General statements, scientific laws, principles, etc. cannot be substantiated purely empirically, by reference only to experience. They also require a theoretical justification based on reasoning and referring to other accepted statements. Without this, there is neither abstract theoretical knowledge nor well-founded beliefs.

It is not possible to prove a general statement by referring to evidence relating to any particular instance of its applicability. Universal generalizations of science are a kind of hypotheses built on the basis of essentially incomplete series of observations. Such universal statements cannot be proved not only on the basis of the observations in the course of generalization of which they were put forward, but also on the basis of the subsequent extensive and detailed series of predictions derived from them and found their confirmation in experience.

Theories, concepts and other generalizations of empirical material are not logically deduced from this material. The same set of facts can be generalized in different ways and covered by different theories. However, none of them will be fully consistent with all the facts known in their field. The facts and theories themselves not only constantly diverge from each other, but they are never clearly separated from each other.

All this suggests that the agreement of the theory with experiments, facts or observations is not enough for an unambiguous assessment of its acceptability. Empirical argumentation always requires the addition of a theoretical one. Not empirical experience, but theoretical reasoning is usually decisive when choosing one of the competing concepts.

Unlike empirical argumentation, the methods of theoretical argumentation are extremely diverse and internally heterogeneous. They include deductive reasoning, systemic reasoning, methodological reasoning, etc. There is no single, consistent classification of methods of theoretical argumentation.

1. Deductive justification

One of the important ways of theoretical argumentation is deductive argumentation.

An argument in which some statement follows (logically follows) from other statements is called deductive, or simply deduction.

Deductive reasoning is the derivation of a substantiated position from other, previously accepted statements.

If the advanced position can be logically (deductively) deduced from already established provisions, this means that it is acceptable to the same extent as these provisions themselves.
Suppose someone who is not familiar with the basics of the theory of electricity, conjectures that direct current is characterized not only by strength, but also by voltage. To confirm this conjecture, it is enough to open any reference book and find out that every current has a certain voltage. From this general position it follows that direct current also has voltage.

In the story of Leo Tolstoy (The Death of Ivan Ilyich) there is an episode that is directly related to logic.

Ivan Ilyich felt that he was dying and was in constant despair. In an agonizing search for some kind of light, he even seized on his old idea that the rules of logic, which are always true for everyone, are inapplicable to him. “That example of the syllogism that he studied in Kizevetter’s logic: Kai is a man, people are mortal, therefore Kai is mortal, seemed to him throughout his life to be correct only in relation to Kai, but not in any way to him. It was Kai - a man, a man in general, and it was absolutely fair; but he was not Kai and not a man in general, but he was a very, very special being from all the others ... And Kai is definitely mortal, and it’s right for him to die, but not for me, Vanya, Ivan Ilyich, with all my feelings, thoughts, - It's a different matter for me. And it can't be that I should die. It would be too terrible."

The course of Ivan Ilyich's thoughts is dictated, of course, by the despair that gripped him. Only it can make one assume that what is true always and for everyone will suddenly turn out to be inapplicable at a particular moment to a particular person. In a mind not terrified, such an assumption cannot even arise. However undesirable the consequences of our reasoning may be, they must be accepted if the premises are accepted.

Deductive reasoning is always, in some sense, coercion. When we think, we constantly feel pressure and unfreedom. It is no coincidence that Aristotle, who was the first to emphasize the unconditional nature of logical laws, noted with regret:

“Thinking is suffering,” for “if a thing is necessary, it is a burden to us.”

In normal reasoning processes, fragments of deductive reasoning usually appear in a very abbreviated form. Often the result of deduction looks like an observation rather than the result of a reasoning.
Good examples of deductions, in which the conclusion appears as an observation, are given by A. Conan Doyle in stories about Sherlock Holmes.

“Dr. Watson, Mr. Sherlock Holmes,” Stamford introduced us to each other.

Hello! Holmes said kindly. - I see you lived in Afghanistan.

How did you guess? I wondered...

Due to a long habit, the chain of inferences arises in me so quickly that I came to a conclusion without even noticing the intermediate premises. However, they were, these parcels. The course of my thoughts was as follows: “This person is a doctor by type, but he has a military bearing. So, a military doctor. He has just arrived from the tropics - his face is swarthy, but this is not the natural shade of his skin, since his wrists are much whiter. The face is emaciated, - obviously, he has suffered a lot and endured the disease. He was wounded in his left hand - he holds it motionless and a little unnaturally. Where, under the tropics, could an English military doctor suffer hardships and get a wound? Of course, in Afghanistan” 58 .
Justifying the statement by deriving it from other accepted provisions, we do not make this statement absolutely reliable and irrefutable. But we fully transfer to it the degree of certainty that is inherent in the propositions accepted as premises of deduction. If, say, we are convinced that all people are mortal and that Ivan Ilyich, with all his particularity and uniqueness, is a man, we are obliged to admit that he is also mortal.

It may seem that deductive justification is, so to speak, the best of all possible methods of justification, since it gives the justified assertion the same firmness as the premises from which it is deduced. However, such an estimate would be clearly overstated. It is far from always possible to derive new general propositions from established truths. The most interesting and important statements that can be premises of justification, as a rule, are themselves general and cannot be consequences of existing truths. Statements requiring substantiation usually speak of relatively new, not studied in detail phenomena that are not yet covered by universal principles.

Justifying some statements by referring to the truth or acceptability of other statements is not the only function performed by deduction in the processes of argumentation. Deductive reasoning also serves to verify (indirectly confirm) statements: from the verified position, its empirical consequences are deductively derived; confirmation of these consequences is evaluated as a possible argument in favor of the original position. Deductive reasoning can also be used to falsify hypotheses. In this case, it is demonstrated that the consequences arising from the hypotheses are false. Unsuccessful falsification of data is a weakened version of verification: failure to disprove the empirical consequences of the hypothesis being tested is an argument, albeit a very weak one, in support of this hypothesis. And finally, deduction is used to systematize a theory, trace the logical connections of its constituent statements, build explanations based on the general principles offered by the theory. The clarification of the logical structure of the theory, the strengthening of its empirical base and the identification of its general premises is, as will be clear from what follows, a contribution to the substantiation of the statements included in it.

Deductive reasoning is applicable in all areas of reasoning and in any audience.

Here is an example of such an argument, taken from the theological literature: “I want to prove here,” writes C.S. life, but I refuse to believe that He was God.” That's what you shouldn't say. What great teacher of life, being just a man, would say what Christ said? In that case, he would either be crazy - no better than a sick man pretending to be a boiled egg - or a real devil. There is no escape from the choice. Either this man was and remains the Son of God, or he was insane, or even worse ... You can not listen to Him, considering Him foolish, you can spit on Him and kill Him, considering Him the devil, or you can fall at His feet, calling Him Lord God. Let's not just carry any patronizing nonsense About the teachers of life. He didn’t leave us such a choice, and He didn’t want to leave us” 59 . This argument is typically deductive, although its structure is not particularly clear.

More simple and clear is the reasoning of the medieval philosopher I.S. Eriugena: “And if bliss is nothing but eternal life, and eternal life is the knowledge of the truth, then bliss is nothing but the knowledge of the truth” 60 . This reasoning is a deductive inference, namely a categorical syllogism (the first figure, mode Barbara).

The share of deductive reasoning in different fields of knowledge is significantly different. It is used very widely in mathematics and mathematical physics, and only occasionally in history or philosophy. Aristotle wrote, having in mind just the scope of application of deductive reasoning: "Scientific evidence should not be required from the speaker, just as emotional conviction should not be required from mathematics" 61 . A similar thought was expressed by F. Bacon: "...Excessive pedantry and cruelty, requiring too strict proofs, and even more negligence and readiness to be satisfied with very superficial proofs in others, brought great harm to science and greatly retarded its development" 62 . Deductive reasoning is a very powerful tool, but like any such tool, it must be used narrowly.

Depending on how widely deductive reasoning is used, all sciences are usually divided into deductive and inductive. In the former, deductive reasoning is predominantly or even exclusively used. Secondly, such argumentation plays only a deliberately auxiliary role, and in the first place is empirical argumentation, which has an inductive, probabilistic character. Mathematics is considered a typical deductive science, and the natural sciences are an example of inductive sciences.

The division of sciences into deductive and inductive, which was widespread several decades ago, has now largely lost its former significance. It is focused on science, considered in statics, primarily as a system of reliably established truths.
Applying the rules of deduction to any premises guarantees conclusions that are as reliable as the premises themselves. If the premises are true, then the conclusions deduced from them are also true.

On this basis, the ancient mathematicians, and after them the ancient philosophers, insisted on the exclusive use of deductive reasoning.

Medieval philosophers and theologians also overestimated the importance of deductive reasoning. They were interested in the most general truths concerning God, man and the world. But in order to convince someone that God is essentially good, that man is his likeness, and that the divine order reigns in the world, deductive reasoning, starting from a few general principles, is much more suitable than induction and empirical argument. It is characteristic that all the proposed proofs of the existence of God were conceived by their authors as deductions from self-evident premises.

Here is how, for example, Thomas Aquinas sounded the "argument of a motionless engine." Things are divided into two groups - some are only moved, others move and at the same time move. Everything that is moved is set in motion by something, and since an infinite inference from effect to cause is impossible, at some point we must arrive at something that moves without being itself moved. This motionless engine is God. Thomas Aquinas gave four more proofs of the existence of God, which were again clearly deductive in nature: the proof of the first cause, which again rests on the impossibility of an endless inference from effect to cause; proof that there must be a finite source of all necessity; the proof that we find various degrees of perfection in the world, which must have their source in something absolutely perfect; proof that we find that even lifeless things serve a purpose which must be a purpose set by some being outside of them, that only living beings can have an inner purpose 63 . The logical structure of all these proofs is very obscure. And yet, at the time, they seemed extremely convincing.

In the early modern period, Dakart argued that mathematics, and geometry in particular, is a model for how science works. He believed that the fundamental scientific method is the deductive method of geometry, and imagined this method as a rigorous reasoning based on self-evident axioms. He thought that the subject of all physical sciences should be in principle the same as the subject of geometry, and that from the point of view of science, the only important characteristics of things in the physical world are the spatial characteristics studied by geometry. Descartes proposed a picture of the world in which the only realities besides God are, on the one hand, a purely mathematical substance that has no characteristics other than spatial ones, and, on the other hand, purely mental substances, the existence of which essentially consists in thinking, and in in particular in their ability to grasp self-evident axioms and their deductive consequences. There are, therefore, on the one hand, the object of geometry, and, on the other hand, souls capable of mathematical or geometric reasoning. Cognition is only the result of the application of this ability.

Deductive reasoning was overestimated as long as the study of the world was speculative and alien to experience, observation and experiment.

The concept of deduction is a general methodological one. In logic, it corresponds to the concept of proof.

A proof is usually defined as a procedure for substantiating the truth of a statement by citing those true statements from which it logically follows.

This definition includes two central concepts of logic: truth and logical consequence. Both of these concepts are not sufficiently clear, which means that the concept of proof defined through them cannot be classified as clear either.

Many of our statements are neither true nor false, they lie outside the "category of truth." These include requirements, warnings, etc. They indicate what the given situation should become, in which direction it should be transformed. We have the right to demand from descriptions that they are true. But a good order, advice, etc. we characterize as effective or expedient, but not as true.

The standard definition of proof uses the notion of truth. To prove a thesis means to logically deduce it from other, which are true positions. But, as we see, there are statements that are not connected with the truth. It is also obvious that, in dealing with them, one must be both logical and conclusive.

Thus, the question arises of a significant expansion of the concept of proof. It should cover not only descriptions, but also statements such as estimates and norms.

The problem of redefining the proof has not yet been solved either by the logic of estimates or by the logic of norms. As a result, the concept of proof remains not entirely clear in its meaning 64 .

This concept is defined through the law of logic: statement (or system of statements) A logically implies statement B if and only if the expression "if A, then B" is a law of logic.

This definition is only a general outline of an infinite number of possible definitions. Specific definitions of logical consequence are obtained from it by indicating the logical system that defines the concept of a logical law. There are, in principle, an infinite number of logical systems claiming the status of a law of logic. Well-known, in particular, are the classical definition of logical consequence, its intuitionistic definition, the definition of consequence in relevant logic, etc. However, none of the definitions of logical law and logical consequence available in modern logic is free from criticism and from what can be called “paradox logical following".

In particular, classical logic says that anything logically follows from a contradiction. For example, from the contradictory statement "Tokyo is a big city, and Tokyo is not a big city" follow, along with any others, the statements: "Mathematical set theory is consistent", "The moon is made of green cheese", etc. But there is no substantive connection between the original statement and these statements supposedly arising from it. This is a clear departure from the usual, or intuitive, notion of following. The situation is exactly the same with the classical proposition that logical laws follow from any statements. Our logical experience refuses to admit that, say, the statement "Ice is cold or ice is not cold" can be deduced from statements like "Two are less than three" or "Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great." The consequence that is deduced must be somehow connected in its content with that from which it is deduced. Classical logic neglects this obvious circumstance.

These paradoxes concerning logical consequence also take place in intuitionistic logic. But in the latter, the law of the excluded middle, which is indisputable for classical logic, does not operate. A number of other logical laws are also discarded, which make it possible to prove the existence of objects that cannot be built or calculated. Among those rejected are, in particular, the law of removal of double negation and the law of reduction to absurdity, which gives the right to assert that a mathematical object exists if the assumption of its non-existence leads to a contradiction. This means that a proof carried out using classical logic will not necessarily be considered a proof from the point of view of intuitionistic logic as well.

More perfect than the classical and intuitionistic description of logical consequence has been given by relevant logic. She succeeded, in particular, in eliminating the standard paradoxes of logical consequence. Many other theories of logical consequence have also been proposed. Each of them has its own understanding of evidence.
The model of proof, which in one way or another tends to be followed in all sciences, is mathematical proof. “There is no real evidence anywhere,” wrote B. Pascal, “except in the science of geometers and where it is imitated” 65 . By "geometry" Pascal meant, as was common in his day, all of mathematics.

For a long time it was believed that mathematical proof is a clear and undeniable process. In our century, the attitude towards mathematical proof has changed. Mathematicians are divided into groups, each of which adheres to its own version of the proof. This was due to several factors. First of all, ideas about the logical principles underlying the proof have changed. Confidence in their uniqueness and infallibility has disappeared. There was also disagreement about how far the realm of logic extended. Logicists were convinced that logic was sufficient to justify all of mathematics; according to the formalists, logic alone is not enough for this, and logical axioms must be supplemented with purely mathematical ones; representatives of the set-theoretic direction were not particularly interested in logical principles and did not always indicate them explicitly; Intuitionists, for reasons of principle, considered it necessary not to go into logic at all. Summing up this revision of the concept of proof in mathematics, R. L. Wilder writes that mathematical proof is nothing more than “testing the products of our intuition ... It is quite clear that we have not possessed and, apparently, we never will possess a criterion of proof independent of time, of what is to be proved, or of those who use the criterion, be it an individual or a school of thought. Under these conditions, it is perhaps most reasonable to admit that, as a rule, there is no absolutely true proof in mathematics, although the general public is convinced of the opposite.

Mathematical proof is the paradigm of proof in general, but even in mathematics it is not absolute and final. “New counterexamples undermine old proofs, depriving them of their strength. The evidence is revised and the new versions are erroneously considered definitive. But, as history teaches, this only means that the time has not yet come for a critical review of the proof.

