Perfect operation. How Soviet special forces took Amin's palace. Time "h" for country "a" Taking amin's palace documentary film

"I would not like to, but I will have to"
Yu Andropov

Sh Turm of Amin's palace (Dar-ul-aman) was codenamed "Agat".
The operation was developed by Department 8 of Department "C" (illegal intelligence) of the KGB of the USSR (the head of the department was Major General of the KGB V. A. Kirpichenko). It was this operation that preceded the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan (option "Storm-333"). Amin was guarded very seriously, but the Alpha team, Zenit and paratroopers destroyed the Afghan President Hafizullah Amin and his numerous Afghan guards.

Amin's rise to power took place after in September 1979, the leader of the PDPA N. Taraki was arrested and then killed on his orders. An illegal anti-constitutional coup took place. Then, terror unfolded in the country not only against the Islamists, but also against the PDPA members, former supporters of Taraki. The repression also affected the army.

The Soviet leadership was afraid that a further exacerbation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Through the KGB, information was received about Amin's connection with the CIA.

They did not decide on the operation until the end of November, but when Amin demanded the replacement of the Soviet ambassador A.M. Puzanov, the chairman of the KGB Andropov and the Minister of Defense Ustinov insisted on the need to replace Amin with a leader more loyal to the USSR.

When developing the operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use the requests of Amin himself for Soviet military assistance (in total, from September to December 1979, there were 7 such appeals).

In early December 1979, a "Muslim battalion" was sent to Bagram - a special-purpose unit of the GRU, specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet servicemen of Central Asian origin to guard Taraki and carry out special tasks in Afghanistan.

Officers "Thunder" and "Zenith" M. Romanov, Y. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and E. Mazaev conducted a reconnaissance of the area. Not far from the palace there was a restaurant (casino), where the highest officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. It was higher than the palace and from there the Taj Bek was visible at a glance. Under the pretext that it was required to order places for our officers to celebrate the New Year, the commandos examined the approaches and firing points.

The palace is a well-defended structure. Its thick walls were able to withstand the impact of artillery. The area around was shot at by tanks and heavy machine guns.

On December 16, an imitation of the assassination attempt on Amin was made. He survived, but the security was reinforced by a "Muslim battalion" from the USSR.

On December 25, the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began. In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division by noon on December 27 completed the landing method and took control of the airport, blocking the Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. The division also included the GRU special forces.

Other units of this division were concentrated in designated areas of Kabul, where they received tasks to blockade the main government agencies, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important facilities in the city and its environs. After a clash with Afghan servicemen, the 357th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment were established over the Bagram airfield. They also provided security for B. Karmal, who was taken to Afghanistan on December 23 with a group of his closest supporters.

The direct leadership of the assault and the elimination of Amin was carried out by KGB Colonel Grigory Ivanovich Boyarinov. Operation "Agat" was supervised by Vladimir Krasovsky, head of the 8th KGB Department (sabotage and intelligence of foreign special forces), who flew to Kabul.

The participants in the assault were divided into two groups: "Thunder" - 24 people. (fighters of the Alpha group, commander - deputy chief of the Alpha group MM Romanov) and Zenit - 30 people. (officers of the special reserve of the KGB of the USSR, graduates of the KUOS; commander - Yakov Fedorovich Semyonov).

The attackers wore no insignia Afghan uniforms with a white armband on their sleeves. The password for identifying their own people was the shouts "Yasha" - "Misha".

In order to sound masking of the retractable armored personnel carriers, a few days before the assault, a tractor was driven around the palace not far from the palace so that the guards got used to the noise of the engines.

STORM

Plan "A". On December 27, Amin and his guests were poisoned at lunch. If Amin died, the operation was canceled. All the poisoned fainted. This was the result of a special KGB action (the main chef of the palace was Mikhail Talibov, an Azerbaijani, a KGB agent, two Soviet waitresses were serving).

The food and juice were immediately sent for examination, and the cooks were detained. A group of Soviet doctors and an Afghan doctor arrived at the palace. Doctors, unaware of the special operation, pumped Amin out.

We proceeded to plan "B". At 19:10 a group of Soviet saboteurs in a car approached the hatch of the central distribution center of underground communications, drove over it and "stalled". While the Afghan sentry was approaching them, a mine was lowered into the hatch and after 5 minutes an explosion thundered, leaving Kabul without a telephone connection. This explosion was also the signal for the start of the assault.

