerous reports of our intelligence on the Gitler's current plans, did not take proper measures. Did not recover, did not admonition, did not make sure personally. He remained calmly calm even when the decision on the war from the USSR and the general plan of the future campaign was announced by Hitler at a meeting with the highest military command of July 31, 1940, shortly after the victory over France. And Stalin the intelligence reported this ... What Stalin hoped - still remains the subject of disputes and discussions ...

P LAN HITLER was simple - the elimination of the Soviet state, the establishment of its wealth, the extermination of the main part of the population and the "Germanization" of the country's territory up to the Urals. The idea of \u200b\u200bthe attack on Russia, Hitler hatched long before the start of invasion planning. In his famous book "Main Campf", he published his ideas belonging to the so-called. Eastern lands (Poland and USSR). Peoples inhabiting them must be destroyed in order for the representatives of the Aryan race there.

Why did Stalin silent?

Despite the fact that the war from the first days became sacred and folk, Great Patriotic War Officially, it will become only after 11 days, it was after the Relief of Stalin to the people on July 3, 1941. Until now - from June 22 to July 3, the Soviet people did not hear their leader. Instead, the People's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov, announced the Soviet people at noon on June 22, 1941 on the beginning of the war with Germany - Vyacheslav Molotov. And in the following days, this appeal was already published in all newspapers with Stalin's portrait next to the text.

From the appeal of Molotova, I want to allocate one most interesting paragraph:

"This war is imposed on us by the German people, not the German workers, peasants and the intelligentsia, the suffering of which we are well understood, but by clicking the bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany, enslaved French, Chekhov, Polyakov, Serbs, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and others Peoples. "

Leningrad workers are listening to a message about the attack of fascist Germany to the Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti

It is clear that Molotov just read what was given to him. With the compilers of this "statement" there were other people ... After decades, we look at this statement more with reproach ...

This paragraph, as evidence that the power in the USSR perfectly understood who such fascists, but on unknown reasons, people in power decided to take pictures of innocent lambs, stood aside when Hitler was frozen on the whole head subordinate to Europe - the territory that was next to THE USSR.

The passivity of Stalin and the party, as well as the cowardly silence of the leader in the early days of the war, speaks many things ... In the realities of the modern world, the people would not forgive their silence to their leader. And then, at that time, not only closed her eyes, but also fought "for the homeland, for Stalin!"

The fact that Stalin did not appeal to the people immediately after the start of the war, immediately caused some bewilderment. The opinion is common that Stalin in the initial period of war constantly or for a long period was in an depressed state or in prostration. According to the memories of Molotov, Stalin did not want to express his position immediately, in conditions, when there was still little, it was clear.

Surprisingly and the very performance of Stalin when he gave status war - Great and Patriotic! It was after this appeal that the phrase "Great Patriotic War" entered the turnover, and in the text of the word "Great" and "Patriotic" used separately.

The speech begins in words: "Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Fighters of our army and fleet! I appeal to you, my friends! ".

Further, Stalin talks about a heavy position at the front, about the enemy areas, bombing of cities; He states: "Over our homeland hung a serious danger." He rejects the "invincibility" of the German-fascist army, while leading as an example of the defeat of the Army of Napoleon and Wilhelm II. The failures of the first days of the war are explained by the favorable position of the German army. Stalin denies the fact that the conclusion of the non-aggression pact was a mistake - it helped to provide a year and a half peace.

The question is then risen: "What is required to eliminate the danger that hung over our homeland, and what measures should be taken to defeat the enemy?". First of all, Stalin proclaims the need for all Soviet people to "realize the depth of danger that threatens our country" and mobilize; emphasizes that we are talking about the life and death of the Soviet state, about the life and death of the peoples of the USSR, about being to be the peoples of the Soviet Union free or fall into enslave. "

Evaluating the performance of Stalin, V. V. Putin said:

"At the most critical moments of our history, our people turned around their roots, to moral fundamentals, religious values. And you remember well when the Great Patriotic War began, the first one who said this to the Soviet people was Molotov who appealed "Citizens and Citizens." And when Stalin performed, despite his all his hard, if not to say a brutal policy against the church, he turned completely differently - "brothers and sisters". And there was a huge sense in this, because such an appeal is not just words.

It was an appeal to the heart, to the soul, to the story, to our roots, in order to outlines, firstly, the tragedy of the events occurring, and secondly, to encourage people, mobilize them to protect their homeland.

And so it was always when we came across any difficulties and problems, even in the time of atheistic, nevertheless, without these moral foundations, the Russian people could not do. "

So, on June 22, 1941 - "Day of Memory and Grief" - what else we know about this day - short:

The name "Great Patriotic War" was born by analogy with the Patriotic War of 1812.

Directive No. 21 "Barbarossa version" - that is how officially called the attack plan for the USSR, was adopted and signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. According to the plan, Germany was supposed to "defeat Soviet Russia during the same short-term campaign." Therefore, on the first day of the war in the USSR, more than 5 million German soldiers were "dropped from the chain". According to plan, the main cities of the USSR - Moscow and Leningrad should have been massive attacked on the 40th day of the war.

In war against the Soviet Union, the Army of the Allies of Germany - Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria participated.

Bulgaria did not declare the War of the USSR and the Bulgarian soldiers did not participate in the war against the USSR (although Bulgaria's participation in the occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia and military operations against the Greek and Yugoslav partisans released German divisions to send to the Eastern Front). In addition, Bulgaria has submitted to the German military command of all major airfields and ports of Varna and Burgas (which the Germans used for the supply of troops on the Eastern Front).

The Russian Liberation Army (ROA) under the command of General Vlasov A. A. also performed on the side of Nazi Germany, although the Wehrmacht was not included.

On the side of the Third Reich also used national formations from natives of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia -Balon Bergmann, Georgian Legion, Azerbaijan Legion, North Caucasian SS detachment.