The mathematician does not rely on rigorous proof to the extent that is commonly believed. “Intuition can be more satisfactory and inspire more confidence than logic,” writes M. Kline. - When a mathematician asks himself why a given result is true, he seeks an answer in an intuitive way. Having discovered a misunderstanding, the mathematician subjects the proof to the most thorough critical revision. If the proof seems right to him, he will do his best to understand why his intuition failed him. The mathematician longs to understand the inner reason why a chain of syllogisms works successfully... The progress of mathematics has undoubtedly been mainly promoted by people endowed not so much with the ability to carry out rigorous proofs as with an unusually strong intuition” 68 .

Thus, even a mathematical proof does not have absolute persuasiveness and guarantees only relative certainty in the correctness of the proven position. As K. Aidukevich writes, “to say that in the deductive sciences such statements are considered justified for which a deductive proof is given, it means little to say, since we do not clearly know what constitutes that deductive proof, which makes the acceptance of the proved legitimate in the eyes of a mathematician. assertion or which constitutes its justification” 69 .

The overestimation of the role of evidence in argumentation is connected with the implicit assumption that a rational discussion should be in the nature of evidence, justification, or logical derivation from some initial principles. These principles themselves must be taken on faith if we are to avoid endless peipecca, references to more and more principles. However, real discussions only in rare cases take the form of deducing the provisions under discussion from some more general truths.

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philosophy -> Meaning of life and acme: 10 years of searching Proceedings of VIII x symposia Ed. A. A. Bodaleva, G. A. Vaiser, N. A. Karpova, V. E. Chukovsky Part 1 Moscow Smysl 2004

Logical culture, which is an important part of the general human culture, includes many components. But the most important of them, connecting, as in an optical focus, all other components, is the ability to reason argumentation.

Argumentation is the presentation of arguments, or arguments, with the intent to arouse or increase the support of the other side (audience) for the proposition put forward. "Argumentation" is also called the totality of such arguments.

The purpose of the argumentation is the acceptance by the audience of the provisions put forward. Truth and goodness can be intermediate goals of argumentation, but its ultimate goal is always to convince the audience of the justice of the position offered to its attention and, possibly, the action suggested by it. This means that the oppositions "truth-false" and "good-evil" are not central either in the argument or, respectively, in its theory. Arguments can be given not only in support of theses that seem true, but also in support of deliberately false or vague theses. Argumentation can be defended not only by goodness and justice, but also by what seems or later turns out to be evil. The theory of argumentation, proceeding not from abstract philosophical ideas, but from real practice and ideas about a real audience, should, without discarding the concepts of truth and goodness, put the concepts of "belief" and "acceptance" at the center of its attention.

The argument distinguishes thesis- a statement (or a system of statements) that the arguing party considers it necessary to inspire the audience, and an argument, or argument, - one or more related statements intended to support the thesis.

Argumentation theory explores the diverse ways of persuading an audience with the help of speech influence. You can influence the beliefs of listeners or viewers not only with the help of speech and verbal arguments, but also in many other ways: gesture, facial expressions, visual images, etc. Even silence in certain cases turns out to be a strong enough argument. These methods of influence are studied by psychology, the theory of art, but are not affected by the theory of argumentation. Beliefs can be further influenced by violence, hypnosis, suggestion, subconscious stimulation, drugs, drugs, and the like. Psychology deals with these methods of influence, but they clearly go beyond the framework of even a widely interpreted theory of argumentation.

Argumentation is a speech action that includes a system of statements designed to justify or refute an opinion. It is addressed primarily to the mind of a person who is able, by reasoning, to accept or refute this opinion. The argument is thus characterized by the following features: it is always expressed in language, takes the form of spoken or written statements, argumentation theory explores the relationships of these statements, and not the thoughts, ideas and motives behind them; is purposeful activity, whose task is to strengthen or weaken someone's beliefs; This social activity, since it is directed at another person or other people, involves dialogue and an active reaction of the other side to the arguments; argumentation suggests reasonableness those who perceive it, their ability to rationally weigh arguments, accept them or challenge them.

The theory of argumentation, which began to take shape in antiquity, has gone through a long history, rich in ups and downs. Now we can talk about the formation new argumentation theory, emerging at the intersection of logic, linguistics, psychology, philosophy, hermeneutics, rhetoric, eristics, etc. The actual task is to build a general theory of argumentation that answers such questions as: the nature of argumentation and its boundaries; ways of argumentation; originality of argumentation in different areas of knowledge and activity, starting with the natural and human sciences and ending with philosophy, ideology and propaganda; a change in the style of argumentation from one era to another due to a change in the culture of the era and its characteristic style of thinking, etc.

The central concepts of the general theory of argumentation are: persuasion, acceptance (statements or concepts), audience, method of argumentation, position of the participant in the argumentation, dissonance and consonance of positions, truth and value in argumentation, argumentation and proof, etc.

The general contours of a new theory of argumentation have been outlined in the last two or three decades. It restores the positive that was in ancient rhetoric and is sometimes called "new rhetoric" on this basis. It became obvious that the theory of argumentation is not reducible to the logical theory of proof, which is based on the concept of truth and for which the concepts of persuasion and audience are completely foreign. The theory of argumentation is also not reducible to the methodology of science or the theory of knowledge. Argumentation is a certain human activity that takes place in a specific social context and has as its ultimate goal not knowledge in itself, but the conviction of the acceptability of some provisions. The latter may include not only descriptions of reality, but also assessments, norms, advice, declarations, oaths, promises, etc. Argumentation theory is not limited to eristic- the theory of the dispute, because the dispute is only one of many possible situations of argumentation.

The works of H. Perelman, G. Johnston, F. van Yemeren, R. Grootendorst and others played an important role in the formation of the main ideas of the new theory of argumentation. hardly visible field of different opinions on the subject of this theory, its main problems and development prospects.

In the theory of argumentation, argumentation is considered from three different positions that complement each other: from the point of view of thinking, from the point of view of human And societies, and finally, in terms of stories. Each of these aspects of consideration has its own specific features and is divided into a number of subdivisions.

The analysis of argumentation as a human activity of a social nature involves the study audiences in which it unfolds. The narrowest audience includes only the one who puts forward a certain position or opinion, and the one whose beliefs he seeks to strengthen or change. A narrow audience can be, for example, two people arguing or a scientist putting forward a new concept, and the scientific community called to evaluate it. The wider audience in these cases will be all those who are present at the dispute, or all those who are involved in the discussion of a new scientific concept, including non-specialists recruited to one side through propaganda. The study of the social dimension of argumentation also involves an analysis of the dependence of the manner of argumentation on the general characteristics of that particular holistic society or community within which it takes place. A typical example is the features of argumentation in the so-called “collectivist (closed) societies” (totalitarian society, medieval feudal society, etc.) or “collectivist communities” (“normal science”, army, church, totalitarian political party, etc.). The study of the historical dimension of argumentation includes three time slices:

Accounting for that historically specific time in which the argumentation takes place and which leaves its fleeting mark on it.

The study of the style of thinking of the historical era and those features of its culture that leave their indelible imprint on any argument relating to this era. Such a study allows us to single out five fundamentally different, replacing each other types, or styles, of argumentation: archaic (or primitive) argumentation, ancient argumentation, medieval (or scholastic) argumentation, “classical” argumentation of the New Age and modern argumentation.

An analysis of the changes that argumentation undergoes throughout human history. It is in this context that it becomes possible to compare the styles of argumentation of different historical eras and raise questions about the comparability (or incomparability) of these styles, the possible superiority of some of them over others, and, finally, about the reality of historical progress in the field of argumentation.

The theory of argumentation interprets argumentation not only as a special technique for persuading and substantiating the propositions put forward, but also as a practical art that involves the ability to choose from a variety of possible methods of argumentation that combination and that of their configuration that are effective in a given audience and are due to the peculiarities of the problem under discussion.

2. Rationale

In the most general sense, to substantiate a statement means to give those convincing or sufficient grounds (arguments), by virtue of which it should be accepted.

The substantiation of theoretical propositions, as a rule, is a complex process that cannot be reduced to the construction of a separate conclusion or the conduct of a single-act empirical, experimental verification. Justification usually includes a whole series of procedures concerning not only the proposition under consideration, but also that system of statements, that theory, of which it is an integral element. An essential role in the justification mechanism is played by deductive reasoning, although only in rare cases can the process of justification be reduced to an inference or a chain of inferences.

The knowledge validity requirement is commonly referred to as principle of sufficient reason. This principle was first explicitly formulated by the German philosopher and mathematician G. Leibniz. “Everything that exists,” he wrote, “has sufficient grounds for its existence,” due to which not a single phenomenon can be considered real, not a single statement is true or just without indicating its basis.

All the diverse ways of substantiation, which ultimately provide sufficient grounds for accepting the statement, are divided into absolute And comparative. Absolute justification is the presentation of those convincing, or sufficient grounds, by virtue of which the justified position should be adopted. Comparative justification - a system of convincing arguments in support of the fact that it is better to accept a justified position than another position that is opposed to it. The set of arguments given in support of the justified position is called basis.

The general scheme, or structure, of absolute justification: " A must be taken into effect WITH", Where A- substantiated position and WITH- basis of justification. Comparative Rationale Structure: “It is better to take A, how B, due to C. For example, the expression “We must accept that the sky is blue under normal conditions, since direct observation speaks in favor of this” is an absolute justification, its summarizing part. The expression “It is better to accept that the sky is blue than to accept that it is red, based on the provisions of atmospheric physics” is the resulting stage of the comparative justification of the same statement “The sky is blue”. Comparative justification is sometimes also called rationalization: in conditions when absolute justification is unattainable, comparative justification is a significant step forward in improving knowledge, in bringing it closer to the standards of rationality. Clearly, comparative justification is not reducible to absolute justification: if it can be justified that one statement is more plausible than another, this result cannot be expressed in terms of the isolated validity of one or both of these statements.

The requirements of absolute and comparative validity of knowledge (its validity and rationality) play a leading role both in the system of theoretical and practical thinking, and in the field of argumentation. All other topics of epistemology intersect and concentrate in these requirements, and it can be said that validity and rationality are synonymous with the ability of the mind to comprehend reality and draw conclusions regarding practical activity. Without these requirements, argumentation loses one of its essential qualities: it ceases to appeal to the mind of those who perceive it, to their ability to rationally evaluate the arguments presented and, on the basis of such an assessment, accept or reject them.

The problem of absolute justification was central to modern epistemology. The specific forms of this problem have changed, but in the thinking of a given era they have always been associated with its characteristic idea of ​​the existence of absolute, unshakable and unreviewed foundations of any genuine knowledge, with the idea of ​​​​a gradual and consistent accumulation of “pure” knowledge, with the opposition of truth, which allows justification, and subjective values ​​that change from person to person, with a dichotomy of empirical and theoretical knowledge and other "classical prejudices". It was about a method or procedure that would provide unconditionally solid, undeniable foundations for knowledge.

With the decomposition of "classical" thinking, the meaning of the problem of substantiation has changed significantly. Three things became clear:

There are no absolutely reliable and not revised over time grounds and theoretical and even more so practical knowledge, and we can only talk about their relative reliability;

In the process of substantiation, numerous and varied techniques are used, the proportion of which varies from case to case and which are not reducible to some limited, canonical set of them, representing what can be called the "scientific method" or more broadly the "rational method";

Justification itself has limited applicability, being primarily a procedure of science and related technology and not allowing automatic transfer of justification patterns that have developed in some areas (and, above all, in science) to any other areas.

In modern epistemology, the “classical” problem of justification has been transformed into the task of investigating that variety of ways to justify knowledge, devoid of clear boundaries, with the help of which an acceptable level of justification is achieved in this area - but never absolute. The search for "solid foundations" for individual scientific disciplines has ceased to be an independent task, isolated from the solution of specific problems that arise in the course of the development of these disciplines.

Substantiation and argumentation are related to each other as a goal and a means: the methods of substantiation in the aggregate constitute the core of all the diverse methods of argumentation, but do not exhaust the latter.

The argumentation uses not only correct methods, which include methods of justification, but also incorrect methods (lies or treachery), which have nothing to do with justification. In addition, the argumentation procedure, as a living, direct human activity, must take into account not only the thesis being defended or refuted, but also the context of the argumentation, and primarily its audience. Justification techniques (proof, reference to confirmed results, etc.), as a rule, are indifferent to the context of the argumentation, in particular, to the audience.

Argumentation techniques can be, and almost always are, richer and sharper than justification techniques. But all methods of argumentation that go beyond the scope of methods of justification are obviously less universal and, in most audiences, less convincing than methods of justification.

Depending on the nature of the basis, all methods of argumentation can be divided into generally valid (universal) and contextual.

Valid argumentation applicable to any audience; efficiency contextual reasoning limited to certain audiences.

Commonly valid methods of argumentation include direct and indirect (inductive) confirmation; deduction of the thesis from the accepted general provisions; checking the thesis for compatibility with other adopted laws and principles, etc. Contextual ways of argumentation include reference to intuition, faith, authorities, tradition, and so on.

Obviously, not always contextual methods of argumentation are also methods of justification: for example, a reference to beliefs shared by a narrow friend of people, or to authorities recognized by this circle, is one of the common methods of argumentation, but definitely does not apply to methods of justification.

3. Empirical reasoning

All the various ways of substantiation (argument), which ultimately provide “sufficient grounds” for accepting a statement, can be divided into empirical And theoretical. The former rely primarily on experience, the latter on reasoning. The difference between them is, of course, relative, just as the very boundary between empirical and theoretical knowledge is relative.

Empirical methods of justification are also called confirmation, or verification(from lat. verus - true and facere - to do). Validation can be divided into direct And indirect.

Direct confirmation is the direct observation of those phenomena that are referred to in the test statement.

Indirect confirmation - confirmation in the experience of the logical consequences of the justified position.

A good example of direct confirmation is the proof of the hypothesis of the existence of the planet Neptune: soon after the hypothesis was put forward, this planet was seen through a telescope.

Based on the study of disturbances in the orbit of Uranus, the French astronomer J. Le Verrier theoretically predicted the existence of Neptune and indicated where telescopes should be directed in order to see a new planet. When Le Verrier himself was offered to look through a telescope at the planet found at the “tip of the pen”, he refused: “This does not interest me, I already know for sure that Neptune is exactly where it should be, judging by the calculations.”

It was, of course, unjustified self-confidence. No matter how accurate Le Verrier's calculations were, the assertion of the existence of Neptune remained until the observation of this planet, albeit highly probable, but only an assumption, and not a reliable fact. It could turn out that the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus are caused not by a yet unknown planet, but by some other factors. This is exactly what happened in the study of perturbations in the orbit of another planet - Mercury.

The sensory experience of a person - his sensations and perceptions - is a source of knowledge that connects him with the world. Justification by reference to experience gives confidence in the truth of such statements as "It's hot", "Twilight has come", "This chrysanthemum is yellow", etc.

It is not difficult, however, to notice that even in such simple statements there is no "pure" sensuous intuition. In a person, it is always permeated with thinking, without concepts and without an admixture of reasoning, he is not able to express even his simplest observations, to fix the most obvious facts.

We say, for example, "This house is blue" when we see the house in normal light and our senses are not disturbed. But we will say "This house looks blue" if there is little light or we doubt our ability to observe. To perception, to sensory "data", we add a certain idea of ​​how objects are seen in ordinary conditions and what these objects are in other circumstances, in the case when our senses are able to deceive us. “Even our experience, obtained from experiments and observations,” writes the philosopher K. Popper, “does not consist of“ data ”. Rather, it consists of a web of conjectures—speculations, expectations, hypotheses, and so on—with which the traditional scientific and non-scientific knowledge and prejudices we have adopted are linked. There is simply no such thing as pure experience, obtained as a result of an experiment or observation.”

The "hardness" of sensory experience, of facts, is thus relative. It is not uncommon for facts that at first seem to be reliable, and in the course of their theoretical rethinking, have to be revised, clarified, or even completely discarded. The biologist K.A. Timiryazev drew attention to this. “Sometimes they say,” he wrote, “that a hypothesis must be in agreement with all known facts; it would be more correct to say - or to be able to detect the inconsistency of what is incorrectly recognized as facts and is in contradiction with it.