Fifteen minutes before the start of the assault, the fighters of one of the groups of the "Muslim" battalion saw that Amin's guards were alerted, the commander and his deputies were standing in the center of the parade ground, and the personnel received weapons and ammunition. Taking advantage of the situation, the scouts captured the Afghan officers, but the Afghans did not let them leave and opened fire to kill. The scouts accepted the battle. The Afghans lost more than two hundred people killed. The snipers, meanwhile, removed the sentries from the tanks dug into the ground near the palace.

At the same time, two self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" of the "Muslim" battalion opened fire on the Amin's palace and on the location of the Afghan tank guard battalion (to prevent its personnel from reaching the tanks).

Four armored personnel carriers went to break through, but two vehicles were hit. The density of fire was such that triplexes were blown up on all BMPs, and the bulwarks were pierced at every square centimeter.

The commandos were rescued by body armor (although almost all were injured) and the skill of the drivers, who brought the cars as close to the doors to the building as possible. Having burst into the palace, the storming men "cleaned" floor by floor, using grenades in the premises and firing from machine guns.

Viktor Karpukhin recalls: “I didn’t run up the stairs, I crawled up there, like everyone else. It was simply impossible to run there, and I would have been killed three times if I had run there. Each step was conquered there, like in the Reichstag. Compare Probably it is possible. We moved from one shelter to another, shot through all the space around, and then - to the next shelter. "

In the palace, the officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100 - 150 people) staunchly and bravely resisted, but the God of War was not on their side.

When Amin learned about the attack on the palace, he ordered his adjutant to inform the Soviet military advisers about it, saying: "The Soviets will help."
When the adjutant reported that it was the Soviets who were attacking, Amin in a rage threw an ashtray at him and shouted "You're lying, it can't be!"

Amin himself was shot during the storming of the palace. According to the recollections of the participants in the assault, he was lying near the bar in the Adidas shorts and a T-shirt (according to other sources, he was taken alive and then shot by order from Moscow). Also, during the assault, two of his young sons were killed by stray bullets.

Although a significant part of the soldiers of the guard brigade surrendered (about 1700 people were captured in total), some of the brigade's divisions continued to resist. In particular, the "Muslim" battalion fought with the remnants of the third battalion of the brigade for another day, after which the Afghans left for the mountains.

Simultaneously with the assault on the Taj Bek palace, KGB special forces groups with the support of the paratroopers of the 345th paratrooper regiment, as well as the 317th and 350th regiments of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, captured the general headquarters of the Afghan army, the communications center, the KhAD buildings and Ministry of Internal Affairs, radio and television. Afghan units stationed in Kabul were blocked (in some places it was necessary to suppress armed resistance).

Amin's palace and the Alpha team return to the USSR after the operation.

During the assault on Taj Bek, 5 officers of the KGB special forces, 6 people from the "Muslim battalion" and 9 paratroopers were killed. The head of the operation, Colonel Boyarinov, was also killed (from a stray bullet when the danger seemed to have passed). Boyarinov seemed to have a presentiment of death, before the operation he was depressed, which was noted by his subordinates. Almost all the participants in the operation had injuries of varying severity.

On the opposite side, Kh. Amin, his two young sons and about 200 Afghan guards and servicemen were killed. The wife of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sh. Vali, who was in the palace, was also killed. Amina's widow and their daughter, wounded during the assault, after serving several years in a Kabul prison, left for the USSR.

The killed Afghans, including two young sons of Amin, were buried in a mass grave not far from the palace. Amin was buried there, but separately from the others. No headstone was placed on the grave.

The KGB operation was included in the textbooks of the secret services of many countries of the world. According to its results, the title of Hero Soviet Union received four servicemen (one posthumously). In total, about four hundred people were awarded orders and medals.

The newspaper Pravda wrote on December 30 that “as a result of the rising wave of popular anger, Amin, along with his henchmen, was brought before a fair people's court and was executed” ...

Info and photo (C) Internet

In the late 70s, Afghanistan was in a severe fever. The country entered a period of coups, successful and unsuccessful uprisings, political upheavals. In 1973, Muhammad Daoud brought down the old Afghan monarchy. Daud tried to maneuver between the interests of the USSR and the states of the Middle East, during his reign there was a period of difficult relations with the Soviet Union. Since the days of Khrushchev, the USSR maintained rather warm relations with this country, Soviet technical and military specialists worked in Afghanistan, and provided all kinds of support to the country. However, the USSR was inevitably drawn into the internal intricacies of local politics.