Hungary did not immediately take part in the attack on the USSR, and Hitler did not require direct assistance from Hungary. However, the Hungarian ruling circles convinced the need to join Hungary in the war in order to prevent the resolution of the territorial dispute to the Hitler about Transylvania in favor of Romania.

Clear Spaniards.

In the fall of 1941, the fighting on the side of Germany began the so-called Blue Division from Spanish volunteers.

Not wanting to open Spain to the second world war on the side of Hitler and at the same time, seeking to strengthen the phalanxi regime and ensure the security of the country, Francisco Franco has taken the position of armed neutrality, providing Germany on the Eastern Front Division of Volunteers who wished to fight on the side of the Germans against the Soviet Union. De Yura Spain retained neutrality, he did not enter the allies of Germany and the War of the USSR did not declare. The division has gained its name on blue shirts - the form of phalange.

Foreign Minister Suncher, announced on June 24, 1941 on the formation of the "Blue Division", said that the USSR was guilty of the Spanish Civil War, that this war was dragging, in the fact that there were mass executions that there were extrajudicial reprisals. In agreement with the Germans, the oath was changed - they did not swear to the Führer, but performed fighters against communism.

Motivations from volunteers were different: from the desire to take revenge for those who died in the civil war close to the desire to hide (former Republicans, they, as a rule, were subsequently the bulk of the sides of the Soviet army later). There were people who sincerely desired to redeem their republican past. Many were guided by mercenary considerations - The servicemen of the divisions were decent at the time of the sorry in Spain, plus the sorrows German (respectively 7.3 pees from the Spanish government and 8.48 peashes from the German command per day)

The 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps of the SS General Background, and other Cossack parts fought as part of the army of Nazi Germany. In order to substantiate the use of Cossacks in the Armed Fight on the side of Germany, the "Theory" was developed, according to which the Cossacks were declared descendants of the sharp. And this is despite the fact that the isgotes are an ancient German tribe, which constituted the eastern branch of the Gothic tribal association, unpacked by the middle of the III century into two tribal groups: Visigoths and sharp. They are considered one of the distant ancestors of modern Italians.

The protection of the state border of the USSR at the time of the attack numbered only about 100 thousand people.

One of the first to suffered the city of Brest and the famous Brest Fortress-hero. Commander of the German 2nd Tank Army Center "Center" Geinz Guderian He writes in his diary: "Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they are not suspected of our intentions. In the courtyard of the Brest fortress, which was viewed from our observation points, they spent the sounds of Karaulov under the sounds of the orchestra. Coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not busy with Russian troops. "

According to the plan, the fortress should be seized for 12 o'clock in the first day of the war. The fortress was taken only on 32 days of war. One of the inscriptions in the fortress is reading: "I'm dying, but I do not give up. Goodbye homeland. 20 / VII-41. "

Curious fact:

It is noteworthy that on September 22, 1939, a joint solemn parade of Wehrmacht and RKKA was held through the streets of Brest. All this was held during the official procedure for the transfer of the city of Brest and the Brest fortress by the Soviet side during the invasion of Poland in Germany and the USSR. The procedure ended with a solemn descent of Germanic and raising Soviet flags.

The historian Mikhail Meltyukhov notes that at this time Germany tried in every way to show England and France that the USSR is her ally, while in the USSR itself in every way they tried to emphasize their "neutrality". This neutrality will turn the USSR to the re-fall of the Brest Fortress, though a little later - on the first day of the war on June 22. And only a year later, it will be aware of the defenders of the Brest Fortress and their unshakable resistance - from the reports of German soldiers about the fights in Brest.

German troops invaded the territory of the USSR

In fact, in fact, the war began on the evening of June 21 - in the north of the Baltic, where the implementation of the Barbaross Plan began. That evening, German mine barrels, based in Finnish ports, put two large mine fields in the Gulf of Finland. These mine fields were able to locate the Soviet Baltic fleet in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland.

And already on June 22, 1941, at 03 hours of 06 minutes, the head of the Black Sea Fleet Council Council Admiral I. D. Eliseev ordered to open fire on fascist aircraft who invaded the USSR airspace than and entered the story: it was the very first combat order to fight the fascists who attacked us in the Great Patriotic War.

Time began, the beginning of the war - 4 o'clock in the morning, when the Imperial Foreign Minister Ribbentrop presented the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin Deanozov Note about the announcement of the war, although we know that the attack on the USSR began before.

In addition to the appeal to the Molotov to the people on the day of the announcement of war on June 22, the Soviet man's voice remembered the most popular voice of another person - the voice of the famous radio operator Yu. Levitan, who also told the Soviet people about the German attack on the USSR. Although in the people for many years there was a conviction that Levitan was the first to read the message of the beginning of the war, in reality this course of the French Foreign Affairs Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, and Levitan repeated him after a while.

It is noteworthy that such marshals like Zhukov and Rokossovsky in their memoirs also wrote that the first message was transferred by the announcer Yuri Levitan. So this is the championship and preserved for Levitan.

From the memories of Speaker Yuri Levitan:

"Call from Minsk:" enemy aircraft over the city "call from Kaunas:

"The city is burning, why don't you pass anything on the radio?", "Over Kiev enemy aircraft." Female crying, excitement: "War really? .." Nevertheless, no official posts before 12:00 Moscow time is not transmitted.

On the third day of the war - June 24, 1941, the Soviet Information Bureau was created with the aim of "... Lighting in print and on radio international events, military actions at the fronts and the life of the country."

Every day, throughout the war, millions of people have been drove away from radio receivers with the words of Yuri Levitan "from the Soviet Informburo ...". General Chernyakhovsky once said: "Yuri Levitan could replace a whole division."

Adolf Hitler announced his personal enemy number one and promised to "hang as soon as the Wehrmacht goes to Moscow." For the head of the first speaker of the Soviet Union, a remuneration was even promised - 250 thousand brands.