For example, it seems certain that if an opaque disk is placed between the screen and a point source of light, then a solid dark circle of shadow is formed on the screen, cast by this disk. In any case, at the beginning of the last century, this seemed an obvious fact. The French physicist O. Fresnel put forward a hypothesis that light is not a stream of particles, but the movement of waves. It followed from the hypothesis that there should be a small bright spot in the center of the shadow, since waves, unlike particles, are able to bend around the edges of the disk. There was a clear contradiction between hypothesis and fact. Subsequently, more carefully set up experiments showed that a bright spot does indeed form in the center of the shadow. As a result, it was not Fresnel's hypothesis that was discarded, but a fact that seemed obvious.

The situation is especially difficult with facts in the sciences of man and society. The problem is not only that some facts may turn out to be doubtful, or even simply untenable. It also lies in the fact that the full meaning of a fact and its specific meaning can only be understood in a certain theoretical context, when considering the fact from some general point of view. This particular dependence of the facts of the humanities on the theories within which they are established and interpreted was emphasized more than once by the philosopher A.F. Losev. In particular, he said that all so-called facts are always random, unexpected, fluid and unreliable, often incomprehensible; therefore, willy-nilly, one often has to deal not only with facts, but even more with those generalities, without which it is impossible to understand the facts themselves.

Direct confirmation is possible only in the case of statements about single objects or their limited collections. Theoretical propositions usually concern unlimited sets of things. The facts used in such confirmation are by no means always reliable and largely depend on general, theoretical considerations. There is nothing strange, therefore, that the scope of application of direct observation is rather narrow.

There is a widespread belief that in substantiating and refuting statements, the main and decisive role is played by facts, direct observation of the objects under study. This belief needs, however, substantial clarification. Bringing true and indisputable facts is a reliable and successful way of substantiating. Contrasting such facts with false or dubious propositions is a good method of refutation. An actual phenomenon, an event that is not consistent with the consequences of some universal proposition, refutes not only these consequences, but also the proposition itself. Facts, as you know, are stubborn things. When confirming statements relating to a limited range of objects, and refuting erroneous, divorced from reality, speculative constructions, the “stubbornness of facts” is manifested especially clearly.

And yet facts, even in their narrow application, do not have absolute "hardness." Even taken together, they do not constitute a completely reliable, unshakable foundation for the knowledge based on them. Facts mean a lot, but not everything.

As already mentioned, the most important and at the same time universal method of confirmation is indirect confirmation – derivation of logical consequences from the substantiated position and their subsequent experimental verification.

Here is an example of indirect confirmation that has already been used.

It is known that a strongly cooled object in a warm room is covered with dew drops. If we see that a person entering a house immediately fogs up his glasses, we can conclude with reasonable certainty that it is frosty outside.

The importance of empirically substantiating claims cannot be overemphasized. It is primarily due to the fact that the only source of our knowledge is experience - in the sense that knowledge begins with a living, sensual contemplation, with what is given in direct observation. Sensory experience connects a person with the world, theoretical knowledge is only a superstructure on an empirical basis.

However, the theoretical is not completely reducible to the empirical. Experience is not an absolute and indisputable guarantor of the irrefutability of knowledge. He, too, can be criticized, tested and revised. “In the empirical basis of objective science,” writes K. Popper, “there is nothing ‘absolute’. Science does not rest on a solid foundation of facts. The rigid structure of her theories rises, so to speak, above the swamp. It is like a building erected on stilts. These piles are driven into the swamp, but do not reach any natural or "given" foundation. If we stopped driving piles further, it was not at all because we had reached solid ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are strong enough to support, at least for a while, the weight of our structure.”

Thus, if we limit the circle of ways of substantiating statements by their direct or indirect confirmation in experience, then it will turn out to be incomprehensible how it is still possible to move from hypotheses to theories, from assumptions to true knowledge.

4. Facts as examples and illustrations

Empirical data can be used in the course of argumentation as examples, illustrations And samples.

An example is a fact or special case used as a starting point for a subsequent generalization and to reinforce the generalization made.

“Next I say,” wrote the 18th century philosopher. J. Berkeley, - that sin or moral depravity does not consist in external physical action or movement, but in an internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. For killing an enemy in battle, or carrying out a death sentence on a criminal, is not considered sinful according to the law, although the external action here is the same as in the case of murder. Two examples are given here (murder in war and in the execution of a death sentence) to support the general proposition of sin or moral corruption. The use of facts or particular cases as examples must be distinguished from their use as illustrations or sample. Acting as an example, a particular case makes generalization possible; as an illustration, it reinforces an already established position; as a model, it encourages imitation.

An example can be used not only to support descriptive statements, but also as a starting point for descriptive generalizations. The example is incapable of supporting judgments and assertions, which, like norms, oaths, promises, recommendations, declarations, and the like, gravitate toward judgments. An example cannot serve as a starting material for evaluative and similar statements. What is sometimes presented as an example, designed to somehow support an assessment, a norm, etc., is in fact not an example, but a model. The difference between an example and a sample is significant: an example is a description, while a sample is an assessment related to some particular case and setting a particular standard, ideal, etc.

The purpose of the example is to lead to the formulation of the general proposition and, to some extent, to be an argument in support of the latter. Related to this is the selection criteria for the example. First of all, the fact or particular case chosen as an example should look clear and undeniable. It must also clearly enough express the tendency to generalization. With the requirement of tendentiousness, or typicality, of facts taken as an example, there is a recommendation to list several examples of the same type, if taken one by one they do not suggest with the necessary certainty the direction of the forthcoming generalization or do not reinforce the generalization already made. If the intention to argue with an example is not explicitly declared, the fact itself and its context should show that listeners are dealing with an example, and not with a description of an isolated phenomenon, perceived as simple information. The event used as an example should be taken, if not as usual, then at least as logically and physically possible. If this is not so, then the example simply breaks off the sequence of reasoning and leads just to the opposite result or comic effect. The example must be chosen and formed in such a way that it encourages a transition from the singular or particular to the general, and not from the particular again to the particular.

The opinion is sometimes expressed that an example should be given before the formulation of the generalization to which it pushes and which it supports. It is unlikely that this opinion is justified. The order of presentation is not particularly important for arguing by example. It may precede the generalization, but may also follow it. The function of an example is to push the thought towards a generalization and to support this generalization with a specific and typical example. If the emphasis is on giving thought movement and helping it to inertia come to a generalizing position, then the example usually precedes the generalization. If the reinforcing function of the example comes to the fore, then perhaps it is better to give it after generalization. However, these two tasks facing the example are so closely related that their separation and even more so their opposition, which affects the sequence of presentation, is possible only in abstraction. Rather, here we can talk about another rule related to the complexity and surprise of the generalization that is made on the basis of an example. If it is difficult or simply unexpected for the audience, it is better to prepare its introduction with an example that precedes it. If the generalization is known in general terms to the listeners and does not sound like a paradox to them, then an example can follow its introduction into the presentation.

An illustration is a fact or a special case, designed to strengthen the audience's conviction in the correctness of an already known and accepted position. An example pushes the thought to a new generalization and reinforces this generalization, an illustration clarifies a well-known general position, demonstrates its meaning with the help of a number of possible applications, enhances the effect of its presence in the minds of the audience. The difference between the tasks of the example and the illustration is related to the difference in the criteria for their selection. The example should look rather “solid”, unambiguously interpreted fact. An illustration has the right to cause slight doubts, but at the same time it should especially vividly influence the imagination of the audience, stop its attention on itself. An illustration, to a much lesser extent than an example, runs the risk of being misinterpreted, since behind it there is an already known position. The distinction between an example and an illustration is not always clear cut. Aristotle distinguished two uses of an example, depending on whether the speaker has any general principles or not: for a witness worthy of faith is useful even when he is alone.”

The role of special cases, according to Aristotle, is different depending on whether they precede the general position to which they refer, or follow it. The point, however, is that the facts given before the generalization are, as a rule, examples, while one or the few facts given after it are illustrations. This is also evidenced by Aristotle's warning that the listener's demands, for example, are higher than for illustrations. An unfortunate example casts doubt on the general position that it is intended to reinforce. A contradictory example can even refute this proposition. The situation is different with an unsuccessful, inadequate illustration: the general position to which it is given is not questioned, and an inadequate illustration is regarded rather as a negative characteristic of the one who applies it, indicating a lack of understanding of the general principle or his inability to choose a successful illustration. An inadequate illustration can have a comic effect: “You have to respect your parents. When one of them scolds you, immediately object to him. The ironic use of illustration is especially effective when describing a particular person: first, a positive characterization is given to this person, and then an incompatible characterization is given. Thus, in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Anthony, constantly reminding that Brutus is an honest man, cites one after another evidence of his ingratitude and betrayal.

Concretizing the general position with the help of a particular case, the illustration enhances the effect of presence. On this basis, it is sometimes seen as an image, a living picture of an abstract thought. The illustration, however, does not set itself the goal of replacing the abstract with the concrete and thereby transferring consideration to other objects. It does analogy, the illustration is nothing more than a special case, confirming the already known general position or facilitating its clearer understanding.

Often an illustration is chosen based on the emotional resonance it can evoke. This is what Aristotle does, for example, who prefers a periodical style to a coherent style that does not have a clearly visible end: “...because everyone wants to see the end; for this reason (competitors on the run) suffocate and weaken on the turns, while before they did not feel tired, seeing the limit of the run in front of them.

A comparison used in argumentation that is not a comparative assessment (preference) is usually an illustration of one case by another, while both cases are considered as concretizations of the same general principle. A typical example of comparison: “People are shown by circumstances. So, when some circumstance falls to you, remember that it was God, like a gymnastics teacher, who pushed you to a rough end.

5. Theoretical reasoning

All general provisions, scientific laws, principles, etc. cannot be substantiated purely empirically, by reference only to experience. They also require theoretical justification based on reasoning and referring us to other accepted statements. Without this, there is neither abstract theoretical knowledge nor firm, justified beliefs.

One of the important ways to theoretically substantiate the assertion is deriving it from some more general propositions. If the put forward assumption can be logically (deductively) deduced from some established truths, this means that it is true.

Suppose someone who is not familiar with the basics of the theory of electricity, conjectures that direct current is characterized not only by strength, but also by voltage. To confirm this conjecture, it is enough to open any reference book and find out that any current in general has a certain voltage. From this general position it follows that direct current also has voltage.

In Leo Tolstoy's story "The Death of Ivan Ilyich" there is an episode that is directly related to logic.

Ivan Ilyich felt that he was dying and was in constant despair. In an agonizing search for some kind of light, he even seized on his old idea that the rules of logic, which are always true for everyone, are inapplicable to him. “That example of the syllogism that he studied in logic: Kai is a man, people are mortal, therefore Kai is mortal, seemed to him throughout his life to be correct only in relation to Kai, but not to him. It was Kai - a man, a man in general, and it was absolutely fair; but he was not Kai and, in general, a man, but he was a very, very special being from all the others ... And Kai is definitely mortal, and it’s right for him to die, but not for me, Vanya, Ivan Ilyich, with all my feelings, thoughts, - for me it’s another thing. And it can't be that I should die. It would be too terrible."

The course of Ivan Ilyich's thoughts is dictated, of course, by the despair that gripped him. Only it gave rise to the idea that what is true always and for everyone will suddenly turn out to be inapplicable at a particular moment to a particular person. In a mind not terrified, such an assumption cannot even arise. However undesirable the consequences of our reasoning may be, they must be accepted if the premises are accepted.

Deductive reasoning is always coercion. When we think, we constantly feel pressure and unfreedom. It is no coincidence that Aristotle, who was the first to emphasize the unconditional nature of logical laws, noted with regret: “Thinking is suffering,” for “if a thing is necessary, it is a burden to us.”

Justifying the statement by deriving it from other accepted provisions, we do not make this statement absolutely reliable and irrefutable. But we fully transfer to it the degree of certainty that is inherent in the propositions accepted as premises of deduction. If, say, we are convinced that all people are mortal and that Ivan Ilyich, with all his particularity and uniqueness, is a man, we are obliged to admit that he is also mortal.

It may seem that deductive justification is, so to speak, the best of all possible methods of justification, since it imparts to the justified assertion the same firmness as the premises from which it is deduced. However, such an estimate would be clearly overstated. The derivation of new propositions from established truths finds only limited application in the process of substantiation. The most interesting and important statements that need to be substantiated are, as a rule, general and cannot be obtained as consequences of existing truths. Statements that require substantiation usually speak of relatively new phenomena that have not been studied in detail and are not yet covered by universal principles.

A substantiated statement must be in agreement with the factual material on the basis of which and for the explanation of which it is put forward. It must also correspond to the laws, principles, theories, etc. available in the area under consideration.. This is the so-called compatibility condition.

If, for example, someone proposes a detailed design of a perpetual motion machine, then we are primarily interested not in the subtleties of the design and not in its originality, but in whether its author is familiar with the law of conservation of energy. Energy, as is well known, does not arise from nothing and does not disappear without a trace, it only passes from one form to another. This means that a perpetual motion machine is incompatible with one of the fundamental laws of nature and, therefore, is in principle impossible, whatever its design.

Being fundamentally important, the condition of compatibility does not, of course, mean that every new provision should be required to fully, passively adapt to what is commonly considered "law" today. Like the correspondence with the facts, the correspondence with the theoretical truths found should not be interpreted too straightforwardly. It may happen that new knowledge will force us to take a different look at what was accepted before, to clarify or even discard something from the old knowledge. Consistency with accepted theories is reasonable as long as it is aimed at finding the truth, and not at maintaining the authority of the old theory.

If the compatibility condition is understood absolutely, then it excludes the possibility of intensive development of science. Science is given the opportunity to develop by extending already discovered laws to new phenomena, but it is deprived of the right to revise the already formulated provisions. But this is tantamount to a virtual denial of the development of science.

The new position should be in agreement not only with well-established theories, but also with certain general principles that have developed in the practice of scientific research. These principles are heterogeneous, they have varying degrees of generality and specificity, compliance with them is desirable, but not necessary.

The most famous of them is simplicity principle. It requires using as few independent assumptions as possible in explaining the phenomena under study, and the latter should be as simple as possible. The principle of simplicity runs through the history of the natural sciences. Many eminent naturalists pointed out that he repeatedly played a leading role in their research. In particular, I. Newton put forward a special requirement "not to overdo it" in the causes when explaining phenomena.

However, the concept of simplicity is not unambiguous. We can talk about the simplicity of the assumptions underlying the theoretical generalization, about the independence of such assumptions from each other. But simplicity can also be understood as ease of manipulation, ease of learning, etc. It is also not obvious that the desire to get by with a smaller number of premises, taken by itself, increases the reliability of the conclusion drawn from them.

“It would seem reasonable to look for the simplest solution,” writes the logician and philosopher W. Quine. “But this supposed property of simplicity is much easier to feel than to describe.” And yet, he continues, “the current standards of simplicity, difficult as they may be to formulate, are playing an increasingly important role. The competence of the scientist includes the generalization and extrapolation of exemplary data and, consequently, the comprehension of laws covering more phenomena than was taken into account; and simplicity in his understanding is precisely what serves as the basis for extrapolation. Simplicity refers to the essence of statistical inference. If a scientist's data is represented as points in a graph, and the law is to be represented as a curve through those points, then he draws the smoothest, simplest curve he can. He even slightly affects the points to simplify the task, justifying himself with inaccurate measurements. If he can get a simpler curve by omitting some points altogether, he tries to explain them in a special way… Whatever simplicity is, it is not just a hobby.”