Afghan Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud (center) with his wife (right). Photo: © RIA Novosti / Yuri Abramochkin

Daoud sat on bayonets and fought simultaneously with Islamic fundamentalists and left-wing radicals from the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Moscow did not put all its eggs in one basket and, in addition to official contacts, secretly collaborated with the PDPA. Against the background of general instability in the country, the PDPA decided to take power in the same way as Daud - through a coup. In April 1978, the "People's Democrats" staged a coup. Daoud died in a short but bloody clash, and the left took over the country. It was then that the future dictator Hafizullah Amin came to the fore. In the new government, he received the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

First victims

The USSR officially supported the revolution, but in reality Moscow was not so unambiguous about what was happening. First, the development of events caught Soviet diplomats and statesmen by surprise. Even Brezhnev found out about the incident from the press. Second, and much worse, the PDPA was internally fragmented into two warring factions, and in addition, PDPA members were neophytes with the fervor of Marx. Reforms, even reasonable in design, were carried out roughly, uncompromisingly, without taking into account local traditions. In the spring of 1979, an anti-government uprising took place in Herat, and at least two Soviet citizens were killed.

The first Soviet officer to die in Afghanistan in the 70s was Nikolai Bizyukov, a military adviser. He was torn to pieces by the crowd. There could have been more casualties, but local officer Shahnavaz Tanay and Soviet military Stanislav Katichev sent a detachment of government troops to protect Soviet citizens. Although the Herat rebellion killed Soviet citizens for the first time, it was only the first of a series of speeches. In Afghanistan, a civil war flared up between the opposition and the government. After that, they discussed the involvement of Soviet troops in ensuring security in Afghanistan. Moreover, Afghan leader Taraki suggested using Soviet troops with Afghan signs on technology. The Afghan government went into panic. Then the Politburo refused to send troops, the Afghans received only weapons. However, in the spring, the formation of the famous military unit of the Afghan war - the Muslim battalion of the GRU - began.

Soviet troops in the mountains of Afghanistan. Photo: © RIA Novosti / Vladimir Vyatkin

Musbat was formed from the natives of the Asian republics of the USSR. There are many Tajiks and Uzbeks living in Afghanistan, so during operations "across the river" the soldiers of this battalion would not have been conspicuous. At the same time, a group of special forces of the KGB "Zenith" arrived in Afghanistan to carry out especially delicate tasks to ensure security. Both units were to play a huge role in the events of 1979. A paratrooper battalion has also arrived in Afghanistan to guard the key Bagram airport. The Soviet Union gradually moved towards direct interference in local affairs. However, the activities of the military have not yet been advertised.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Afghan government has escalated to the limit. Internal squabbles led to a quarrel between two key PDPA figures: Nur Mohammad Taraki, the head of state, and Amin, who gradually came to the fore. On September 14, 1979, the bodyguards of Taraki and Amin started a firefight. Attempts by the Soviet embassy to reconcile these figures failed. Amin accused Taraki - and along with the Soviet ambassador - of an attempt on his person. Then, on the orders of Amin, Taraki was arrested and soon killed, and Amin himself proclaimed himself the leader of the PDPA and the head of Afghanistan. Several of Taraki's associates were evacuated by KGB officers.

From left to right: Nur Muhammad Taraki and Amin Hafizullah. Photo: © Wikipedia.org Creative Commons

After this, events developed rapidly. Amin proved to be an unreliable and uncontrollable partner. In addition, he immediately got in touch with Washington and began some negotiations with the United States. The Soviet special services were sure that the speech about Amin's work for the CIA, in the CIA itself, of course, did not confirm or deny anything, and Amin could no longer be asked for obvious reasons. Be that as it may, in the USSR, the threat of Afghanistan's transition to the enemy's camp was taken more than seriously. Moreover, the new foreign minister directly accused the Soviet special services of attempting to assassinate Amin.

Contacts between the USSR and Afghanistan had not yet been severed, but such grave and absurd public accusations incredibly infuriated Moscow. Moreover, Taraki was appreciated, he had a warm relationship with Brezhnev personally, and such a turn made Amin an enemy of the USSR. Amin simply yelled at the Soviet diplomats who had come to protest. In addition, units of the opposition, tacitly supported by the United States, quickly expanded their zone of influence. Therefore, Moscow decided that it was necessary to hurry. Thus began the preparation of one of the most famous special operations of the Soviet Union.

Amin's palace

The final decision to send troops to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979. After that, Amin was doomed, but, oddly enough, he himself did not know about it. Probably, Amin also assumed the possibility of obtaining additional preferences from the USSR and retaining power. Even before that, army and KGB officers went to Afghanistan to develop the operation. The destruction of Amin was only part of a larger plan - Soviet troops were to take control of the entire Kabul.