At 5:30. Morning June 22 in German Radio ReichSmin Propaganda Goebbels Reads appeal Adolf Hitler To the German people in connection with the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union: "Now it has come for an hour when the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warstores of war and the Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik Center in Moscow are also needed to oppose this conspiracy ...

At the moment, the magnitude of the troops on its length and volume is carried out, which only seen the world ... The task of this front is no longer the protection of individual countries, but ensuring the safety of Europe and thereby salvation of all. "

On June 22, he has known two more speeches - Adolf Hitler to the German people on the radio on the occasion of the attack on the USSR, where he exiled the causes of the attack ... and the presentation of the oldest enemy of the Communism Winston Churchill on the Air Force Radio Station.

The most interesting excerpts from this speech:

1. "At 4 o'clock this morning, Hitler attacked Russia.

All of its usual treachery formalities were observed with scrupulous accuracy. Between the countries, a solemnly signed non-aggression agreement was operated. Under the cover of his false guarantees, the German troops lined up their enormous forces in a line stretching from white to the Black Seas, and their air force and armored divisions slowly and methodically occupied positions. Then suddenly, without a declaration of war, even without an ultimatum, the German bombs fell from the sky to Russian cities, the German troops broke the Russian borders, and the hour later the Ambassador of Germany, who literally generously broke his assurances of his assurances in friendship and almost union was a visit Russian foreign minister and stated that Russia and Germany are in a state of war. "

2. "All this did not become a surprise to me.

In fact, I clearly and clearly warned Stalin about the upcoming events. I warned him as before that warned others. It remains only to hope that my signals were not left unattended. All I know at the current moment - the Russian people protect their native land and its leaders called for resistance to the last. "

3. "Hitler is an evil monster,

insatiable blood and robbery in his thirst. Not satisfied with the fact that all Europe is either under his fifth, or intimidated to the state of humiliated obedience, he now wants to continue the slaughter and emptying in the endless spaces of Russia and Asia ... no matter how poor Russian peasants, workers and soldiers, he must steal their ugly bread . He must ruin their pashnya. He should take away their oil, which leads to the movement of their plow, and thus bring hunger, the examples of humanity did not know. And even a bloody slaughter and ruin, which in the case of his victory (although he has not yet won) threaten to Russian people, will only be a step towards trying to plunge four or five hundred million living in China and 350,000,000 living in India to this bottomless puchin of human degradation in India The devilish emblem of the Swastika is proudly fluttered. "

4. Nazi regime is indistinguishable from the worst features of communism.

It is devoid of any foundations and principles, except for a hated appetite for racial domination. It is sophisticated in all forms of human malice, in efficient cruelty and fierce aggression. No one has been a more resistant opponent of communism over the past 25 years than me. I will not take the wrong words back. But all this pale in front of the spectacle, unfolding now.

Past, with his crimes, madness and tragedies, retreats.

I see Russian soldiers, as they stand on the border of their native land and protect the fields that their fathers plow from time immemorial. I see how they guard their homes; Their mother and wives pray - oh yeah, because at such a time everyone prayes to preserve their loved ones, about the return of the breadwinner, patron, his defenders.

I see all ten thousand Russian villages, where the means to existence with such luck was broken by the Earth, but there are also original human joys, girls laugh and play children, and on all this comes in a disgusting, mad attack Nazi military car with its tickling heels , embarrassing weapons, dressed with a needle by Prussian officers, with her skillful secret agents, just pacified and tens of dozens of countries. "

5. "My mind comes back years ago

in the days when Russian troops were our ally against the same deadly enemy when they fought with great courage and hardness and helped to win, the fruits of which they, alas, were not given to take advantage, although not in our fault ...

We have only one-only goal and one constant task. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime. Nothing can dismiss us from it. Nothing. We will never negotiate, we will never discuss the conditions with Hitler or with any of his gangs. We will fight him on land, we will fight him to the sea, we will fight him in the air, while you do not save the earth with God's shadow and do not free the peoples from his yoke.

Anyone or state fighting against Nazism will receive our help. Anyone or state marching with Hitler is our enemies.

Consequently, we must have Russia and the Russian people all the assistance as they can. We must call all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to adhere to the same course and spend it as fast and steadily, as we will do it, until the very end.

We have already suggested that the Government of Soviet Russia any technical or economic assistance that we are able to provide and which may be useful to him. We will bomb Germany and the day and night, in an increasing scale, throwing out of the month of the month a month, more difficulty bombs, so that the German people himself took an increasing portion of those misfortunes that they have wrapped in humanity. "

6. "I can't talk about the actions of the United States on their behalf,

but I will say the following: If Hitler imagined that his attack on Soviet Russia will cause at least the slightest discrepancy in order to destroy the efforts of our great democracies, the complete determination to destroy it, he is regrettably mistaken ... Now there is no time to moralize the errors of countries and governments that allowed self one, while the united efforts they could easily save themselves and the whole world from this catastrophe ... "

7. "Motive Hitler is much deeper.

He wants to destroy the power of Russia, because it hopes in case of luck, turn back from the east the main forces of your army and the air fleet to our island, because he knows that he will have to either win him or pay for his crimes.

The attack on Russia is no more than the prelude to an attempt to conquer the British Isles. Without a doubt, he hoped that all this would be able to complete before the onset of winter, and that he could crush the UK before the fleet and the air force of the United States could intervene.

He hopes that it will be able to repeat again in an even larger scale than ever earlier, the very process of destroying his opponents, who for so long allowed him to flourish and gracious, and that in the end the scene will be cleared for the last act, without which everything His conquest will be in vain - namely, the subordination of the entire Western hemisphere of his will and his system.

Therefore, the danger, threatening Russia, is a threat to us and the threat to the United States, and the case of each Russian, which fights for their home and the focus is a matter of all free people and peoples in all parts of the globe. "

June 22 a special day for Russia and all the peoples of the former USSR. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War - 1417 days of the terrible war in the history of mankind.