Another general principle often used in evaluating the assumptions put forward is the so-called familiarity principle. He recommends avoiding unjustified innovations and trying, as far as possible, to explain new phenomena with the help of known laws. “The usefulness of the habitual principle for the continuous activity of the creative imagination,” writes W. Quine, “is a kind of paradox. Conservatism, preferring an inherited or developed conceptual scheme to one's own work done, is both a defense of laziness and a strategy of discovery. If, however, simplicity and conservatism give opposite recommendations, simplicity should be preferred.

The picture of the world developed by science is not unambiguously predetermined by the studied objects themselves. Under these conditions of incomplete certainty, a variety of general recommendations are unfolding, helping to choose one of several competing ideas about the world.

Another way of theoretical substantiation is analysis of the statement in terms of the possibility of its empirical confirmation and refutation.

Scientific statements are required to admit the fundamental possibility of refutation and to presuppose certain procedures for their confirmation. If this is not the case, it is impossible to say with respect to the proposition put forward which situations and facts are incompatible with it, and which ones support it. The position, which in principle does not allow refutation and confirmation, turns out to be beyond constructive criticism; it does not outline any real ways for further research. An assertion that is incomparable either with experience or with existing knowledge cannot, of course, be recognized as justified.

If someone predicts that tomorrow it will rain or it will not rain, then this assumption is fundamentally impossible to refute. It will be true both if it rains the next day, and if it does not. At any time, regardless of the weather, it either rains or it doesn't. It will never be possible to refute this kind of "weather forecast". It also cannot be confirmed.

It can hardly be called justified and the assumption that in exactly ten years in the same place it will be sunny and dry. It is not based on any facts, one cannot even imagine how it could be refuted or confirmed, if not now, then at least in the near future.

At the beginning of this century, the biologist G. Driesch tried to introduce some kind of hypothetical "life force" inherent only in living beings and forcing them to behave the way they behave. This force - Driesch called it "entelechy" - supposedly has different types, depending on the stage of development of organisms. In the simplest unicellular organisms, entelechy is comparatively simple. In humans, it is much larger than the mind, because it is responsible for everything that every cell does in the body. Driesch did not define how the entelechy of, say, an oak differs from that of a goat or a giraffe. He simply said that every organism has its own entelechy. He interpreted the ordinary laws of biology as manifestations of entelechy. If you cut off a limb from a sea urchin in a certain way, then the urchin will not survive. If cut off in another way, the hedgehog will survive, but it will grow only an incomplete limb. If the incision is made differently and at a certain stage of sea urchin growth, then the limb will recover completely. All these relationships, known to zoologists, Driesch interpreted as evidence of the action of entelechy.

Could the existence of a mysterious "life force" be tested experimentally? No, because it did not manifest itself in anything other than the known and explainable and without it. She added nothing to the scientific explanation, and no concrete facts could touch her. The entelechy hypothesis, which had no fundamental possibility of empirical confirmation, was soon abandoned as useless.

Another example of a fundamentally unverifiable assertion is the assumption about the existence of supernatural, non-material objects that do not manifest themselves in any way and do not reveal themselves in any way.

Propositions that, in principle, cannot be verified must, of course, be distinguished from statements that cannot be verified only today, at the current level of development of science. A little over a hundred years ago, it seemed obvious that we would never know the chemical composition of distant celestial bodies. Various hypotheses on this score seemed fundamentally untestable. But after the creation of spectroscopy, they became not only testable, but also ceased to be hypotheses, turning into experimentally established facts.

Assertions that cannot be checked immediately are not discarded if it is possible in principle to check them in the future. But usually such claims do not become the subject of serious scientific discussions.

This is the case, for example, with the assumption of the existence of extraterrestrial civilizations, the practical possibility of testing which is still negligible.

The methods of theoretical substantiation also include checking the put forward position for its applicability to a wide class of objects under study.. If a statement that is true for one area turns out to be sufficiently universal and leads to new conclusions not only in the original, but also in related areas, its objective significance increases markedly. The tendency to expansion, to expand the scope of its applicability is inherent in all fruitful scientific generalizations to a greater or lesser extent.

A good example here is the quantum hypothesis put forward by M. Planck. At the end of the last century, physicists faced the problem of the radiation of the so-called absolutely black body, i.e. a body that absorbs all radiation falling on it and reflects nothing. In order to avoid infinite quantities of radiated energy that have no physical meaning, Planck assumed that energy is not emitted continuously, but in separate discrete portions - quanta. At first glance, the hypothesis seemed to explain one relatively common phenomenon - the radiation of a completely black body. But if this were indeed the case, then the quantum hypothesis would hardly have survived in science. In fact, the introduction of quanta proved to be extraordinarily fruitful and quickly spread to a number of other areas. Based on the idea of ​​quanta, A. Einstein developed the theory of the photoelectric effect, and N. Bohr developed the theory of the hydrogen atom. In a short time, the quantum hypothesis explained from one basis an extremely wide field of very different phenomena.

The expansion of the field of action of the statement, its ability to explain and predict completely new facts is an undoubted and important argument in its support. The confirmation of some scientific position by facts and experimental laws, the existence of which before its nomination could not even be assumed, directly indicates that this position captures the deep inner relationship of the phenomena under study.

It is difficult to name a statement that would justify itself, in isolation from other statements. Justification is always systemic character. The inclusion of a new provision in a system of other provisions that gives stability to its elements is one of the most important steps in its justification..

Confirmation of the consequences arising from a theory is at the same time a reinforcement of the theory itself. On the other hand, the theory imparts certain impulses and force to the propositions put forward on its basis, and thereby contributes to their justification. An assertion that has become part of a theory is no longer based only on individual facts, but in many respects also on a wide range of phenomena explained by the theory, on its prediction of new, previously unknown effects, on its connections with other scientific theories, etc. Having included the analyzed position in the theory, we thereby extend to it the empirical and theoretical support that the theory as a whole has.

This point has been noted more than once by philosophers and scientists who have been thinking about the justification of knowledge.

Thus, the philosopher L. Wittgenstein wrote about the integrity and systemic nature of knowledge: “It is not an isolated axiom that strikes me as obvious, but a whole system in which consequences and premises mutually support each other.” Consistency extends not only to theoretical positions, but also to the data of experience: “It can be said that experience teaches us some statements. However, he does not teach us isolated statements, but a whole set of interdependent propositions. If they were separate, I might doubt them, because I have no experience directly related to each of them. The foundations of a system of assertions, Wittgenstein notes, do not support this system, but are themselves supported by it. This means that the reliability of the foundations is determined not by them in themselves, but by the fact that an integral theoretical system can be built on top of them. The "foundation" of knowledge appears to be hanging in the air until a stable building is built on it. The claims of scientific theory are mutually intertwined and support each other. They hold on like people on a crowded bus when propped up on all sides, and they don't fall because there is nowhere to fall.

Since the theory gives additional support to its claims, improvement of the theory, strengthening of its empirical base and clarification of its general, including philosophical prerequisites, is at the same time a contribution to the substantiation of the statements included in it.

Among the methods of clarifying a theory, a special role is played by revealing the logical connections of its statements, minimizing its initial assumptions, constructing it in the form of an axiomatic system, and, finally, if possible, its formalization.

At axiomatizations theory, some of its provisions are chosen as initial ones, and all other provisions are derived from them in a purely logical way. Assumptions accepted without proof are called axioms(postulates), the provisions proved on their basis - theorems.

The axiomatic method of systematization and clarification of knowledge originated in antiquity and gained great fame thanks to Euclid's "Principles" - the first axiomatic interpretation of geometry. Now axiomatization is used in mathematics, logic, as well as in certain sections of physics, biology, etc. The axiomatic method requires a high level of development of an axiomatizable content theory, clear logical connections of its statements. Associated with this is its rather narrow applicability and the naivety of attempts to rebuild any science along the lines of Euclid's geometry.

In addition, as the logician and mathematician K. Gödel showed, sufficiently rich scientific theories (for example, the arithmetic of natural numbers) do not allow complete axiomatization. This indicates the limitations of the axiomatic method and the impossibility of a complete formalization of scientific knowledge.

Methodological argumentation is the substantiation of a single statement or a holistic concept by referring to the undoubtedly reliable method by which the justified statement or defended concept was obtained.

Ideas about the scope of methodological argumentation have changed from one era to another. Significant importance was attached to it in modern times, when it was believed that it was the methodological guarantee, and not the correspondence to the facts as such, that gave the judgment its validity. The modern methodology of science is skeptical of the view that strict adherence to method can itself provide truth and serve as its reliable justification. The possibilities of methodological argumentation are different in different fields of knowledge. References to the method by which a specific conclusion is obtained are common in the natural sciences, but extremely rare in the humanities and almost never found in practical and even more artistic thinking.

Methodologism, the essence of which is the exaggeration of the value of methodological argumentation and even giving it priority over other methods of theoretical argumentation, is fraught with the danger of relativization of scientific and other knowledge. If the content of knowledge is determined not by a reality independent of it, but by what we should or want to see in it, and the truth is determined by the observance of methodological canons, then the soil of objectivity slips from under knowledge. No surrogates, such as intersubjectivity, acceptance of the method, its success, etc., can replace the truth and provide a sufficiently solid foundation for the acceptance of knowledge. Methodologism reduces scientific thinking to a system of well-established, mainly technical ways of finding new knowledge. The result is that scientific thinking is arbitrarily reduced to the set of techniques it invents. According to the principle empiricism, only observations or experiments play a decisive role in science in the process of accepting or rejecting scientific statements. In accordance with this principle, methodological argumentation can only be of secondary importance and is never able to put an end to the dispute about the fate of a particular scientific statement or theory. The general methodological principle of empiricism is that the various rules of scientific method must not allow for a "dictatorial strategy". They must exclude the possibility that we will always win the game played according to these rules: nature must be able to defeat us at least sometimes.

Methodological rules are vague and unstable, they always have exceptions. In particular, induction, which plays a special role in scientific reasoning, has no clear rules at all. The scientific method certainly exists, but it is not an exhaustive list of rules and models that are mandatory for every researcher. Even the most obvious of these rules can be interpreted in different ways. The "rules of the scientific method" change from one area of ​​knowledge to another, since the essential content of these "rules" is uncodifiable craftsmanship, i.e. the ability to conduct specific research and make generalizations.

The scientific method does not contain rules that do not have or in principle do not allow exceptions. All its rules are conditional and can be violated even if their conditions are met. Any rule can be useful in conducting scientific research, just as any method of argumentation can affect the beliefs of the scientific community. But it does not follow from this that all research methods and argumentation methods actually used in science are equivalent and it does not matter in what sequence they are used. In this respect, the "methodological code" is quite similar to the moral code.

Methodological argumentation is thus quite legitimate, and in science, when the core of methodological requirements is stable, it is necessary. However, methodological arguments are not decisive even in science. First of all, the methodology of humanitarian knowledge is not so clear that it can be referred to. It is sometimes even claimed that the sciences of the mind use a completely different methodology than the sciences of nature. It is generally difficult to say anything concrete about the methodology of practical and artistic thinking. Further, the methodological ideas of scientists are in each specific period of time the result and conclusion of the previous history of scientific knowledge. The methodology of science, formulating its requirements, is based on the history of science. To insist on the unconditional fulfillment of these requirements would be to elevate a certain historical state of science to an eternal and absolute standard. Each new study is not only the application of already known methodological rules, but also their verification. The researcher may obey the old methodological rule, but may also find it unacceptable in some particular new case. The history of science includes both cases where proven rules led to success and cases where success was the result of abandoning some established methodological standard. Scientists not only obey methodological requirements, but also criticize them and create both new theories and new methodologies.

6. Contextual reasoning

Contextual reasoning is reasoning whose effectiveness is limited to certain audiences.

Contextual methods of argumentation include arguments to tradition and authority, to intuition and faith, to common sense and taste, etc. Contextual argumentation is opposed universal argumentation applicable, in principle, to any audience. The line between contextual and universal reasoning is relative. Methods of argumentation that are supposedly universally applicable, such as proof, may not be effective in a particular audience. Conversely, some contextual arguments, like arguments about tradition or intuition, can be convincing to just about any audience. It would be a mistake to characterize the contextual argument as non-rational or even irrational. The distinction between "rational" and "irrational" according to the methods of argumentation is not justified. It sharply narrows the scope of the rational, excluding from it most of the humanitarian and practical reasoning, which is unthinkable without the use of "classics" (authorities), the continuation of tradition, an appeal to common sense and taste, etc. Understanding the finitude that dominates human existence and historical consciousness presupposes the acceptance of conceptual argumentation as a necessary constituent element of rational argumentation.

Of the contextual ways of argumentation, the most common and most significant is argument for tradition. In fact, all other contextual arguments contain a reference to tradition in a condensed form; The audience's perception of the arguments presented is also largely determined by the traditions it shares. Such an influence of tradition on the effectiveness of argumentation is due to the fact that it reinforces those most general assumptions that must be believed in order for the argument to seem plausible, creates that preliminary setting, without which it loses its strength.

A tradition is an anonymous, spontaneously formed system of samples, norms, rules, etc., which guides a fairly large and stable group of people in their behavior.

The broadest traditions, covering the whole society at a certain period of its development, as a rule, are not recognized as such by those who follow them. This is especially evident in the so-called "traditional society", where traditions determine all the least significant aspects of social life. Traditions have a clearly expressed dual, descriptive and evaluative character. On the one hand, they accumulate previous experience of successful activity, they turn out to be a kind of its expression. On the other hand, they represent a blueprint and prescription for future behavior. Tradition is what makes a person a link in the chain of generations, which expresses his stay in historical time, his presence in the “present” as a link connecting the past and the future. Tradition wins its recognition, relying primarily on knowledge and does not require blind obedience. It is also not something like a natural given, limiting freedom of action and not allowing critical discussion; tradition is the point of intersection of human freedom and human history. The opposition of tradition and reason must take into account that reason is not some kind of initial factor, called upon to play the role of an impartial and infallible judge. Reason develops historically and rationality can be considered as one of the traditions.

An argument to tradition is inevitable in all those arguments, including scientific ones, that include the "present" as a topic of discussion or as one of the factors that determine the position of the researcher.

The argument is close to tradition argument to authority - a reference to the opinion or action of a person who has proven himself well in this area by his judgments or actions.

An argument to authority is necessary, although not sufficient, in the case of substantiation of prescriptions (commands, directives, state laws, etc.). It is also important when discussing the value of advice, wishes, methodological and other recommendations. This argument must be taken into account when evaluating warnings, requests, promises, threats, etc. There is no doubt about the role of authority and, accordingly, appeals to it in almost all practical matters.

It is necessary to distinguish between epistemic authority, or the authority of an expert, a specialist in some field, and deontic authority, the authority of a superior person or body. The authority argument advanced in support of the descriptive statement is an appeal to epistemic authority; the same argument, but supporting the evaluative statement, is an appeal to deontic authority. The latter is subdivided into authority sanctions and authority solidarity. The order of the first is carried out under the threat of punishment, the instructions of the second are carried out, since this contributes to the achievement of the set common goal. For example, behind the laws of the state is the authority of the sanction; behind the orders of the captain of the ship at the moment of danger - the authority of solidarity. The division of authorities into authorities of sanction and authorities of solidarity is not rigid. Let's say the laws of the state pursue certain goals that can be shared by the citizens of the state; the captain's orders addressed to the sailors of a sinking ship rely not only on the authority of solidarity, but also on the authority of the sanction.

Argument to authority is only rarely considered sufficient reason to accept a statement. It is usually accompanied by other, explicit or implied arguments. Norms, unlike other assessments, always require an indication of the authority to which they belong. The first question that arises when discussing a norm is the question of whether there is some kind of authority behind it and whether it is competent to oblige, allow or prohibit. If there is no authority or does not have sufficient authority, there is no possible punishment for non-compliance with the norm, and therefore there is no norm itself.