Soviet troops on the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan

The Muslim battalion of the GRU flew into the city. He was to act in conjunction with the KGB detachment "Zenith" (later he would become widely known as "Vympel"). An armada of the combined arms army was deployed on Soviet territory at that time. Entry into the territory of Afghanistan was scheduled for December 25. By the time the main forces arrived in Afghanistan, Amin should have already been neutralized.

Meanwhile, Amin seemed to sense the clouds were gathering. The dictator moved the residence from a building in the center of Kabul to the outskirts, to the Taj Bek Palace. This capital building, if necessary, was not easy to destroy even with artillery fire. In total, more than two thousand people ensured Amin's safety. The roads leading to the building, except for one, were mined, guns, machine guns and even several dug-in tanks were included in the defensive perimeter.

The nerves of all participants in the events were inflamed to the limit. Airborne troops with paratroopers have already landed in Kabul. In addition, another KGB unit, assigned to the role of Amin's gravediggers, appeared on the scene: the "Thunder" squad. The officers of the Alpha unit were hiding under this name. In general, it was planned to storm the palace with the forces of "Thunder", "Zenith" (a total of 54 people), a Muslim battalion and a company of the Airborne Forces.

The attackers were armed with Shilka installations - quadruple self-propelled automatic cannons. Actually, the main task - the direct seizure of the palace - was carried out by special groups of the KGB headed by Colonel Grigory Boyarinov. Shortly before the assault, the palace was visited by Yuri Drozdov, a high-ranking KGB intelligence officer. Drozdov sketched floor plans. At this time, the KGB officers, who were quartered in the building, left the palace under a plausible pretext. Meanwhile, the anti-aircraft gunners wasted no time: two commanders conducted a reconnaissance mission.

From left to right: Major General of the USSR Yuri Drozdov and KGB Colonel, Hero of the Soviet Union Grigory Boyarinov. Photo: © Wikipedia.org Creative Commons

Interestingly, the KGB hoped to eliminate Amin in some simpler way. However, the attempt to poison the ruler suffered a fiasco: the Soviet doctors, who did not know anything about the intelligence plans, managed to pump Amin and everyone who had tasted the poison. All that remained was to act quickly and tough.

On the evening of the 27th, the Soviet military moved towards the cherished goal. The Soviet military were dressed in Afghan uniforms without insignia. The first victims were sentries who were shot down by snipers. The Zenith subgroup blew up the communications center. Then Shilki opened fire. However, fire on thick walls was of little use. Much more effective was the fire of automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 and two more "shilok". The grenade launchers and anti-aircraft gunners did not try to destroy the palace, but with barracks they cut off the barracks from heavy weapons that could be used by the guards. On the way, one of the assault teams came across the Afghans from the guard battalion under construction. The officer in command of the battalion was tied down and the disorganized soldiers were dispersed.

During this time, a specially assigned small group of soldiers captured the tanks. The crews were never able to get to the cars. However, the guards quickly recovered and were now desperately fighting back. The armored personnel carriers of the assault groups came under fire from heavy machine guns. Two vehicles were seriously damaged, one armored personnel carrier overturned into a ditch. Because of this, the already small strike group under the walls of the palace was further reduced. However, the shilki continued to fire, and their support was unexpectedly effective. One of the installations was hit by a machine gun, which prevented them from breaking into the building, so the soldiers made their way to the first floor and began a sweep. By this time, many were already wounded, including Colonel Boyarinov, who commanded the assault.

Due to the darkness and the stone crumbling, the white bandages that were supposed to help the identification were no longer useful. The only system "friend or foe" was a furious checkmate. At this time, another group made their way into the palace along the serpentine. Due to poor coordination, their communications did not recognize their own, and the "shilka" of fire support, together with the Afghans, burned down a friendly BMP. However, both KGB spetsnaz squads eventually rushed into the building.

Special forces of the Muslim battalion of the GRU and paratroopers blocked and seized the guard barracks. Agees and "shilki" drove the soldiers inside, did not allow them to leave, and the assault groups took the stunned Afghans prisoner. The resistance turned out to be weak: the enemy was completely stunned. The number of prisoners exceeded the number of soldiers in the assault groups. A tank column that appeared on the road was shot with anti-tank missiles and the crews were captured. The situation with the anti-aircraft battalion was more dangerous. Some artillerymen broke through to the guns, and the commandos took the battery literally from the wheels, bursting into it in armored vehicles.