This day reminds us of all those killed in the battles, tortured in the fascist captive, who died in the rear from hunger and deprivation. We grieve for all who fulfilled the holy duty to the cost of their lives, protecting our Fatherland in those harsh years.

Vyacheslav Molotov, People's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the USSR:

"Advisor of the German ambassador Hilger, when he handed a note, was slandered."

Anastas Mikoyan, Member Politburo Central Committee:

"Immediately members of the Politburo gathered from Stalin. We decided to make a speech on the radio in connection with the beginning of the war. Of course, suggested that Stalin. But Stalin refused - let Molotov speak. Of course, it was a mistake. But Stalin was in such an depressed state that he did not know what to say to the people. "

Lazar Kaganovich, Member of Politburo Central Committee:

"At night, we gathered from Stalin, when Molotov took Shulebourg. Stalin, each of us gave a task - to me on transport, Mikoyan - on supply. "

Vasily Pronin, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Mossovet:

"On June 21, 1941, in the tenth hour of the evening, with the secretaries of the Moscow Committee of the Party, Shcherbakov called to the Kremlin. As soon as we sat down like, turning to us, Stalin said: "According to intelligence and mining, German troops intend to attack our borders today. Apparently, war begins. Do you have everything ready in urban air defense? Report! " At about 3 o'clock in the morning we were released. Twenty minutes later we arrived at home. The gates were waiting for us. "Called from the Central Committee of the party," said the meeting, "and instructed to convey: the war began and need to be in place."

• Georgy Zhukov, Pavel Batov and Konstantin Rokossovsky
• RIA News

Georgy Zhukov, General Army:

"At 4:30 in the morning, I came to the Kremlin with S.Timoshenko. All caused members of the Politburo were already assembly. I was invited to the office.

I.V. Stalin was pale and sat at the table, holding a tube in his hands that was not tobacco.

We reported to the situation. I.V. Stalin wonderingly said:

"Is it a provocation of German generals?"

"The Germans bomb our cities in Ukraine, in Belarus and the Baltic States. What kind of provocation is ... "- answered S.K. Vymoshenko.

... after a while in the office quickly entered V.M. Molotov:

"The German government has declared war on us."

I.V.Stalin silently dropped to the chair and thought deeply.

There was a long, durable pause. "

Alexander Vasilevsky,major General:

"At 4 o'clock and minutes, we became aware of the operational bodies of the district headquarters on the bombing of the German aviation of our airfields and cities."

Konstantin Rokossovsky,lieutenant-General:

"About four o'clock in the morning on June 22 upon receipt of a telephone program from the headquarters was forced to operate a special secret operational package. The directive indicated: immediately bring the body into combat readiness and speak in the direction of Rovno, Lutsk, Kovel. "

Ivan Bagramyan, Colonel:

"... The first blow to German aviation, although it turned out to be unexpected for troops, did not cause panic. In a difficult atmosphere, when everything that could burn was, the barracks, residential buildings, warehouses were collapsed in front of the eyes, the commanders were made to maximize efforts to preserve the leadership for troops. They firmly followed the fighting prescriptions that they became known after the opening of the packages stored. "

Semen Budnya, Marshal:

"At 4:01 22.06.41, I called the People's Comrade Tymoshenko, I called me that the Germans bombed Sevastopol and whether to report to Comrade Stalin about it? I told him that I should immediately report, but he said: "Call you!" I immediately called and reported not only about Sevastopol, but also about Riga, which the Germans also bombed. Tov. Stalin asked: "Where is the drug addict?" I replied: "Here with me nearby" (I was already in the office of the People's Commissar). Tov. Stalin ordered to give him a tube ...

So the war began! "

• RIA News

Joseph Gabibo, deputy commander of the regiment of the 46th IAP, wrapping:

"... I got cold in my chest. Four two double-door bomber with black crosses on wings. I even bit my lip. Why is it "junkers"! German bombers Yu-88! What to do? .. Another thought arose: "Today, Sunday, and on Sundays, Germans do not happen." Outlook, war? Yes, war! "

Nikolai Osinsev, Head of the Department of Division of the 188th Zenith-Artillery Regiment of the Red Army:

"On the 22nd, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the sounds were heard: boom-boom boom boom. It turned out that this German aviation unexpectedly flew to our airfields. Our aircraft did not have time to change these airfields and remained everything in their places. They were almost destroyed. "

Vasily Chelombyko, Head of the 7th Department of the Academy of Armored and Mechanized Troops:

"On June 22, our regiment stopped at rest in the forest. Suddenly we see the planes fly, the commander declared an academic alarm, but unexpectedly the aircraft began to bomb us. We realized that the war began. Here, in the forest at 12 o'clock in the afternoon, we were listened to. Molotov on the radio and on the same day at noon received the first combat order of Chernyakhov about the speech of the division forward, towards Šiauluyu. "

Jacob Boyko, Lieutenant:

"Today, i.e. 06/22/41, day off. While I wrote a letter to you, suddenly hear on the radio that the abandoned Hitler's fascism bombed our cities ... But it will cost them expensive, and Hitler will no longer live in Berlin ... I have only one in the shower now Hate and desire to destroy the enemy where he came from ... "

Petr Kotelnikov, Defender of the Brest Fortress:

"In the morning we woke up a strong blow. Thought the roof. I stunned. I saw the wounded and killed, I understood: it is no longer a teaching, but war. Most soldiers of our barracks died in the first seconds. I, after adults, rushed to weapons, but the rifles did not give me. Then I rushed with a worm warehouse with one of the redarmeys. "

Timofey Dombrovsky, Red Armenian machine gunner:

"The airplanes watered us with fire from above, artillery - mortars, heavy, light guns - downstairs on earth, and all at once! We lay on the shore of Bug, where everyone came from what was happening on the opposite shore. Everyone immediately understood what was happening. The Germans attacked - War! "

Culture figures of the USSR

• Distorter of All-Union Radio Yuri Levitan

Yuri Levitan, announcer:

"When in the early morning of us, speakers, called on the radio, have already begun calls to distribute. Call from Minsk: "enemy airplanes over the city," call from Kaunas: "The city burns, why don't you pass anything on the radio?", "Over Kiev enemy airplanes." Female crying, excitement: "War really"? .. And now I remember - turned on the microphone. In all cases, I remember myself that I was worried only internally, only internally worried. But here, when I deliberate the words "says Moscow", I feel that I can not speak, I'm stuck a lump in my throat. From the hardware already knocking - "Why are silent? Continue! " Slugged fists and continued: "Citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union ..."