Of the many fallacies associated with the authority argument, two stand out: the sharp opposition between authority and reason; confusion of deontic authority with epistemic. Authority and reason do not contradict each other, to listen to authority - most often means to behave quite prudently. If, for example, a mother tells a child that there is a big city of Moscow, the child acts sensibly, believing this to be true. The pilot acts just as wisely when he believes the reports of the meteorologist. Even in science, we resort to authorities, as evidenced, in particular, by the extensive libraries available in every scientific institute.

As you know, the essence of dogmatism is the desire to always go from a hardened doctrine to reality, to practice, and in no case in the opposite direction. The dogmatist is incapable of noticing the discrepancy between an idea and changed circumstances. He does not even stop to dissect the latter so that they turn out to be - or at least seem - to correspond to the idea.

The product and continuation of dogmatism is authoritarian thinking. It strengthens and concretizes dogmatism by combining quotations, sayings, sayings belonging to recognized authorities. At the same time, the latter are canonized, turning into idols, incapable of making mistakes and guaranteeing those who follow them against mistakes.

Thinking without preconditions, relying only on itself, does not exist. Any thinking proceeds from certain, explicit or implicit, analyzed or accepted without analysis premises, because it always relies on past experience and its comprehension. But the prerequisites of theoretical thinking and its authoritarianism are not identical. Authoritarianism is a special, extreme, so to speak, degenerate case of prerequisites, when the function of research and reflection itself is almost completely shifted to authority.

Even before the study of specific problems, authoritarian thinking limits itself to a certain set of “fundamental” statements, to the model that determines the main line of research and largely determines its result. The original sample is not subject to any doubt and no modification, at least in its essence. It is supposed to contain in embryo the solution to every problem that arises, or at least the key to such a solution. The system of ideas taken as a model is considered to be internally consistent. If there are several samples, they are considered to be quite consistent with each other.

Reference to authority, to something said or written by someone does not belong to the universal methods of justification. Of course, authorities are needed, including in the theoretical sphere. The possibilities of an individual are limited, far from everything he is able to independently analyze and verify. In many ways, he is forced to rely on the opinions and judgments of others.

But one should rely not because it was said by "so-and-so", but because what was said seems to be correct. Blind faith in the everlasting rightness of authority, and even more superstitious admiration for it, is poorly compatible with the search for truth, goodness and beauty, requiring an unbiased, critical mind. As B. Pascal said, "nothing is so inconsistent with reason as its distrust of itself."

Authoritarian thinking is condemned by almost everyone. And yet such "blinkered thinking" is far from uncommon. There are several reasons for this. One of them has already been mentioned: a person is not able not only to live, but also to think alone. He remains a "social being" in the sphere of thought as well: the reasoning of each individual is based on the discoveries and experiences of other people. It is often difficult to grasp the line where critical, balanced perception turns into unjustified trust in what is written and said by others.

The American entrepreneur and production manager Henry Ford once remarked: “For most people, the punishment is the need to think.” This is hardly true of the majority, but there are certainly people who are more inclined to rely on someone else's opinion than to seek an independent solution. It is much easier to go with the flow than to try to row against it.

A certain Dauphin of France could not understand from the explanations of his teacher why the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. Finally, the teacher exclaimed: “I swear to you, Your Highness, that she is their equal!” “Why didn’t you immediately explain to me so convincingly?” asked the Dauphin.

“We are all lazy and incurious,” said the poet, probably referring to the frequent unwillingness to think on our own. The case of the Dauphin, who trusts more in oath than in geometric proof, is a concentrated expression of the "laziness and lack of curiosity" that sometimes tends to incline towards passive following of authority.

One day, the Norwegian police, worried about the spread of homemade medicines, placed an ad in the newspaper about the inadmissibility of using a medicine with the following advertisement: “New drug Lurism-300x: saves from baldness, cures all chronic diseases, saves gasoline, makes fabric bulletproof. The price is only 15 crowns.” The promises made by this advertisement are absurd, besides, the word "lurism" in the local jargon meant "half-wit." Nevertheless, the newspaper that published the ad received three hundred requests for this drug in the next few days, with the required amount attached.

A certain role in this unexpected turn of events was played not only by faith and hope for a miracle, which are characteristic even of modern man, but also by the excessive trust in the authority of the printed word, which is characteristic of many. Once printed, it means true - this is one of the prerequisites for authoritarian thinking. But one has only to imagine how many different kinds of fables and absurdities appear in the press, so as not to look at what is printed uncritically.

Authorities are needed, including in the theoretical sphere. But one should rely on their opinions, not because it was said by "so-and-so", but because what was said seems to be correct. Blind faith in the ever-rightness of authority, and even more superstitious admiration for it, is incompatible with the search for truth and goodness, which requires an unbiased, critical mind. Authority belongs to a certain human person, but the authority of a person has as its final basis not submission and renunciation of reason, but the realization that this person surpasses us in intelligence and sharpness of judgment. Recognizing someone as an authority is always associated with the assumption that his judgments are not unreasonably arbitrary, but are accessible to understanding and critical analysis.

Intuitive argumentation is a reference to the immediate, intuitive evidence of the put forward position.

The role of intuition and, accordingly, intuitive argumentation in mathematics and logic is very great. Intuition is essential in moral life, in historical and in general in humanitarian knowledge. Artistic thinking is generally unthinkable without intuition. However, pure intuitive reasoning is rare. Usually, for a result found intuitively, reasons are sought after the fact that seem more convincing than a reference to its intuitive evidence. Intuition is never final and its result is subject to critical analysis. Even in mathematics, intuition is not always clear: statements like 2+2=4 have the highest degree of evidence, but already 1002+2=1004 has a lower degree of evidence and is proved not by actual calculation, but by reasoning. Intuition can simply deceive. For most of the 19th century mathematicians were intuitively convinced that any continuous function has a derivative, but Weierstrass proved the existence of a continuous function that does not have a derivative at any point. Mathematical reasoning corrected intuition and supplemented it. Intuition changes over time and is largely a product of cultural development and advances in discursive thinking. Einstein's intuition about space and time was clearly different from the corresponding intuition of Newton or Kant. The intuition of a specialist, as a rule, surpasses the intuition of an amateur.

Intuition is close faith- a deep sincere, emotionally saturated conviction in the justice of some position or concept. If intuition is the direct perception of truth and goodness, then faith is the direct inclination towards what appears to be truth or goodness. Like intuition, faith is subjective and varies from person to person. In different eras, diametrically opposed views were the subject of sincere faith. What everyone once sacredly believed in, after a while, most already seemed to be a naive prejudice. Depending on the way in which faith is justified, there are rational And irrational faith. The latter serves as an excuse for itself. The very fact of faith is considered sufficient to justify it. A reference to firm faith, a strong conviction in the correctness of a position, can be used as an argument in favor of accepting that position. However argument To faith seems convincing and weighty, as a rule, only to those who share this faith or are inclined to accept it. The rest of the argument for faith may seem subjective and almost empty: you can believe in the most ridiculous statements. Nevertheless, there are situations when the argument for faith turns out to be almost the only one - situations of radical dissent, irreconcilable "dissent". It is impossible to convert a dissident with reasonable arguments. In this case, it remains only to firmly hold on to your faith and declare opposing views as heretical, insane, etc. Where reasoning and reasoning are powerless, the expression of a firm, persistent conviction can play some role over time. The argument to faith only in rare cases appears explicitly. Usually it is implied, and only the weakness or indistinctness of the arguments given directly indirectly shows that there is an implicit appeal to faith behind them.

Common sense can be characterized as a general sense of truth and justice inherent in every person, given by the experience of life.

At its core, common sense is not knowledge. Rather, it is a way of selecting knowledge, that general illumination, thanks to which the main and the secondary are distinguished in knowledge and the extremes are outlined. Argument for common sense, one of the most common in contextual argumentation. Modern philosophical hermeneutics attaches significant importance to this argument, opposing its intellectualization and reducing it to the level of a simple amendment: that which contradicts common sense in feelings, judgments and conclusions cannot be correct. Common sense can be applied first of all in social, practical affairs. He judges not by the general prescriptions of reason, but rather by convincing examples. History and life experience are decisive for him. Common sense cannot be learned, it can only be practiced. An appeal to common sense is inevitable in the humanities, which are woven into the historical tradition and are not only its understanding, but also its continuation. Appeal to common sense is quite rare and unreliable in the natural sciences, which seek to abstract from their history and put it out of brackets.

The argument to taste is an appeal to the sense of taste that the audience has and is able to persuade it to accept the advanced position.

Taste concerns only the perfection of some things and relies on direct feeling, and not on reasoning. I. Kant characterized taste as "a sensual definition of perfection". The concept of taste was originally a moral one, and only later its use was narrowed down to the aesthetic sphere of "beautiful spirituality." Good taste is not wholly subjective; it presupposes the capacity for distance from oneself and group predilections. You can give preference to something, despite the fact that it is not at the same time accepted by your own taste. The principle “There is no dispute about tastes” is not true in its general formulation. Disputes about tastes are common enough, aesthetics and art criticism consist mainly of such disputes. You can argue about tastes, but only with the intention to achieve not truth, but victory, i.e. assertion of their system of evaluations, and arguing is not only incorrect, sophistical, but also quite correct. Argument for fashion is a special case of the taste argument. Taste bears the imprint of the commonality of social life and changes along with its change. Judgments of taste relating to different epochs or to different societies usually turn out to be incompatible with each other.

7. Rationale and Truth

Examples from the history of science show that justification is not only complex, but also a multi-stage procedure. A substantiated statement, which has entered the theory as its constituent element, ceases to be problematic knowledge. But this does not mean that it becomes an absolute truth, the ultimate truth, incapable of further development and refinement.

The substantiation of the statement makes it not an absolute, but only a relative truth, correctly grasping the mechanism of the phenomena under study at a given level of cognition. In the process of further deepening of knowledge, such a truth can and will certainly be overcome. But its main content, subjected to limitation and clarification, will retain its significance.

The complexity of the procedure for substantiating theoretical statements leads some philosophers and scientists to believe that this procedure never leads to any solid result and that all our knowledge is, by its very nature, conditional and hypothetical. It begins with an assumption and remains so forever, since there is no path leading from a plausible assumption to an undeniable truth.

Philosopher B. Russell wrote that "all human knowledge is unreliable, inaccurate and partial." “Not only science cannot reveal the nature of things to us,” A. Poincaré argued, “nothing can reveal it to us.” K. Popper for a long time defended the idea that such a thing as confirmation of hypotheses is generally a fiction. Only their refutation is possible on the basis of establishing the falsity of the consequences arising from them. What we are accustomed to consider as reliable knowledge is, according to Popper, only a set of assumptions that for the time being withstand attempts to refute them.

An even more radical position is taken by the philosopher P. Feyerabend, who claims that the so-called “scientific method”, which has always been considered the most effective means of obtaining new knowledge and substantiating it, is nothing more than a fiction: “Science does not stand out in a positive direction by its method, because such a method does not exist; it does not stand out for its results either: we know what science has achieved, but we have no idea of ​​what other traditions could achieve. Feyerabend is inclined to explain the authority of science by circumstances external to it: "... Today science dominates not because of its comparative merits, but thanks to the propaganda and advertising campaigns organized for it." Feyerabend’s general conclusion follows in the key of this “debunking” of the scientific method and its result - objective scientific knowledge: “... Science is much closer to a myth than the philosophy of science is ready to admit. This is one of the many forms of thinking humans have developed, and not necessarily the best. It blinds only those who have already made a decision in favor of a certain ideology or do not think at all about the advantages and limitations of science. Since the acceptance or non-acceptance of this or that ideology should be left to the individual himself, it follows that the separation of the state from the church must be supplemented by the separation of the state from science - this most aggressive and most dogmatic religious institution. Such a separation is our only chance to achieve that humanism that we are capable of, but which we have never achieved.

If science does not provide objective, substantiated knowledge and is so close to myth and religion that, like them, it must be separated from the state and, in particular, from the learning process, then the very formulation of the problem of substantiating knowledge loses its meaning. Fact and word of authority, scientific law and faith or tradition, scientific method and intuitive insight become completely equal. Thus, the distinction between truth, which requires a reliable foundation, and subjective opinion, which is often not based on any reasonable arguments, is erased.

So the complexity and ambiguity of the justification process inclines to the idea that all knowledge is a hypothesis, and even inspires the idea that science differs little from religion.

Indeed, the search for absolute certainty and certainty is doomed to failure, whether in chemistry, history, or mathematics. Scientific theories are always conjectural in one way or another. They do not give absolute, but only relative truth.

But this is precisely the truth, and not a guess or a risky assumption. The practical results of applying scientific knowledge to transform the world, to achieve human goals clearly show that the theories of science have an objectively true and, therefore, irrefutable content.

Speaking about methods of justification that differ in their effectiveness, and in particular about scientific justification, it should be remembered that science, for all its importance, is neither the only, nor even the central sphere of human activity. Scientific knowledge is primarily only a means for society to solve its manifold problems. To reduce all forms of human activity to such cognition or to model them on its model is not only naive, but also dangerous. The result of such information would be "marriage as an exact science", "playing cards in a scientific way", raising children in a scientific way, love "according to science", and even mercy, justified in a scientific way.

Earlier, we talked about the methods of justification used in science and those areas of life in which consistent, demonstrative reasoning plays a central role. But even a system of scientific knowledge cannot be established solely by arguments. An attempt to substantiate any scientific proposition "to the end" would lead to a regression to infinity. The rationale is based on mode of action, specific practice.

It is unjustified to extend the methods of justification characteristic of science to other areas that may have little in common with it and convince by completely different means.

In a work of art, one does not need to specifically prove, one must, on the contrary, give up the desire to build chains of reasoning, revealing the consequences of accepted premises.

“The power of reason is,” B. Pascal wrote, “that he recognizes the existence of many phenomena that are incomprehensible to him; he is weak if he cannot understand it.” By "reason" is meant, of course, the reasoning, substantiating reason, which finds the most perfect embodiment in science.

The aesthetician J. Joubert notes about Aristotle: “He was wrong in his desire to make everything in his books scientific, that is, provable, reasoned, irrefutable; he did not take into account that there are truths that are accessible only to the imagination, and that, perhaps, it is these truths that are the most beautiful. And if this is true in relation to Aristotle, who was primarily concerned with logic and philosophy, then those who, “verifying harmony by algebra”, want to rebuild ideology, morality, art criticism, etc., are all the more wrong.

Rational methods of justification are an indispensable tool of the human mind. But their scope is not unlimited. Its expansion beyond measure is just as unjustified as its immoderate narrowing.

8. Argumentation in support of estimates

Justification of ratings - bringing arguments (arguments) in support of the stated ratings with the intention of convincing the audience of their acceptability.

For example, as an argument in support of the evaluation "It is good when a soldier is disciplined", one can refer to the statement "An army consisting of undisciplined soldiers will surely fail"; rating " N must be honest" can be substantiated by referring to the fact that it follows from the premises " N. is a man" and "Every man must be honest."

Ways of argumentation are divided to universal applicable to any audience, and contextual successful only in some audiences. Universal reasoning is further subdivided into empirical, which includes a reference to what is given in experience, and theoretical based mainly on reasoning. This classification of justification methods in relation to evaluative statements requires an important clarification: the empirical justification of estimates has a different meaning than the justification of descriptive (descriptive) statements. Estimates cannot be supported by references to what is given in direct experience. At the same time, there are ways of justifying estimates that are in a certain respect similar to the ways of justifying descriptions and which can therefore be called quasi-empirical. These include various inductive reasonings, among the premises of which there are estimates and the conclusion of which is also an estimate. This incomplete induction, analogy, link to sample, target justification(confirmation), interpretation of the act of understanding as inductive evidence in favor of its premises, etc.