It is not known exactly how Amin himself died. The body was found at the bar. According to one of the versions, he ran out to meet the special forces in civilian clothes, but with a pistol in his hands - and was immediately shot. According to another, he just sat on the floor, waiting for his fate, and was hit by a grenade splinter. It is interesting that the dignitaries of Taraki also came to the armored personnel carrier of the assault group, who now took heroic poses over the body of the dictator.

Some of Amin's relatives also died in the battle, however, contrary to popular legend, the special forces spared everyone who could be spared. In total, up to 1,700 people were captured that evening. However, civilian casualties could not be avoided. Among others, Amin's 11-year-old son was killed. “When there is a battle, you are met with machine-gun and machine-gun fire, everything around is burning and exploding, it’s impossible to see where the children are,” noted Rustam Tursunkulov, the commander of one of Musbat's assault groups. The murdered dictator was wrapped in a carpet and buried without a grave.

On the Soviet side, during the storming of the palace and fighting with guards, five were killed in the Muslim battalion, five in the KGB special forces. Colonel Boyarinov was among those killed. Also, by tragic accident, the military doctor who treated Amin died. The exact number of casualties of the palace guards is unknown, but probably more than two hundred people were killed. The whole operation lasted 43 minutes, although one of the security detachments fought back for some time and went into the mountains.

Key objects of Kabul were seized in a similar scenario. It is interesting that the residents reacted sluggishly to these events: they had already got used to civil strife and the shooting that accompanied it. On the other hand, the political prisoners rejoiced loudly, they not only opened the gates, but also drove buses to take them out of the prison. In the meantime, the victors almost lost their entire command at once. The fact is that army and KGB officers traveled around Kabul in Amin's captured Mercedes. The General Staff was guarded by a young paratrooper who, without understanding, gave a turn.

Fortunately, he missed, he only shot through the body of the car with several bullets. The reconnaissance general Drozdov approached the lieutenant who came running to the shooting and said only: "Thank you, son, for not teaching your soldier to shoot." At this time, doctors fought over the victims of those who had been taught to shoot. Assistance was rendered to both the Soviet military and the Afghans. Later, the participants in the assault noted the highest qualifications of the doctors: of those Soviet soldiers who were dragged to the doctors alive, no one died - although there were dozens of wounded in the assault groups. The Afghans were also operated mostly successfully; among others, Amin's eldest daughter and grandson were rescued.

Afghanistan woke up the next morning with a new government. The head of state was Babrak Karmal, who was forced to emigrate under Amin.

The assassination of the leader of Afghanistan was the beginning of the invasion of the Soviet troops into the territory of this country. After this event, a ten-year undeclared war started, costing the Soviet Union thousands of soldiers and officers' lives.

Swap pieces on the political chessboard

The USSR has always paid great attention to supporting friendly regimes in foreign countries... And if the political situation there did not meet the interests of the party and the government, then they did not hesitate to edit it. Afghanistan is no exception. In the late 1970s, as a result of a coup, Moscow's protege, leader of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Nur Taraki, was killed in this country, and Hafizullah Amin, the unwanted USSR, came to power. Taraki's supporters began to be oppressed and persecuted, which was very displeasing to the leadership of the Soviet Union. Information about Amin's cooperation with the US intelligence services strengthened the decision to eliminate the new Afghan leader and replace him with a more loyal to the USSR.

You asked for it

In part, Amin himself brought his end closer. He repeatedly asked the USSR for military assistance. And under the pretext of strengthening "fraternal aid" to the people of friendly Afghanistan, the Soviet Union in December 1979 sent to this country the so-called "Muslim battalion", which actually consisted of GRU officers. The beginning of the operation coincided with the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Together with the servicemen and equipment, the Kremlin protege Babrak Karmal and several of his supporters were brought to Bagram. The "Muslim battalion" became part of the Amin's palace guard brigade, which greatly simplified the task of eliminating the unwanted ruler. In a short time, Soviet servicemen in Kabul established full control over strategically important facilities.