Georgy Knyazev, director of the archive of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Leningrad:

The radio was sent by V.M. Molotov about the attack on the Soviet Union of Germany. The war began at 4 1/2 in the morning attack by German aviation for Vitebsk, Kovno, Zhytomyr, Kiev, Sevastopol. There are killed. The Soviet troops delivered the order to repel the enemy, expel it from the limits of our country. And the heart flopped. So he, the moment we were afraid to even think about. Ahead ... who knows what ahead! "

Nikolay Mordvinov, actor:

"The rehearsal of Makarenko was ... Anovov was broken without permission ... and an alarming, a deaf voice reports:" War with fascism, comrades! "

So, the most terrible front opened!

Mount! Mount! "

Marina Tsvetaeva, Poet:

Nikolay Punin, historian of arts:

"They remembered the first impressions of the war ... Molotov's speech, which he told the run-off with rash hair (sabotaged) in the Black Shelkov Chinese Galate A.A. . (Anna Andreevna Akhmatova)».

Konstantin Simonov, Poet:

"That war has already begun, I found out only two hours in the afternoon. All morning, June 22 wrote poems and did not fit the phone. And when it came up, the first thing I heard: War.

Alexander Tvardovsky, Poet:

"War with Germany. I'm going to Moscow. "

Olga Bergolts, Poet:

Russian emigrants

• Ivan Bunin
• RIA News

Ivan Bunin, writer:

"22nd of June. From the new page I write the continuation of this day - a great event - Germany today announced the war of Russia - and Finns and Romanians already "invaded" in "limits".

Peter Makhrov, Lieutenant-General:

"The day of the war announcement by the Germans of Russia, June 22, 1941, so strongly affected everything that was for another day, the 23rd (22nd was Sunday), I sent a registered letter to the Bogomolov [Soviet ambassador in France], asking him Send me to Russia to enroll in the army, at least ordinary. "

Citizens of the USSR

• Residents of Leningrad are listening to a message about the attack of fascist Germany to the Soviet Union
• RIA News

Lydia Chalks:

"We drilled dranke in the yard to cover the roof. The kitchen window was open, and we heard how the radio was announced that the war began. Father froze. Hands sank: "The roof, apparently, no longer completed ...".

Anastasia Nikitina Arshinova:

"Early in the morning we woke us up a terrible rumble. Shells rushed, bombs, squeezed fragments. I, grabbing children, barefoot ran into the street. We barely had time to grab something from clothes. On the street reigned horror. Above the fortress (Brest) Airplanes circled and dumped bombs on us. Women and children rushed around in a panic, trying to escape. In front of me lay the wife of one lieutenant and her son - both killed a bomb. "

Anatoly Krivenko:

"We lived near Arbat, in the Big Afanasyevsky lane. That day the sun was not, the sky was tightened with clouds. I walked in the courtyard with boys, we chased the rag ball. And here my mom jumped out of the entrance in one combination, barefoot, runs and shouts: "Home! Tolya, immediately home! War!"

Nina Shinkareva:

"We lived in the village in the Smolensk region. That day, Mom went to the neighboring village behind eggs and butter, and when he returned, dad and other men had already gone to the war. On the same day, residents began to evacuate. A large car arrived, and Mom put on us with my sister all the clothes, which was that in the winter, too, what to wear. "

Anatoly Vastrosh:

"We lived in the village of Pokrov in the Moscow region. On that day, the guys and the guys were going to catch karas on the river. Mother caught me on the street, said at first it was. I went to the house, went. When I began to smear the honey on bread, the Molotov message rang about the beginning of the war. After a meal, I ran away with the boys on the river. We rushed in the bushes, shouted: "The war began! Hooray! We will win all! " We absolutely did not understand what it all means. Adults discussed the news, but I do not remember that the village was panic or fear. Rustic engaged in habitual affairs, and on this day, and the following dackets came to the following from the cities. "

Boris Vlasov:

"In June 1941 he came to Eagle, where they were distributed immediately after the end of the Hydrometeorological Institute. On the night of June 22, I spent the night at the hotel, as things in the reserved apartment could not have time to transport. In the morning I heard some kind of crayon, and the alarm has slept. On the radio announced that an important government message will be transferred at 12 o'clock. Here I realized that I was not a study, but a fighting alarm - a war began. "

Alexandra Komarnitskaya:

"I rested in a children's camp near Moscow. There, the leadership of the camp declared us that the war began with Germany. All-owned and children started crying. "

Ninel Karpova:

"Message about the beginning of the war we listened to the reproductor on the home of defense. There are many people crowded. I was not upset, on the contrary I was infused: my father will defend his homeland ... In general, people were not afraid. Yes, women, of course, were upset, cried. But the panic was not. Everyone was sure that we would quickly defeat the Germans. Men said: "Yes, the Germans will divert from us!"

Nikolay Chebkykin:

"June 22 - it was Sunday. Sunny such day! And my father and my father, shovels dug in potatoes. About twelve hours. Somewhere in five minutes, my sister, my Shura opens the window and says: "On the radio passes:" Now a very important government message will be transferred! " Well, we put shovels and went to listen. It spoke Molotov. And he said that the German troops, treacherously, without the announcement of war attacked our country. Moved the state border. The Red Army leads heavy battles. And he finished with the words: "Our business is right! The enemy will be broken! Victory will be ours!".