Values ​​are not given to a person in experience. They don't talk about There is in the world, but that must in him be, and they cannot be seen, heard, etc. Knowledge about values ​​cannot be empirical; the procedures for obtaining it can only superficially resemble the procedures for obtaining empirical knowledge.

The simplest and at the same time the most unreliable way of inductively justifying estimates is incomplete(popular) induction. Her general scheme:

Here are the first n the premises are estimates, the last premise is a descriptive statement; the conclusion is an estimate. For example:

Suvorov had to be steadfast and courageous.

Napoleon had to be steadfast and courageous.

Eisenhower had to be tough and courageous.

Suvorov, Napoleon and Eisenhower were generals.

Every commander must be steadfast and courageous

A popular way of inductively arguing in support of estimates is by analogy. The general scheme of evaluative analogy:

Item A has features a b, c and is positively (negatively, neutrally) valuable.

Item B has signs a, b, c

Item B is also probably positively (negatively, neutrally) valuable.

In this reasoning, the similarity of two objects in some features turns out to be continued, and on the basis of the fact that the first object has a certain value, it is concluded that the second object has the same value.

For example: "Book A- a dystopia written in good language, with an entertaining plot, deserves praise; book B it is also a dystopia, written in good language and having an entertaining plot; means a book B also seems to be commendable."

Often the analogy with the evaluative premise appears in the form: “The subject A has properties a, b, c and should be d; item B has properties a, b, c; means the subject B should probably be d».

For example: “A good car has wheels, a motor, and should be economical; a good tractor has wheels and a motor; it means that a good tractor, apparently, should also be economical.” Only in the most rare cases does evaluative analogy appear in such a transparent form as in the examples cited. “A man is as childish compared to a deity,” said Heraclitus, “like a child compared to a man.” In this folded analogy, the point is that a person, in comparison with a higher stage of development (which is a deity), should appear childish, since a child, in many ways similar to an adult (and having him at a higher stage of his development), should appear childish.

In Don Quixote, Cervantes draws this clear analogy: “A knight-errant without a lady is like a tree without leaves, a building without a foundation, or a shadow without a body to cast it.” Since a tree devoid of leaves, a building without a foundation, and a shadow without a body are suspicious and cannot be evaluated positively, a knight-errant without a lady evokes the same reaction.

Another way of inductively justifying estimates is sample appeal.

A model is the behavior of a person or group of people to be followed.. The sample is fundamentally different from example: the example says that There is actually and is used to support descriptive statements, the pattern says that should be and is used to reinforce general evaluative statements. Due to its special social prestige, the model not only supports the assessment, but also serves as a guarantee for the chosen type of behavior: following a generally recognized model guarantees a high assessment of behavior in the eyes of society.

The model plays an exceptional role in social life, in the formation and strengthening of social values. A person, a society, an epoch are largely characterized by the patterns they follow and the way they understand these patterns. There are models intended for general imitation, but there are also designed only for a narrow circle of people. Don Quixote is a kind of model: he is imitated precisely because he was able to selflessly follow the model chosen by himself. An example can be a real person, taken in all the variety of his inherent properties, but a person’s behavior in a certain, rather narrow area can also act as a model: there are examples of love for one’s neighbor, love of life, self-sacrifice, etc. The behavior of a fictitious person can also be a model: a literary hero, a mythical hero, etc. Sometimes such a hero does not act as a whole person, but demonstrates only individual virtues by his behavior. You can, for example, imitate Ivan the Terrible or Pierre Bezukhov, but you can also strive to follow in your behavior the altruism of Dr. P.F. Haaz or the love of Don Juan. Indifference to a model can itself look like a model: the one who knows how to avoid the temptation of imitation is sometimes set as an example. If the model is an integral person, who usually has not only advantages, but also known shortcomings, it often happens that his shortcomings have a greater impact on people's behavior than his undeniable advantages. As B. Pascal noted, “an example of the purity of morals of Alexander the Great much less often inclines people to abstinence, weeks an example of his drunkenness - to licentiousness. It is not at all shameful to be less virtuous than he is, and it is pardonable to be just as vicious."

Along with samples, there are also antisamples. The task of the latter is to give repulsive examples of behavior and thereby turn away such behavior. Exposure to the anti-pattern is more effective for some people than exposure to the specimen. As determinants of behavior, pattern and anti-pattern are not entirely equal. Not everything that can be said about a pattern applies equally to the anti-pattern, which is generally less definite and can only be correctly interpreted by comparing it with a specific pattern: what does it mean not to behave like Sancho Panza , is understandable only to those who know the behavior of Don Quixote.

Argumentation to the model is common in fiction. Here it is, as a rule, indirect in nature: the reader himself will have to choose the sample according to the indirect instructions of the author.

Along with patterns of human actions, there are also patterns of other things: objects, events, situations, and so on. The first examples are called ideals, the second - standards. For all objects that a person regularly encounters, be it hammers, watches, medicines, etc., there are standards that say what objects of this kind should be. Reference to these standards is a common argument in support of estimates. The standard for items of a certain type usually takes into account their typical function; in addition to functional properties, it may also include some morphological features. For example, no hammer can be called good if it cannot be used to hammer nails; it will also not be good if, while allowing nails to be driven in, it still has a bad handle.

The most important and common way to justify estimates is target justification of estimates.

Purposeful justification is the justification of a positive assessment of some object by referring to the fact that it can be used to obtain another object that has a positive value.

For example, in the morning you should do exercises, as this helps to improve health; one must return good for good, as this leads to justice in relations between people, and so on. Goal justification is sometimes called motivational; if the goals mentioned in it are not the goals of a person, it is usually called teleological.

The central and most important way of empirical substantiation of descriptive (descriptive) statements is the derivation of logical consequences from the substantiated position and their subsequent experimental verification. Confirmation of the consequences is evidence in favor of the truth of the proposition itself. General scheme of indirect empirical confirmation:

(1) From A logically follows IN; IN confirmed in experience; means probably A true.

This is inductive reasoning; the truth of the premises does not ensure the truth of the conclusion here. Empirical confirmation can also be based on confirmation in the experience of the consequence of a causal relationship. The general scheme of such causal confirmation is:

(2) A is the reason B; consequence B occurs; so probably the reason A also takes place.

An analogue of scheme (1) of empirical confirmation is the following scheme quasi-empirical justification(confirmations) estimates:

(1*) From A logically follows IN; IN A

For example: “If we go to the cinema tomorrow and go to the theater, then we will go to the theater tomorrow; it's good that we'll go to the theater tomorrow; it means, apparently, it’s good that we will go to the cinema tomorrow and go to the theater. This is an inductive reasoning that justifies one assessment ("It's good that we'll go to the cinema tomorrow and we'll go to the theater") by reference to another assessment ("It's good that we'll go to the theater tomorrow").

An analogue of scheme (2) of causal confirmation of descriptive statements is the following scheme quasi-empirical target justification(confirmations) estimates:

(2*) A is the reason B; consequence B- positive value so probably the reason A is also positively valuable.

For example: “If it rains at the beginning of summer, the harvest will be large; it is good that there will be a big harvest; so, apparently, it’s good that it rains at the beginning of summer. ” This is again inductive reasoning, justifying one assessment ("It's good that it rains in early summer") by reference to another assessment ("It's good that there will be a big harvest") and some causal connection.

In schemes (1*) and (2*), we are talking about a quasi-empirical justification, since the confirmed consequences are estimates, and not empirical (descriptive) statements.

In the scheme (2 *) the package " A is the reason B» is a descriptive statement that establishes the relationship of the cause A with the investigation B. If a given effect is said to be positively valuable, the cause-effect relationship becomes a means-end relationship. Scheme (2*) can be reformulated as follows:

A there is a means to an end IN; IN- positive value means probably A also positively appreciated.

An argument following this pattern justifies the means by referring to the positive value of the end they achieve. It is, one might say, a detailed formulation of the well-known and always controversial principle "The end justifies the means." The disputes are explained by the inductive nature of the justification (justification) behind the principle of purpose: the end probably, but not always and necessarily justifies the means.

Another scheme of quasi-empirical target substantiation of estimates is the scheme:

(2**) Non- A there is a reason not B; But B- positive value means probably A is also positively valuable.

For example: “If you do not hurry, then we will not come to the beginning of the performance; it would be nice to be at the beginning of the performance; so it looks like you should hurry up.”

It is sometimes argued that the purposeful justification of estimates is deductive reasoning. However, it is not. Target justification, and in particular the so-called known since the time of Aristotle practical syllogism, is inductive reasoning.

The purposeful justification of estimates is widely used in various areas of evaluative reasoning, from everyday, moral, political discussions to methodological, philosophical and scientific discussions.

Here is a typical example taken from B. Russell:

“Most of the opponents of the Locke school,” writes Russell, “admired the war as a heroic phenomenon and suggesting contempt for comfort and peace. Those who embraced the utilitarian ethic, on the other hand, tended to regard most wars as madness. This again, at least in the 19th century, brought them into alliance with the capitalists, who did not like wars because wars interfered with trade. The motives of the capitalists were, of course, purely selfish, but they led to views more in tune with the common interest than the views of the militarists and their ideologists. This passage mentions three different target arguments justifying or condemning war:

War is a heroic phenomenon and fosters contempt for comfort and peace; heroism and contempt for comfort and peace are positively valued; This means that war is also positively valuable.

War not only does not contribute to general happiness, but, on the contrary, most seriously hinders it; general happiness is something to which one should strive in every possible way; This means that war must be categorically avoided.

War interferes with trade; trade is positively valuable; so war is bad.

The persuasiveness of the target justification for the audience essentially depends on three circumstances: first, how effective is the connection between the goal and the means that is proposed to achieve it; second, whether the remedy itself is sufficiently acceptable; thirdly, how acceptable and important for this audience is the assessment that fixes the goal. In different audiences, the same target justification may have different persuasiveness. This means that target justification refers to contextual (situational) ways of argumentation.

Regardless of how valuable the goal is and how acceptable the proposed means to achieve it, goal justification is inductive reasoning. Even if the causality used in it is strong, the proposed means is quite acceptable, and the goal is significant, the conclusion of the goal justification is a problematic statement that needs further justification.

Two more examples of purposeful justification, taken from the philosopher of the XVIII century. J. Locke. Locke writes in one place that a man should not have so many plums that neither he nor his family can eat, as they will spoil, but he can have as much gold and diamonds as he can legally get, for gold and diamonds do not deteriorate. Apparently, Locke reasoned as follows: “If a person has too many plums, then some of them will certainly spoil; bad when plums spoil; so you can't have too many plums." This reasoning is an attempt to purposefully substantiate the norm "You can't have too many plums." The reasoning is unconvincing, since its first premise is not a true statement: it does not occur to Locke that the owner of a large number of plums can sell them or donate them before they spoil.

Locke's second target rationale: “Precious metals are the source of money and social inequality; economic inequality is deplorable and condemnable; therefore, precious metals deserve condemnation. Locke accepted the first premise of this reasoning, deplored, albeit purely theoretically, economic inequality, and at the same time did not think that it would be wise to take steps that could prevent this inequality. There is no logical inconsistency in such a position, since in this target justification, as in any other, the conclusion does not follow logically from the premises.

Methods of theoretical argumentation in support of assessments include their deductive justification, systemic argumentation (in particular, internal restructuring of the theory), demonstration of the compatibility of the justified assessment with other accepted assessments, its compliance with certain general assessment principles, methodological justification, etc. We can say that theoretical argumentation in support of value statements, including norms, is largely parallel to the theoretical substantiation of descriptive statements: almost all methods of argumentation applicable in the case of descriptions can also be used to substantiate estimates. An exception is the analysis of statements from the point of view of the possibility of their empirical confirmation and refutation: estimates cannot be required to admit the fundamental possibility of refutation by empirical data and presuppose certain procedures for their confirmation by such data.

The deductive justification of estimates consists in the derivation of a justified evaluative statement from other, previously accepted estimates. evaluation logic And deontic(normative) logics.

The system substantiation of estimates is their inclusion in a well-founded system of evaluative statements as its constituent elements.

An important step in the theoretical substantiation of evaluative statements is to demonstrate their compatibility with the estimates and their systems available in the area under consideration. The new assessment must be in accordance not only with the already accepted and established assessments and their systems, but also with certain general principles, similar to the principles of simplicity, familiarity, beauty, etc.

Further, the methodological argumentation, which consists in referring to the fact that the estimate was obtained using a method that has repeatedly demonstrated its reliability, may have a certain value in substantiating an evaluative statement.

Each successful act of understanding imparts a certain additional support to the general evaluation or norm on the basis of which it is carried out.

A special role in substantiating evaluative statements is played by contextual methods of justification, including arguments for intuition, tradition, common sense, taste, etc.

In the process of argumentation in support of estimates, a variety of justification methods are usually used, from deductive justification to appeal to intuition and tradition. Most often, not universal, but contextual arguments are used, since assessments vary from one circle of people to another, and only a few of the assessments seem to be generally accepted. A typical example in this respect are the principles of morality. If morality rests to a certain extent on argumentation, then on argumentation, which includes all its possible methods, and not some selected methods that are especially suitable for substantiating morality.

To begin with, you always need to refer to the criteria for evaluating the task that we are analyzing. Download it and keep reading:

Download the demo version of the exam in social studies 201 7

Highlighting a problem

So, let's take a look at the very last pages of the document that you have uploaded and take a look at points K1-K3, trying to extract from this the formula for a good essay that will be judged by experts

First, you need to directly understand the statement: highlight the problem, reveal its meaning and highlight aspects of the problem. A number of cliches will help you here, because the exam is traditionally built on templates and this helps in preparing

What are the problems in the exam? From my own experience, I can identify 6 main “flanks” on which you need to try on your aphorism:

• Essence problem...
• The problem of inconsistency...
• Role problem...
• Relationship problem...
• Relationship problem...
• Unity problem...

What does it mean to reveal meaning? In general, I tell my students that essays should be translated “from Russian into Russian”, in fact, from literary to scientific language, based on the block in which you write your work. You can end everything with a “reason for increasing the score”: look at the problem from different angles. This will be the structure of the first part of the essay.

Theoretical reasoning

Now let's move on to the second criterion, which involves argumentation based on theory. What does this mean and what parts should your essay include?
Naturally, these are terms. Hence, if you are an applicant who is preparing on his own, ALWAYS study this or that topic in the context of any concepts from the field that you are studying

Also, you must clearly, clearly and consistently formulate your statements and conclusions from what you stated in the thesis of your essay - this is a very important element, pay attention to it. In addition, it is necessary to cite various principles and approaches as an example, prove your position and reveal the causes and consequences of the events referred to in the formulation of the assignment.

Factual Argumentation

As a fact, you must prove the theoretical material mentioned above with the help of media reports, materials of educational subjects (usually humanities), facts from social experience and your own reasoning. The most interesting thing is that you need to give 2 ARGUMENTS of a factual nature, and both of them cannot be from media reports, or history, political life ... This is important to understand, otherwise the expert will lower your score

Well, in the end, you make a qualitative conclusion based on the thesis, simply writing it down in other words, with a “tinge” of completeness. That's all you need to know from theory on how to write social studies task 29

Speech by T. Liskova - Features of the solution of the second part at the Unified State Exam-2017

The video of her performance is attached below.

Finished essays

Now let's look at the structure. Below I attach 4 very first works of my students on politics. I suggest you review them, highlight the constituent elements, find errors, if any, and unsubscribe about them in the comments.