Operation "Agate"

Operation Agat was prepared and carried out by the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Defense. The assault team was dressed in Afghan uniforms without insignia. Amin and his guests on the eve of the attack were poisoned by the KGB agent, the chief cook of the presidential palace, they even lost consciousness for a while. The assault on the Taj Bek Palace began on the evening of December 27. A mine detonated in a manhole in the sewer system disabled all telephone communications in Kabul. The assault forces included snipers and armored vehicles, and anti-aircraft guns worked around the palace. The stormtroopers who burst into the building cleared every floor. Until recently, Amin did not believe that he was attacked by Soviet shuravi. As a result of the attack, Amin was killed, most of his guards were captured. In parallel with the palace, our troops seized the general staff of the Afghan army and other objects of strategic importance in the violent overthrow of the government. The new leader of the country, Babrak Karmal, was brought to Kabul, and the USSR officially announced that the latter had taken power in connection with the massive discontent of the Afghan people with the policies pursued by the late Amin.

Consequences of the assault

The attack killed over 100 people from among the attackers on the Taj Bek Palace. In addition to Amin, two of his sons and about 200 presidential guards were killed. The West regarded this operation as the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and subsequently with all its might actively supported the Mujahideen, who fought with the troops of a limited contingent that had been in the country for 10 years. Several participants in the assault received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the group commander Grigory Boyarinov - posthumously. In total, about 700 employees of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Defense were awarded for "Agat".

However, it is incorrect to consider this evening the first episode of the epic that has begun. Rather, it was the culmination of events that happened much earlier. For many years I have questioned the persons directly involved in these events. So before you, if you like, a certain experience of an exclusive political investigation.

CIA agent?

In the autumn of that memorable year, the power structures and special services of the Soviet Union in Kabul were more than widely represented. Even then, long before the introduction of troops, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were openly working there, and our military advisers looked after almost every Afghan major. The largest generals from the Ministry of Defense, from the Lubyanka, as well as the highest party officials from the Old Square regularly visited Afghanistan. In addition, foreign intelligence and GRU residencies, which had reliable sources in all structures of Afghan society, on all levels of power, have been actively poking around there for a long time.

That is, Moscow did not experience a shortage of information about what was happening behind Pyandj, and could well have influenced the situation.

The coup that took place in April 78 brought the People's Democratic Party to power, which was under the strong influence of the CPSU. On the one hand, this pleased our leaders, on the other, it brought them a headache, because the Afghan comrades immediately began to literally gnaw at each other, a fierce factional struggle unfolded in the party, with both groups racing vowing love and loyalty to "Soviet friends." ... Which of them is closer to true Marxism, who is right, on whom to bet? The most interesting thing is that our officials from various departments who oversaw Afghan affairs gradually dissociated themselves: many military men began to sympathize with the "Khalqists" (Taraki, Amin), and the officers of the Lubyanka liked the "brocham" wing (Karmal, Najibullah).

Everything became very complicated in September, when Prime Minister Amin first isolated and then destroyed the secretary general and the head of state, Taraki. Now Amin himself became the main one in Afghanistan. After that, the repressions against the "apostates" within the party became even more fierce. And another misfortune made itself felt more and more clearly: detachments of Islamic partisans - still poorly armed and scattered - now and then attacked the local authorities, approaching Kabul. A serious danger loomed over the April revolution.

Boris Ponomarev,
then the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, candidate member of the Politburo:

Our Chekists suspected Amin of links with American intelligence. Perhaps they were alarmed by the fact that he once studied in the United States. In the summer and autumn of 1979, we increasingly began to receive information that Amin was ruthlessly dealing with the "Parchamists" and generally with unwanted people. Because of this, the revolution appeared in some unattractive light. Our leadership decided that this is not possible.

A. K. Misak,
then the finance minister of Afghanistan:

No, Amin was never a CIA agent. He was a communist. He loved Stalin very much and even tried to imitate him. I cannot deny him the talent of a major organizer, however, I will make a reservation that he strove to achieve progress in everything very quickly, right now. Was vain: for example, he starred in feature film, playing in him the role of the hero of the underground, that is, himself.

Sh.Dzhauzjani,
then a member of the politburo Central Committee of the PDPA:

Amin's portrait cannot be painted with only one paint. He was a courageous man, full of energy, very sociable and popular. In politics, he occupied an extreme leftist position. Dogmatist. He contributed to his cult in every possible way and was absolutely intolerant of dissent, and ruthlessly rooted it out. He bowed to his teacher Taraki, but as soon as he was an obstacle in his path, he destroyed the teacher without delay. He offered to arrange Afghanistan according to the Soviet model, insisted on including the thesis about the dictatorship of the proletariat in our constitution. Your advisers were able to dissuade him from such obvious stupidity.