German generals

• RIA News

Guderian:

"In the outstanding day of June 22, 1941 at 2 hours and 10 minutes in the morning I went to the team center of the group and rose to the observational tower of south of Bogukali. At 3 o'clock 15 minutes, our artillery preparation began. At 3 hours and 40 minutes - The first raid of our dive bombers. At 4 hours and 15 minutes began crossing the Bug of the advanced parts of the 17th and 18th tank divisions. At 6 o'clock 50 minutes, I cried on the assault boat through the Bug. "

"On June 22, at three o'clock and minutes, four corps of the tank group with the support of artillery and aviation, which included the 8th aircraft corps, crossed the state border. Bombarding aviation hit the opponent airfields, having a task to paralyze the actions of its aviation.

On the first day, the offensive was completely in terms of plan. "

Manstein:

"On this first day we had to get acquainted with the methods that the war was carried out from the Soviet side. One of our intelligence doses, cut off by the enemy, was then found by our troops, it was cut and brutally crossed. My adjutant and I drove a lot to areas in which there could still be part of the enemy, and we decided not to surrender in the hands of this opponent. "

Blovenitt:

"The behavior of Russians even in the first battle is strikingly distinguished from the behavior of the Poles and Allies, who suffered a defeat on the Western Front. Even being in the rings of the environment, the Russians were defended. "

German soldiers and officers

• www.nationaalarchief.nl.

Erich Mela, Ober Lieutenant:

"My commander was twice as older than me, and he had to fight Russian under Narva in 1917, when he was in the rank of lieutenant. "Here, on these endless expanses, we will find our death as Napoleon ... - He did not hide pessimism. "Mende, remember this hour, it marks the end of the former Germany."

Johann Danzer, artillery:

"On the very first day, barely only we went to the attack, as one of our shot from our own weapons. Climbing the rifle between the knees, he put the trunk in his mouth and pressed on the descent. So for him ended the war and all the horrors associated with it. "

Alfred Durwanger, Lieutenant:

"When we entered into the first battle with the Russians, they clearly did not expect us, but they could not be called unprepared. Enthusiasm (we have) It was not in mom! Rather, everyone gained a sense of the grandeur of the upcoming campaign. And then the question arose: where, at what locality does this campaign be completed?! "

Governor Becker, Lieutenant:

"It was a sultry summer day. We walked around the field, I suspected anything. Suddenly the artillery fire fell on us. So it happened my fighting baptism - a strange feeling. "

Gelmut Pabst, Unter-Officer

"The offensive continues. We are continuously moving forward through the enemy territory, you have to constantly change the positions. I want to drink terribly. No time swallow a piece. By 10 in the morning we were already experienced, firedly fighters, have managed to see a lot of things: thrown by the enemy position, bored and burnt tanks and cars, the first prisoners, the first Russian killed. "

Rudolf GSHEPF, Capellan:

"This gigantic in power and coverage of the territory of art preparation resembled an earthquake. Everywhere there were visible huge smoke mushrooms, instantly expressing out of the ground. Since there was no speech about which response fire, it seemed to us that we were generally erased this citadel from the face of the earth. "

Hans Becker, Tanker:

"On the Eastern Front, I met people who can be called a special race. Already the first attack turned on the battle not for life, but for death. "

Right holder illustration Ria Novosti. Image Caption. Semyon Tymoshenko and Georgy Zhukov knew everyone, but took secrets in the grave

Until the very beginning of the war and in the first hours after him, Joseph Stalin did not believe in the possibility of the German attack.

The fact that the Germans cross the border and bomb the Soviet cities, he learned about 4 am on June 22 from the head of the General Staff George Zhukov.

According to Zhukovsky "memories and reflections", the leader did not respond to the heard, but only heavily breathed into the tube, and after a long pause, he was limited to the fact that Zhukov and the People's Commissar of Defense Semenu Tymoshenko go to the Kremlin's meeting.

In the prepared, but not spoken speech at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in May 1956, Zhukov argued that Stalin had banned the fire on the enemy.

At the same time, Stalin in May-June secretly transferred to the western border of 939 echelons with troops and technicians, under the guise of educational fees called 801 thousand reservists from stock, and on June 19, the secret order reorganized the border military districts into the fronts, which was always done exclusively a few days before The start of hostilities.

"The transfer of troops was planned with the calculation of the concentration from June 1 to July 10, 1941. The disposal of the arrangement of the fork was influenced by the offensive nature of the planned actions," said the published Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in 1992 by the collective monograph "1941 - lessons and conclusions."

There is a legitimate question: what is the reason for the tragedy on June 22? Usually called "errors" and "miscalculations" of the Soviet leadership. But with attentive consideration, some of them are not naive misconceptions, but a consequence of thoughtful measures to prepare a proactive impact and subsequent offensive actions, Vladimir Danilov, historian

"Suddenness was, but only tactical. Ahead of us Hitler!" - stated in the 1970s Vyacheslav Molotov writer Ivan Stadnieku.

"The trouble was not in the absence of plans we were - the plans were!" And the fact that a suddenly changed setting did not allow them to perform, "Alexander Vasilevsky reported in the article written to the 20th anniversary of the victory, but seen the light only at the beginning of 90. -H.

Not "Motion Rezun", and the President of the Academy of Military Sciences General Army Mahmoud Gareev said: "If the plans of defensive operations were, then there would be a group of forces and funds, the management and echelonization of material reserves would be built in a different way. But this Not done in the border military districts. "

"The main miscalculation of Stalin and his wines was not that the country was not prepared for defense (she did not prepare for her), but in the fact that it was not possible to accurately determine the moment. A proactive blow to our Fatherland Millions of lives and perhaps He would have led to the same political results to which the country was broken, hungry, lost the color of the nation, came in 1945, "said the director of the Institute of History of Ran Academician Andrei Sakharov.