First essay

“Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely” (J. Acton)

In his statement, the American historian and politician J. Acton raises the question of the influence of power on the behavior of a person who possesses it. This statement can be interpreted as follows: the more a person is given power, the more often he begins to go beyond the boundaries of what is permitted and act only in his own interests. This problem has not lost its relevance for many centuries and history knows many cases when the unlimited power of the ruler led the country to ruin.

Disclosure of the theoretical part

So what is power and why does it exist? Power is the ability and ability to influence the behavior of people regardless of their desire to do so. In any state, power is primarily aimed at maintaining order and monitoring compliance with laws, but often the more unlimited power becomes, the more it corrupts a person and ceases to be a guarantor of justice, which is why I fully support the opinion of J. Acton.

Examples for disclosure K3

The ruler, endowed with great power, ceases to care about the welfare of the entire people and tries even more to strengthen his position. Let's take, for example, the first Russian Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible: striving for unlimited autocracy, he introduced the oprichnina in the camp, which consisted in mass terror, violence, and the elimination of not only the discontented boyars, but also any opposition. So, on suspicion of treason, many innocent people were executed, which ultimately led the country to a crisis, the ruin of cities and the death of a huge number of people.

My family also faced the consequences of unlimited power during the reign of I.V. Stalin. During dispossession, my grandmother's family was repressed, her father was sent to the Gulag, and six children were forced to live in a barracks with the same repressed families. Stalin's policy was aimed at equalizing the strata of the population, but the number of dispossessed kulaks during the years of his rule significantly exceeded the number of real kulaks, which is a clear violation of human rights and freedoms.

Thus, one can come to the conclusion that unlimited power corrupts people and brings not so much good as ruin and a fall in the standard of living of the population. In modern society, absolute power no longer dominates in most countries, which makes their inhabitants more free and independent.

Second essay

“When a tyrant rules, the people are silent and the laws do not work” (Saadi)

I see the meaning of Saadi's statement in the fact that the rule of law is the basis for building a democratic state, while tyranny opposes the public good and is aimed only at achieving one's own interests. This statement expresses two aspects: the participation of citizens in the life of the state under different political regimes and the attitude of the government to generally accepted laws.

Disclosure of the theoretical part

Tyranny is often inherent in states with the unlimited power of one ruler; for the most part, these are countries with a totalitarian regime. Its main difference from democracy - a political regime, which is characterized by the equality of all people before the law and the belonging of power to the people, is the concentration of all power in the hands of one ruler (party) and control over all spheres of society. With unlimited power, the ruler can interpret the laws in his own favor, or even rewrite them, while the people do not have the right to express their own opinion, which absolutely does not meet the principle of legality. It is impossible not to agree with the opinion of Saadi, and history knows many confirmations of this.

Examples for disclosure K3

Italy during the reign of B. Mussolini can serve as an example of tyranny. Having suppressed rights and freedoms in the country, Mussolini established a totalitarian regime and applied political repressions. As head of seven ministries and as prime minister at the same time, he eliminated virtually all restrictions on his power, thus building a police state.

A. Solzhenitsyn speaks about the lawlessness of the totalitarian regime in the story “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich”. The work shows the life of a former soldier who, like many others, ended up in prison after the front. Solzhenitsyn described the situation of people during the reign of I.V. Stalin, when soldiers who managed to escape from German captivity were declared enemies of the people and, instead of getting to their relatives, were forced to work in a colony for decades.

Having considered these examples, we can conclude that under the rule of a tyrant, human rights do not have any weight, and the people do not have the right to openly express their opinion, as they are constantly in fear for their lives.

Third essay

In his statement, P. Sir expressed his attitude to the problem of the characteristic features and peculiarities of power. The author argues that any decisions that a person in power will ever have to make must be carefully thought out and analyzed from all sides. These words can be considered from two points of view: the positive and negative influence of power on society.

Disclosure of the theoretical part

P. Syr's statement does not lose its relevance to this day, because all the time rash actions led to bad consequences both for the leaders themselves and for those who obey them. That is why I fully share the author's point of view regarding this problem. In order to confirm the relevance of this, it is first worth considering it from the point of view of theory.

It’s worth starting with the simplest: what is power? As we know, power is the ability to influence the actions and decisions of people against their will. Usually this happens both through persuasion and propaganda, and through the use of violence. Power is an essential attribute of any organization and human group, because without it, order and organization simply cannot form. As the main sources of power, one can single out both the personal attitude of each subordinate to the leader, and the level of his authority, material condition, level of education and strength.

Examples for disclosure K3

To confirm the relevance of P. Syr's statement, we can give an example from history. As ill-conceived actions, the monetary reform carried out by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, which replaced silver money with copper, can act. Due to the lack of coins from the latter material in the treasury, it was the silversmiths who collected taxes, which soon led to the almost complete depreciation of the coppers. The reform, which did not suggest such a scenario, did not allow to correct the situation, which led to the Copper Riot of 1662. The result of the uprising was the withdrawal of copper coins from circulation. This example clearly illustrates the lack of thoughtfulness and logic in the actions of a politician who had to cancel the transformation he had carried out in order to calm the angry people.

As a second example, this time of successful and planned transformations, one can cite events from recent history. We are talking about the policy of the Russian Federation, pursued from the beginning of its existence. Thoughtful, systematic reforms were able to strengthen the disintegrated country. Also, the effect of these transformations was the strengthening of the state and its positions in the international economic and political arena. This example shows us that a policy that involves not sudden and thoughtless changes, but structured and consistent reforms can lead to an improvement in the situation in the state.

Summing up, we can say that the problem of the peculiarities of power and its characteristic features will never cease to be one of the most important issues, on the solution of which the destinies of states depend and will continue to depend. Especially now, in the post-industrial age, which is characterized by globalization, incorrectly implemented reforms can affect not individual countries, but all powers together.

Fourth essay

“The state is something without which it is impossible to achieve either order, or justice, or external security.” (M. Debre)

In his statement, M. Debre expressed his attitude to the main functions of the state and their importance. According to the author, it is the state apparatus that plays a decisive role in the life of society, controlling the norms and rules of its behavior, regulating the basic laws, and also being responsible for protecting the country's borders and maintaining the safety of its population. This issue can be considered from two sides: the importance of the role of the state in the life of society and the ways in which the first influences the second.

The words of M. Debre do not lose their relevance to this day, because regardless of the chronological period, the state has always played a key role in people's lives. That is why I fully share the author's point of view. In order to confirm these words, it is first worth considering them from the point of view of theory.

Disclosure of the theoretical part

What is the state itself? As we know from the course of political science, the state can be called any organization of political power, which has a mechanism for managing society, ensuring the normal activity of the latter. The functions of the state are not limited to any one sphere of life, but affect their entirety. In addition to internal functions, there are also external ones, the most important of which is the process of ensuring the defense of the territory of the state and the establishment of international cooperation.

Examples for disclosure K3

In order to give the first example, let us turn to ancient history. The states of all peoples began to form for similar reasons, but in this case, we will consider this process and its consequences using the example of the East Slavic tribes. One of the main prerequisites for the formation of the Old Russian state was the need for protection from an external enemy - the Khazar Khaganate. The scattered and warring tribes could not cope with the enemy alone, but after the formation of the state, victory over the nomads became only a matter of time. This clearly illustrates the operation of one of the most important functions of the state - defensive.

The following example, illustrating the impact of the state on society, can be taken from New History. As you know, in 1861 Alexander II carried out a peasant reform, the result of which was the abolition of serfdom. This phenomenon had a great impact on the life of the Russian people, because most of the population of the Russian Empire at that time were none other than serfs. By granting them freedom, the state greatly expanded the rights and obligations of the liberated peasants. The abolition of serfdom resulted in the formation of a new social stratum, a change in the foundations and customs that had developed over several centuries. This example shows us the consequences of the reform carried out by the state, which affected the entire population of the country.

Summing up, we can say that the importance of the role of the state and the need for the functions it performs have been tested by time. Without an impact, exerting any influence on the citizens of the country, the state apparatus simply cannot exist, and the changes it carries out can be perceived differently by citizens

I hope the article helped you deal with a rather problematic exam question. Help spread the word about this article: click on the social media buttons and subscribe to blog updates to receive new articles in your email in a timely manner. Bye everyone

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As a result of studying this chapter, the student should: know

• how theoretical reasoning differs from empirical;
• What is systemic reasoning?
• what is the essence of the compatibility condition;
• possibilities of methodological argumentation;
• boundaries of empirical and theoretical substantiation; be able to
• apply theoretical arguments in support of the proposed provisions;
• realistically assess the importance of the requirements of beauty, familiarity and simplicity;
• feel the limits of applicability of theoretical argumentation; own
• the ability to apply theoretical reasoning;
• the skills to use the recommendatory requirements of simplicity, familiarity, beauty, etc.;
• methods of applying methodological reasoning.

Systemic argumentation

Previously, one of the methods of theoretical argumentation has already been considered - logical justification, or justification through the construction of a logical proof. In the following, various other methods of theoretical justification will be discussed. Among them - systemic argumentation, the correspondence of the newly put forward position to already accepted statements, its agreement with some general principles similar to the principle of familiarity, methodological argumentation.

General statements, scientific laws, principles, etc. cannot be substantiated purely empirically, by reference only to experience. They also require theoretical justification based on reasoning and referring to other accepted statements. Without this, there is neither abstract theoretical knowledge nor well-founded beliefs.

It is not possible to prove a general statement by referring to evidence relating to any particular instance of its applicability. Universal generalizations are a kind of hypotheses built on the basis of essentially incomplete series of observations. Such universal assertions cannot be proven from the observations from which they were generalized, and even from the subsequent extensive and detailed series of predictions derived from them and found to be confirmed by experience.

Theories, concepts and other generalizations of empirical material are not logically deduced from this material. The same set of facts can be generalized in different ways and covered by different theories. However, none of them will be fully consistent with all known facts in their field. The facts and theories themselves not only constantly diverge from each other, but they are never clearly separated from each other.

All this suggests that the agreement of the theory with experiments, facts or observations is not enough for an unambiguous assessment of its acceptability. Empirical argumentation always requires the addition of a theoretical one. Not empirical experience, but theoretical reasoning is usually decisive in choosing one of the competing concepts.

Unlike empirical argumentation, the methods of theoretical argumentation are extremely diverse and internally heterogeneous. They include deductive reasoning, systemic reasoning, methodological reasoning, etc. There is no single, consistent classification of methods of theoretical argumentation.

It is difficult to point out a proposition that would justify itself, in isolation from other propositions. Justification is always systemic. The inclusion of a new provision in a system of other provisions that gives stability to its elements is one of the most significant steps in its justification.

Systemic argumentation is the justification of a statement by including it as a constituent element in an apparently well-founded system of statements, or theory.

Confirmation of the consequences arising from the theory, at the same time reinforces the theory itself. On the other hand, the theory imparts certain impulses and strength to the propositions put forward on its basis, and thereby contributes to their justification. The statement, which has become an element of a theory, is no longer based only on individual facts, but in many respects also on a wide range of phenomena explained by the theory, on its prediction of new, previously unknown effects, on its connections with other theories, etc. The analyzed position, included in the theory, receives the empirical and theoretical support that the theory as a whole has.

L. Wittgenstein wrote about the integrity and systemic nature of knowledge: “It is not an isolated axiom that strikes me as obvious, but a whole system in which consequences and premises mutually support each other.” Consistency extends not only to theoretical positions, but also to the data of experience: “One can say,” Wittgenstein continues, “that experience teaches us some statements. However, he does not teach us isolated statements, but a whole set of interdependent propositions. If they were separate, I might doubt them, because I have no experience directly related to each of them. The foundations of a system of assertions do not support this system, but are themselves supported by it. This means that the reliability of the foundations is determined not by them in themselves, but by the fact that an integral theoretical system can be built on top of them.

Doubt, as Wittgenstein makes clear, is not about an isolated sentence, but always about some situation in which I behave in a certain way.

For example, when I take letters out of my mailbox and see who they are addressed to, I check if they are all addressed to me, and at the same time I firmly believe that my name is B.P. And as I continue to check in this way, for me If all these letters, I cannot meaningfully doubt my name. Doubt makes sense only within the framework of some “language game” or established practice of activity, subject to the adoption of its rules. Therefore, it is pointless for me to doubt that I have two hands or that the Earth existed 150 years before my birth, for there is no such practice within which, if its premises are accepted, one could doubt these things.

According to Wittgenstein, empirical suggestions can be tested and confirmed experimentally in some situations. But there are situations when they, being included in the system of statements, in specific practice, are not checked and are themselves used as a basis for checking other proposals. This is the case in the above example. "My name is B.P." - an empirical sentence used as a basis for testing the statement "All letters are addressed to me." However, one can come up with a story (“practice”) when I have to check on the basis of other data and evidence whether I am called B.P. In both cases, the status of an empirical sentence depends on the context, on the system of statements of which it is an element. Out of context, it is meaningless to ask whether a given proposal is empirically verifiable or whether I firmly adhere to it.

When we firmly hold a belief, we are usually more likely to doubt the source of the conflicting data than the belief itself. However, when these data become so numerous that they prevent us from using the belief in question to evaluate other statements, we can part with it.

In addition to the empirical, Wittgenstein singles out methodological suggestions. They are also contingent in the sense that their denial would not be a logical contradiction. However, they are not verifiable in any context. Superficial similarity can confuse us and encourage us to treat empirical sentences like "There are red dogs" and methodological sentences like "There are physical objects" in the same way. But the point is that we cannot imagine a situation in which we could be convinced of the falsity of a methodological proposition. It already depends not on the context, but on the totality of all imagined experience.

Wittgenstein distinguishes two more kinds of sentences: sentences that I can hardly doubt, and sentences that are difficult to classify (for example, the statement that I have never been to another solar system).

At one time, Descartes insisted on the need for the most complete and radical doubt. According to Descartes, only his famous " cogito"-“I think, therefore I am.” Wittgenstein takes the opposite position: there must be strong grounds for doubt, moreover, there are categories of statements whose acceptability we should never doubt. The selection of these categories of statements is directly due to the systemic nature of human knowledge, its internal integrity and unity.

The connection of a justified assertion with the system of assertions within which it is put forward and functions significantly affects the empirical verifiability of this assertion and, accordingly, the argumentation that can be put forward in support of it. In the context of its system (“language game”, “practice”), the statement can be accepted as undoubted, not subject to criticism and not requiring justification in at least two cases.

Firstly, if the rejection of this statement means the rejection of a certain practice, of that integral system of statements, of which it is an integral component.

For example, the statement "The sky is blue" does not require verification and does not allow doubt, otherwise the whole practice of visual perception and discrimination of colors will be destroyed. By discarding the statement "The sun will rise tomorrow" we are calling into question the whole of natural science. Doubt about the authenticity of the statement “If a person’s head is cut off, then it will not grow back” calls into question the whole physiology, etc.

These and similar statements are justified not empirically, but by reference to that established and well-tested system of statements, of which they are constituent elements and which would have to be abandoned if they were to be discarded. The English philosopher and ethicist J. Moore once asked the question: how could one justify the statement “I have a hand”? According to Wittgenstein, the answer to this question is simple: the statement is obvious and does not require any justification within the framework of human experience of perception; to doubt it would be to question the whole practice.

Secondly, a statement should be accepted as undoubted if, within the framework of the corresponding system of statements, it has become the standard for evaluating its other statements and, as a result, has lost its empirical testability. Among such statements, which have moved from the category of descriptions to the category of values, two types can be distinguished:

• statements that are not verified within a certain, rather narrow practice. For example, a person who looks through the mail while he is engaged in this activity cannot doubt his name;
• assertions that are not verifiable within any, however broad, practice.