Alexander Puzanov,
then the Soviet ambassador in Kabul:

Amin ... This, I can tell you, was a smart man. Energetic, exceptionally efficient. I knew him as a military, statesman and politician. From May 1978 to November 1979, practically no day passed that we did not meet. Taraki considered him the most capable and devoted student, was in love with him. And with all this, he is a cruel and merciless executioner. When we realized that Amin's repressions could no longer be stopped, we gave an extremely frank cipher telegram about this to the Center.

Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky,
then General Staff officer:

I once asked former CIA director Admiral Turner, "Was Amin your agent?" He, as it should be according to the rules of the game, avoided a direct answer, said only that "the Americans are credited with as many cases as they simply cannot do." As for my opinion, I doubt the direct work of the Afghan leader for American intelligence.

Yes, if Amin was someone's agent, then most likely he collaborated with the KGB, like all other prominent figures in the PDPA. In the filing cabinet of our foreign intelligence, he appears under the operational pseudonym Kazem. But the clouds over him - especially after the murder of Taraki - were gathering. Brezhnev was not only annoyed by the sudden change of power in Kabul, he was furious. Leonid Ilyich quite recently, in September, received the Afghan secretary general in Moscow, hugged him, discussed plans to build a bright future, and then some adventurer Amin appears, and now it will be necessary to kiss and discuss plans with him. No, that doesn't work. Brezhnev, of course, sent a welcoming telegram to the new leader (oh, the crafty rules of the apparatus life!), But plans were already ripening in Moscow to drastically "rectify the situation."

Kill cannot be pardoned

On November 12, 1979, the top Soviet leaders (only members of the Politburo and one candidate - BN Ponomarev) held a secret meeting at which they approved Andropov's plan to eliminate Amin. The cautious leaders, realizing the delicacy of the moment, instructed the secretary of the Central Committee, Comrade Chernenko, to keep the minutes of their meeting. This is the only case when a truly fateful decision was recorded by hand, in one copy and mysteriously entitled "To the position in" A ".

This paper did not talk about the introduction of troops, they were initially supposed to be moved to the border and deployed there, just in case. The very same operation to change the power was planned to be carried out by the forces and means available in Afghanistan. From that time on, Amin's days were numbered.

But first the clearing had to be cleared.

Alexander Puzanov:

Suddenly I received a telegram signed by Gromyko: "Considering your repeated requests to dismiss the ambassador in Kabul, you are being transferred to another job." Strange, I didn’t make any requests. Well, what can I say ... Everything was clear. On November 21 he flew to the Union.

***

Most likely, Puzanov's unexpected response was a purely distracting maneuver, since Amin, who considered him a friend of the "Parchamists," asked many times to replace our diplomat with another, more accommodating one. So they went to meet him in order to lull, to dispel suspicions. And the embassy is now headed by the former secretary of the Tatar regional committee F.A. Tabeyev, who, having presented his credentials to Amin, immediately began to discuss with the Afghan leader the details of his upcoming official visit to Moscow. Amin had been asking for such a visit for a long time, and now the Soviet side has agreed (another diversionary maneuver).

Fikryat Tabeev:

Amin had a clear dislike for our Central Asian republics, where, in his opinion, the building of socialism was too delayed. He said: "We can do it in ten years." One day he could not resist a poorly veiled threat: "I hope you learn the right lessons from the activities of your predecessor." In almost a month of my new job, nothing special happened. We were preparing Amin's visit to Moscow. All our departments, then represented in Afghanistan, supported the Amin leadership.

***

Moreover, many supported not just formally, but with obvious sympathy for the new Afghan leader. Among them were the chief military adviser, Lieutenant General L.N. Gorelov and adviser to the chief chief, Major General V.P. Zaplatin.

Lev Gorelov:

When Andropov asked about my opinion about Amina, I said: “Strong-willed, efficient, but at the same time cunning and cunning. He carried out a series of repressions. Repeatedly asked to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, including for personal protection. He really wants to meet with Brezhnev. ". Apparently, they didn't like my grades. In early December, I was recalled to Moscow. Other military leaders who did not share the opinion of the leadership also fell out of favor - especially about the possible entry of our contingent: Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov, Commander of the Ground Forces Pavlovsky.

Vasily Zaplatin:

At a meeting with Defense Minister Ustinov in October, we reported that Amin respects the Soviet Union, that we must bear in mind its great capabilities and use them in our interests. There was no talk of bringing in troops. We have confirmed that the Afghan army itself is able to counter the rebel forces. And on December 10, I was again summoned to Moscow, and, one might say, by deception I was cunningly lured out of Kabul. One general from the General Staff calls on a private connection and says: "Your daughter has applied to the Central Committee of the CPSU with a request to meet with her father, that is, with you. Her request has been granted. You should immediately fly to Moscow. The plane has already been sent for you." I never returned back to Afghanistan.