Clearly conscious of the inevitability of the collision with Germany, the leadership of the USSR before June 22, 1941 did not see himself in the role of the victim, did not guess with the dying heart, "they will not attack - they will not attack," and it worked hard to start the war in a favorable moment and spend her "Malaya Blood in someone else's territory. " With this, according to most researchers. The difference in detail, dates and, mainly, in moral estimates.

Right holder illustration Ria Novosti. Image Caption. The war was killed unexpectedly, although the premonition of Vital in the air

In this tragic day, on the eve and immediately after him, amazing things were going on, not laid down in the logic of preparation for defense, nor in the logic of preparation for the offensive.

It is not, based on documents and evidence of the participants of the events of the explanation, and it is unlikely to appear. There are only more or less believable guesses and versions.

Son Stalin

At about midnight, on June 22, having consistent and allowing Tymoshenko and Zhukov to send a contradictory document to the border districts for their signatures, known as the "Directive No. 1", the leader left the Kremlin to the nearby country.

When Zhukov called a message about the attack, the guard said that Stalin was sleeping and did not say to wake himself, so the head of the General Staff had to shrink on him.

The widespread belief that the USSR was waiting for the attacks of the enemy, and only then planned the offensive, it would not take into account that in this case the strategic initiative would be given to the opponent's hands, and Soviet troops were put in the obviously unfavorable conditions Mikhail Meltejukhov, a historian

Saturday June 21 passed in incredible tension. With the border flow, there were reports that the approaching roar of motors comes with the German side.

After at 13:00, German soldiers read the order of the Fuhrer, two or three Communist's Delets were overpowered by the Bug to warn Kamaraden: today at night it will begin. By the way, another mystery is that it is not known to us about these people who would have to become in the USSR and the GDR Heroes.

Stalin spent a day in the Kremlin in the Society of Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and Mehlis, analyzing the incoming information and discussing how to be.

Suppose he doubtedly in the data obtained and did not take concrete steps. But as you could lie to bed, without waiting for the junction when the account was going on the clock? Moreover, the person who had the habit even on the everyday calm atmosphere to work until dawn and sleep before lunch?

Plan and Directive

In the headquarters of the Soviet troops in the Western direction before the divisions, there were included detailed and clear covert plans that were kept in the "red packages" and were subject to execution on obtaining an appropriate order of the defense addict.

Cover plans differ from strategic military plans. This is a set of measures to ensure mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces in the event of a threat of a proactive strike of the enemy (a personnel of fortifications, anticipation of artillery on tan hazard directions, lifting parts of aviation and air defense, intelligence activation).

The introduction of a cover plan is not a war, but fighting alarm.

During the two-hour meeting, started at 20:50 June 21, Stalin did not allow Tymoshenko and Zhukov to make this necessary and obvious step.

Directive completely knocked troops on the border of Konstantin Pleshakov, historian

In exchange, the famous "Directive number 1" was sent to the border districts, in which, in particular, it was said: "During the 22nd and 23 June, the sudden attack of the Germans is possible. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions [...] at the same time be in Full combat readiness to meet a possible blow [...] of other events without a special order not to hold. "

How can I "meet a blow," without conducting events provided for by the cover plan? How to distinguish provocation from the attack?

Belated mobilization

Unbelievable, but it is a fact: universal mobilization The USSR was not announced on the day of the beginning of the war, but only on June 23, despite the fact that every hour of delay gave the enemy additional advantages.

The relevant telegram of the Commissar of Defense entered the central telegraph at 16:40 June 22, although from an early morning a more relevant task of the leadership of the state, perhaps, was not.

At the same time, a short, total of three proposals, text written by a dry stationery, did not contain a word about the treacherous attack, the protection of the Motherland and the Holy Duty, as if it was about a routine appeal.

Theatrical concert evening

The command of the Western Special Military District (by that time in fact of the Western Front), headed by the Army General Dmitry Pavlov held Saturday evening in the Minsk House of Officers at the Operette Presentation "Wedding in Malinovka".

Memoir literature confirms that the phenomenon was massive and widespread. It is difficult to assume that large commanders in that atmosphere are familiar together to have fun without indication.

There are numerous evidence of the abolition of 20-21 of the previously given orders to increase combat readiness, an unexpected announcement of the weekend days, sending aircraft artillery to educational fees.

The anti-aircraft divisions of the 4th Army and the 6th mechanized Corps of the Western OWO met the war on the landfill 120 km east of Minsk.

Order of the troops on the expulsion of artillery on the polygons and other ridiculous in that setting of the instructions caused the complete bewilderment of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky

"On Sunday, a weekend was announced on Sunday. Everyone was delighted: they didn't reste three months. In the evening on Saturday, the command, pilots and technicians went to families," recalled the former pilot of the 13th bombarding airlock Pavel Tsupko.

The commander of one of the three OPOVO APPOVIATIA Nikolay Belov on June 20 received an order of the commander of the District Air Force to bring a division into combat readiness, cancel vacation and dismissal, dispersed the technique, and at 16:00 on June 21 he followed his abolition.

"Stalin sought the state itself and the behavior of the border districts themselves to make it clear that we have calmness, if not carelessness. As a result, we, instead of changing disinformation actions, introduce an aggressor to delusion about the combat readiness of our troops, really reduced it to extremely low Degree, "the former head of the operative department of the 13th Army headquarters Sergey Ivanov was perplexed.

Ill-fated regiment

But the most incredible story happened in the 122nd fighter airlock, covered Grodno.

On Friday, on Friday, high ranks from Moscow and Minsk came to the part, and at 6 pm on Saturday, an order was announced on Saturday: to remove the I-16 from fighters and send weapons and ammumbers to the warehouse.

Right holder illustration Ria Novosti. Image Caption. To reinstall the machine guns on the I-16, was required for several hours

The order was so wild and inexplicable that the pilots spoke about treason, but they were forced to silenced.

Needless to say, the next morning the 122th air strike was completely defeated.