For example, statements called by Wittgenstein methodological: “There are physical objects”, “I cannot be mistaken that I have a hand”, etc. The connection of these statements with our other beliefs is almost universal. Such statements do not depend on a specific context, but on the totality of all imagined experience, which makes it almost impossible to revise them. The situation is similar with the statements “The earth existed before my birth”, “Objects continue to exist even when they are not given to anyone in perception”, etc.: they are so closely related to all our other statements that they practically do not allow exceptions from our system of knowledge.

The systemic character of a scientific statement depends on its connection with the system of statements (or practice) in which it is used. There are five types of statements that are related to the practice of their use in different ways:

• 1) statements about which it is not only possible, but also reasonably doubtable within the framework of a particular practice;
• 2) statements about which doubt is possible, but not reasonable in this context (for example, the results of reliable measurements; information obtained from a case source);
• 3) statements that are not subject to doubt and verification in this practice under the threat of destruction of the latter;
• 4) statements that have become standards for evaluating other statements and therefore are not verifiable within the framework of this practice, but which can be verified in other contexts;
• 5) methodological statements that are not verified in the framework of any practice.

Arguing in support of type 3 claims involves referring to the system of claims (or practice) of which the claims in question are an integral element. Arguments in support of Type 4 statements are based on identifying their evaluative nature, their necessity in a particular practice, and, finally, pointing out the effectiveness of this practice. Statements like 3 and 4 can be challenged, tested and justified by going beyond their practice, by placing them in a wider or simply different context. As for the methodological assertions that are part of every conceivable practice, the argumentation in support of them can only be based on the belief in the existence of a total correspondence between the totality of our knowledge and the outside world, on confidence in the mutual consistency of all our knowledge and experience. However, the general reference to a cumulative, non-segmentable experience usually does not seem particularly convincing.

An important, but so far almost unexplored way of substantiating a theoretical statement is internal restructuring of the theory within which it is put forward. This restructuring, or reformulation, involves the introduction of new models, norms, rules, assessments, principles, etc., changing the internal structure of both the theory itself and the “theoretical world” postulated by it.

A new scientific, theoretical situation is not taking shape in a vacuum, but in a certain theoretical context. The context of the theory determines the specific form of the proposition put forward and the main vicissitudes of its subsequent substantiation. If a scientific assumption is taken in isolation from the theoretical environment in which it appears and exists, it remains unclear how it manages to eventually become an element of reliable knowledge.

The advancement of assumptions is dictated by the dynamics of the development of the theory to which they refer, the desire to cover it and explain new facts, eliminate internal inconsistency and inconsistency, etc. In many ways, the support that the new position receives from the theory is connected with the internal restructuring of this theory. It may consist in introducing nominal definitions (definitions-requirements) instead of real ones (definitions-descriptions), in making additional agreements regarding the objects under study, clarifying the fundamental principles of the theory, changing the hierarchy of these principles, etc.

The theory gives the statements included in it a certain force. This support largely depends on the position of the statement in the theory, in the hierarchy of its constituent statements. The restructuring of the theory, which ensures the movement of some statement from its "periphery" to its "core", gives this statement a greater systemic support. Let us explain this side of the matter with a few simple examples.

It is well known that a liquid is a state of matter in which pressure is transferred uniformly in all directions. Sometimes this feature of the liquid is taken as the basis of its very definition. If such a state of matter were suddenly discovered that would resemble a liquid in everything, but would not have the property of a uniform pressure transfer, we could not consider this substance a liquid.

However, the liquid was not always defined in this way. For quite some time, the assertion that a fluid transfers pressure uniformly in all directions was only an assumption. It has been tested for many fluids, but its applicability to all other fluids not yet explored has remained problematic. With the deepening of ideas about liquid, this statement turned into an empirical truth, and then into a definition of liquid as a special state of matter, and thus became a tautology.

This shift from conjecture to tautology was brought about by two interrelated factors. On the one hand, new experimental material was drawn on, relating to different liquids and confirming the statement under consideration, and on the other hand, the theory of fluid itself was deepened and rebuilt, which eventually included this statement in its core.

The chemical law of multiple ratios was originally a simple empirical hypothesis, which, moreover, had an accidental and dubious confirmation. The work of the English chemist W. Dalton led to a radical restructuring of chemistry. The position on multiple ratios has become an integral part of the definition of chemical composition, and it has become impossible to verify or disprove it experimentally. Atoms can only combine in a one-to-one ratio or in some other simple, integer proportion - this is now a constructive principle of modern chemical theory.

This kind of internal restructuring of the theory can be illustrated by a simplified example. Suppose we need to establish what unites the following cities: Vaduz, Valencia, Valletta, Vancouver, Vienna, Vientiane. You can immediately put forward the assumption that these are cities that are capitals. Indeed, Vientiane is the capital of Laos, Vienna is the capital of Austria, Valletta is the capital of Malta, Vaduz is the capital of Liechtenstein. But Valencia is not the capital of Spain, and Vancouver is not the capital of Canada. At the same time, Valencia is the main city of the Spanish province of the same name, Vancouver is the main city of the Canadian province of the same name. In order to preserve the original hypothesis, the definition of the concept of the capital should be clarified accordingly. We will understand the “capital” as the main city of the state or its territorial part - provinces, regions, etc. In this case, Valencia is the capital of the province of Valencia and Vancouver is the capital of the province of Vancouver. Thanks to the restructuring of the "world of capitals", we have ensured that our initial assumption became true.

The theory gives additional support to its constituent statements. The clearer and more reliable the theory itself, the greater is this support. Because of this, the improvement of the theory, the strengthening of its empirical base, and the clarification of its general, including philosophical and methodological, premises are at the same time a significant contribution to the substantiation of the statements included in it.

Among the methods of clarifying the theory, a special role is played by:

• revealing the logical connections of her statements;
• minimizing its initial assumptions;
• its construction in the form of an axiomatic system;
• its formalization, if possible.

When a theory is axiomatized, some of its provisions are chosen as initial ones, and all other provisions are derived from them in a purely logical way.

Assumptions accepted without proof are called

axioms (postulates); the provisions proved on their basis -

theorems.

The axiomatic method of systematization and clarification of knowledge originated in Antiquity and gained great fame thanks to Euclid's "Principles" - the first axiomatic interpretation of geometry. Now axiomatization is used in mathematics, logic, as well as in certain sections of physics, biology, etc. The axiomatic method requires a high level of development of an axiomatizable content theory, clear logical connections of its statements. Associated with this is its rather narrow applicability and the naivety of attempts to rebuild any science along the lines of Euclid's geometry.

In addition, as the Austrian logician and mathematician K. Gödel showed, sufficiently rich scientific theories (for example, the arithmetic of natural numbers) do not allow complete axiomatization. This indicates the limitations of the axiomatic method and the impossibility of a complete formalization of scientific knowledge.

The construction of a scientific theory in the form of an axiomatized deductive system cannot serve as an ideal and as the ultimate goal, the achievement of which means the limit of theory improvement.

• Wittgenstein L. On Certainty. Oxford, 1969. P. 23.
• Wittgenstein L. On Certainty. R. 23.

Argumentation based on reasoning and not using direct references to experience. A. t. is opposed to empirical argumentation, which directly appeals to what is given in experience. Methods of A. t., in contrast to the methods of empirical argumentation, are extremely diverse and internally heterogeneous. They include deductive justification, systemic argumentation, methodological argumentation, and others. There is no single, consistent classification of methods of A. t. Deductive (logical) reasoning is the derivation of the justified position from other, previously adopted provisions. It does not make such a proposition absolutely certain and irrefutable, but it fully transfers to it the degree of certainty that is inherent in the premises of deduction. Deductive reasoning is universal: it is applicable in all areas of reasoning and in any audience. The importance of deductive reasoning has long been overestimated. Ancient mathematicians, and after them the ancient philosophers, insisted on the exclusive use of deductive reasoning, since it is deduction that leads to absolute truths and eternal values. Medieval philosophers and theologians also exaggerated the role of deductive reasoning. They were only interested in the most general truths concerning God, man and the world. But in order to establish that God is essentially good, that man is only his likeness, and that the divine order reigns in the world, deductive reasoning, starting from a few general principles, is much more suitable than induction and empirical argument. It is characteristic that all the proposed proofs of the existence of God were conceived by their authors as deductions from self-evident premises. Deductive reasoning was overestimated as long as the study of the world was speculative and alien to experience, observation and experiment. Systemic argumentation is the justification of a statement by including it as a constituent element in a seemingly well-founded system of statements or theory. Confirmation of the consequences arising from a theory is at the same time a reinforcement of the theory itself. On the other hand, the theory imparts certain impulses and strength to the propositions put forward on its basis, and thereby contributes to their justification. The statement, which has become an element of a theory, is no longer based only on individual facts, but in many respects also on a wide range of phenomena explained by the theory, on its prediction of new, previously unknown effects, on its connections with other theories, etc. e. The inclusion of a statement in a theory extends to it the empirical and theoretical support that the theory as a whole has. The connection of a justified statement with the system of statements of which it is an element significantly affects the empirical verifiability of this statement and, accordingly, the argument that can be put forward in support of it. In the context of its system ("practice"), the statement can be accepted as undoubted, not subject to criticism and not requiring justification in at least two cases. First, if the rejection of this statement means the rejection of a certain practice, of that integral system of statements, of which it is an integral component. Such, for example, is the statement "The sky is blue": it does not require verification and does not allow doubt, otherwise the whole practice of visual perception and discrimination of colors will be destroyed. By discarding the statement "The sun will rise tomorrow," we are calling into question the whole of natural science. Doubt in the authenticity of the statement "If a person's head is cut off, then it will not grow back" calls into question the whole physiology, etc. These and similar statements are justified not empirically, but by reference to that well-established and well-tested system of statements, the constituent elements of which they are are and which would have to be abandoned if they were to be discarded. Angle, the philosopher J. Moore at one time asked himself: how could one justify the statement "I have a hand"? The answer to this question is simple: this statement is obvious and does not require any justification within the framework of human experience of perception; to doubt it would be to question the whole practice. Secondly, a statement must be accepted as undoubted if it has become, within the framework of the corresponding system of statements, the standard for evaluating its other statements and, as a result, has lost its empirical testability. Such a statement moves from the category of descriptions to the category of assessments, its connection with our other beliefs becomes comprehensive. Such unverifiable statements, in particular, include: "There are physical objects", "Objects continue to exist, even when they are not given to anyone in perception", "The Earth existed long before I was born", etc. They are so closely related to all our other assertions that practically do not allow exceptions from our system of knowledge. The systemic nature of justification does not mean, however, that a single empirical statement cannot be substantiated or refuted outside the framework of the theoretical system to which it belongs. A theory gives additional support to its constituent statements, so that the stronger the theory itself, the clearer and more reliable it is, the greater is this support. The improvement of the theory, the strengthening of its empirical base, and the clarification of its general, including philosophical and methodological, prerequisites are at the same time a significant contribution to the substantiation of the statements included in it. Among the methods of clarifying a theory, a special role is played by revealing the logical connections of its statements, minimizing its initial assumptions, constructing it on the basis of an axiomatic method in the form of an axiomatic system, and, finally, if possible, its formalization. The construction of a scientific theory in the form of an axiomatized deductive system is possible, however, only for a very narrow circle of scientific theories. Therefore, it cannot be the ideal and the ultimate goal to which every scientific theory should strive and the achievement of which would mean the limit of its improvement. Another method of A. t. is the analysis of a statement from the point of view of the possibility of its empirical confirmation and refutation. Scientific provisions are required to admit the fundamental possibility of refutation and to presuppose certain procedures for their confirmation. If this is not the case, it is impossible to say, with respect to the proposition put forward, which situations and facts are incompatible with it and which ones support it. The position, which in principle does not allow refutation and confirmation, turns out to be beyond constructive criticism; it does not outline any real ways for further research. A statement that is incomparable neither with experience nor with existing knowledge can be considered justified. It can hardly be called justified, for example, the assertion that exactly in a year it will be sunny and dry in the same place. It is not based on any facts, one cannot even imagine how it could be refuted or confirmed, if not now, then at least in the near future. This class of assertions also includes statements such as "Eternal essence is movement", "Eternal essence is one", "It is not true that our perception is capable of embracing all forms of existence", "What the soul itself can say about itself never exceeds its most ", etc. An important way of A. t. a holistic concept by referring to that undeniably reliable method by which a justified statement or defended concept is obtained. This enumeration of methods of A. t. is not exhaustive.

Watch value Argumentation Theoretical in other dictionaries

Argumentation- arguments, pl. no, w. (book). Action on verb. argue. Need an argument. || A set of arguments. A theory with solid arguments.
Explanatory Dictionary of Ushakov

The argument of J.- 1. The same as: argumentation. 2. A set of arguments, arguments (1 *), sufficient to prove smth.
Explanatory Dictionary of Efremova

Argumentation- -And; and.
1. to Argue. A. their positions. // Way, method of proof using arguments (1 digit). Clear, logical a. The position needs to be justified.
2. Aggregate........
Explanatory Dictionary of Kuznetsov

Defense Argument, With Reference to the State of the Art of Product Development- In legal practice and in liability insurance: the objection of the defendant in a lawsuit filed on the responsibility of the manufacturer for product quality, ........
Economic dictionary

Inductive Reasoning— An attempt to use information relevant to a particular situation in order to
draw any conclusions.
Economic dictionary

Theoretical Cost— Appraisal
price
an option calculated using a mathematical model such as the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model.
Economic dictionary

Theoretical Cost (Subscription Rights Per Share)- Mathematical ratio of the market value (market value) of the right to subscribe (subscription right) to shares after the announcement of the offer of securities, but before the shares begin to be sold ........
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Theoretical Futures Price— Equilibrium
futures price
contract. See also Fair price (
acceptable price).
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Cumulative Theoretical Productivity (tp) is a measure of computational performance, expressed in millions of theoretical operations per second (Mtops), resulting from the aggregation of computational elements.
Law Dictionary

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Psychological Encyclopedia

Validity Theoretical (validity Constructive)- - in relation to psychodiagnostic methods, it means the correspondence of the results of psychodiagnostics carried out using this technique to the indicators of those psychological ........
Psychological Encyclopedia

Dial, Theoretical Model- In general, any model in which the units under consideration are understood as elements that make up a set, and the relationships between elements are formally represented in terms of ........
Psychological Encyclopedia

Theoretical Psychology- (theoretical psychology) The two main aspects of T. p. are the construction of a substantial (basic) theory and metatheory. The substantive theory is intended to explain...
Psychological Encyclopedia

Argumentation- (lat. argumentatio) - a concept denoting a logical-communicative process that serves to substantiate a certain point of view for the purpose of its perception, understanding and (or) ........
sociological dictionary

Sampling Theoretical- - the method of forming a sample for case studies, is also used in the formation of focus groups and planning experiments with isolated ........
sociological dictionary

Construct Theoretical Validity (validity)- - the property of some indicator (measure) to behave as expected in accordance with the theory.
sociological dictionary

Sociology Theoretical- -eng. sociology, theory; German Soziologie, theoretische. Sociology, focused on an objective scientific study of society in order to obtain theoretical knowledge, giving .....
sociological dictionary

Theoretical Sampling- - a sample based on a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study and its variability. Each individual in such a sample is selected on the basis of a common ........
sociological dictionary

Theoretical Dilemma— (theoretical dilemma). A theoretical problem that has been at the center of discussions for a long time.
sociological dictionary

Theoretical Model of the Subject of Research (TMPI)- a set of logically interconnected abstract concepts that describe the subject area of ​​research.
sociological dictionary

Theoretical (fundamental) Sociology- - the highest level of sociological knowledge, generalizing the data of empirical sociology. Scaling - grouping based on logically selected features ........
sociological dictionary

ARGUMENTATION- ARGUMENTATION, -i, f. 1. see argue. 2. A set of arguments (in 1 value). || adj. argumentative, th, th.
Explanatory dictionary of Ozhegov