The grouping of the Soviet Air Force in the West direction numbered 111 airlocks, including 52 fighter. Why exactly this attracted such attention?

What happened?

"Stalin, contrary to obvious facts, believed that this was not a war, but the provocation of individual undisciplined parts of the German army," said Nikita Khrushchev in the report at the XX Congress of the CPSU.

The obsessive idea of \u200b\u200bsome provocation, apparently, really attended Stalin's mind. He developed it in the "Directive No. 1", and on the first after the beginning of the invasion of the meeting in the Kremlin, which opened at 05:45 June 22. Until 06:30, he did not give permission to open a retaliatory fire, while Molotov did not report that Germany officially declared the War of the USSR.

Now the late St. Petersburg historian Igor Bunly argued that a few days before the start of the war, Hitler sent Stalin a secret personal message with the warning that some English generals could try to provoke a conflict between the USSR and Germany.

Stalin allegedly noticedly noticed Beria that we might, so it is impossible, we were convulsed in our army.

True, detect the document in Germanic or Soviet archives failed.

The Israeli researcher Gabriel Gorodetsky explains the actions of Stalin by panic fear and the desire at any cost not to give Hitler a reason for aggression.

Stalin really drove every thought, but not about the war (he did not think about anything else), but that Hitler at the very last moment will be able to beat him Mark Solonin, historian

"Stalin driven away any idea of \u200b\u200bwar, he lost his initiative and was practically paralyzed," said Gorodetsky.

Opponents object that Stalin was not afraid in November 1940, Molotov's mouth hard to demand Finland from Berlin, South Bukovina and the base in Dardanelles, and at the beginning of April 1941 to conclude whisker Hitler and at the same time did not have a practical sense agreement with Yugoslavia.

The demonstration of defensive preparations provoke a potential enemy cannot be provoked, but you can get once again to think about it.

"Having dealing with a dangerous enemy, it should probably show him, first of all, his willingness to dissolve. If we demonstrated our true power to Hitler, he would have refrained from the War from the USSR at that time," said a crowded stabyst Sergey Ivanov, subsequently served before the army general.

According to Alexander Osokina, Stalin, on the contrary, intentionally pushed Germany to attack to appear in the eyes of the world the victim of aggression and get American help.

Critics indicate that the game in this case came out painfully dangerous, Lend-Liz did not have in the eyes of Stalin of self-sufficient importance, and Roosevelt was guided by the Khlebadov principle "Who started?", But the interests of US National Security.

Shoot the first

Another hypothesis was put forward by historians Kestetut Nokornetsky and Mark Solonin.

In the first three weeks of June, Tymoshenko and Zhukov met with Stalin seven times.

According to Zhukov, they called upon to immediately lead the troops into some incomprehensible "state of complete readiness for war" (preparation and so carried out continuously and at the limit of forces), and, in the opinion of a number of modern researchers - to cause a proactive blow, without waiting for the completion of strategic deployment .

True is an amazing fiction, because the fiction should be kept within the probability, and the truth is not Mark Twain

Riskornetsky and Solonin believe that in the face of the apparent aggressive intentions of Berlin, Stalin was kept to the military.

Presumably at the meeting on June 18 with the participation of Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Molotova and Malenkov was decided to start a preventive war not ever, and on June 22, in the longest day of the day. Only not at dawn, but later.

War with Finland preceded. According to the researchers, the war with Germany also had to begin with provocations - a few bought "Junkers" and "Dorney" on Grodno. Per hour, when residents are breakfast and go to the streets and rest in the parks after the labor week.

The propaganda effect would be deafening, and Stalin could well donate in the highest interests of several dozens of civilians.

The version is quite logical explaining almost everything.

And Stalin's failure to believe that the Germans will hit almost simultaneously (such matches simply never happens, and that Hitler intends to do in the following days, no matter).

And the beginning of mobilization on Monday (the decree was prepared in advance, and they did not get concerned in the confusion of the first morning of the war).

In the field two wills Russian saying

And the disarmament of the fighters based undergruna (so that someone from the "vultures" were not shot down over the Soviet territory).

Proerous grace made even more blatant fascist cunning. Bombs were to fall into a peaceful Soviet city among a complete well-being. Contrary to generally accepted opinion, the demonstration was not addressed to the Germans, but to their citizens.

It becomes clear and reluctance of Stalin to lubricate the effect, before entering the cover of the cover.

Unfortunately for the USSR, aggression was real.

However, it is only a hypothesis that the authors themselves emphasize.

In Sevastopol, the war came earlier than to other cities of the Soviet Union - the first bombs were reset at 3:15 am. Previously, the approved time of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. It was at 3 o'clock 15 minutes the commander of the Black Sea Fleet Vice-Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky called the capital and reported to Admiral Kuznetsov that the aviation raid was performed and the anti-aircraft artillery gives a retaliatory fire.

The Germans sought to block the fleet. They dumped the bottomless non-contact mines of huge power. The bombs dropped on the parachutes when the shell reached the surface of the water, the attachments were broken, and the bomb was on the bottom. These mines had specific goals - Soviet ships. But one of them fell on a residential quarter - about 20 people died, more than 100 were injured.

War ships and anti-air defense funds were ready to draw response strikes. Another 3 hours of 06 minutes, the head of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters Council Admiral Ivan Eliseev gave an order - to open fire on fascist aircraft, which invaded the USSR airspace. By this, he left the mark in the series of historical events - he gave the first combat order to repel the attack of the enemy.

Interestingly, for a long time the feat of Eliseev was either silent, or was customized in the framework of the official chronology of hostilities. That is why in some sources you can find information that the order was given at 4 am. In those days, this order was given by the orders of the higher military command, and according to the laws, it was supposed to be execution.

On June 22, at 3 o'clock 48 minutes in Sevastopol, the first victims of the Great Patriotic War had already had. 12 minutes before the official announcement of the start of hostilities, the German bombs cut the lives of civilians. In Sevastopol, a monument to the first victims of war was built about them.