***

Now in the Afghan capital there are only those of our people who would not hesitate to carry out any order of the Center. The "first violins" were undoubtedly the representatives of the Lubyanka: the advisor to the chairman - General B.S. Ivanov, Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence) - General V.A. Kirpichenko, head of the KGB representative office in the DRA - General L.P. Bogdanov, resident V. I. Osadchy. A little later, they will be joined by the chief of the Department of Illegal Intelligence and Special Operations - General Yu.I. Drozdov. From the Ministry of Defense, the operation was prepared by the new chief military adviser S.K. Magometov, deputy. Commander of the Airborne Forces N.N. Guskov and representative of the General Staff E.S. Kuzmin.

The very "forces and means available in Afghanistan" that were supposed to eliminate the unwanted regime were based in the capital and at the Bagram airbase and were a special forces detachment of the GRU (the famous "Muslim battalion"), an airborne battalion, KGB special forces groups and about fifty border guards guarding our embassy. However, in early December, another battalion of paratroopers landed.

On December 10, at the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense D.F. Ustinov instructed the General Staff to form a new army grouping - the future 40th Army, or, as it was initially called for camouflage, a "limited contingent." At the same time, Babrak Karmal and his team, the core of which were "Parchamists", were being prepared for the ascent to the throne. A special man from the Lubyanka was hastily sent to Czechoslovakia, where Karmal was hiding from the killers of Hafizulla Amin. In November, the entire backbone of the future new leadership of Afghanistan was brought to Moscow from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

Densely surrounded by Soviet comrades - advisers, security guards, cooks, doctors, Amin was actively preparing for his visit to Moscow and the long-awaited meeting with Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. Even in a nightmare, he could not imagine that other Soviet comrades had a completely different idea of ​​the immediate future of the Afghan leader. The verdict had already been passed; only a few hours remained until the execution.

Poisoning history

Alexander Lyakhovsky:

It was planned to neutralize Amin and his nephew Asadullah, who was in charge of the KAM security service, with the help of an agent introduced in advance into their environment. He had to mix a special agent into their food. It was hoped that when it began to act, panic would rise in the palace, our units would move out of Bagram and under the guise of doing their job. At noon on December 13, an event using special equipment was held. The units were given the command to seize the Oak object (Ark Palace in the center of Kabul, where the head of state was then located). But soon followed by the command "Hang up". The fact is that the poison did not affect Amin at all, and his nephew did not feel well until the next morning. Asadullah was sent to the USSR for treatment. After the change of power, he first ended up in the Lefortovo prison, and then was deported to Afghanistan and shot by the "Parchamists". As for Amin, experts later explained that the poison had been neutralized by Coca-Cola. By the way, when General Bogdanov reported the embarrassment to Andropov, he summoned his deputy, who was in charge of science and technology, and ordered to urgently fix things with these so-called "special means".

***

Perhaps that failure then saved the lives of not only two Afghans, but also many of our officers and soldiers. After all, literally a handful of paratroopers and special forces were aimed at the palace, which was guarded by two thousand elite guards. A telegram was sent to Moscow from representatives of the KGB and the Ministry of Defense that it was impossible to eliminate Amin with the available forces. Military support required.

B. Karmal and his associates were secretly sent back to the USSR. Until better times. The next attempt was scheduled for December 27th.

By that time, Amin had moved to the outskirts of the capital to the Taj Bek Palace, which had just been renovated by the Germans especially for him, which stood on the top of a low hill. Our paratroopers, the "Muslim battalion" and special forces were brought up to the palace in advance under the guise of guarding it. Much more forces were envisaged this time. But the scenario now remained the same: first - the poison, then - the assault.

Shah Wali,
then a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Minister of Foreign Affairs:

On December 27, Amin invited all the country's top leadership to his place for lunch. The formal reason was the return from Moscow of the Secretary of the Central Committee Panjsheri, who reported that the Soviet comrades had promised to provide Afghanistan with broad military assistance. At the same time, Amin glanced triumphantly at the guests: "Everything is going well. I am constantly in touch with Comrade Gromyko by phone, and we are jointly discussing the question of how best to formulate information for the world about providing us with military support." After the second courses, the guests went to the next room, where a tea table was laid. And then the inexplicable happened: almost at the same time, everyone felt bad: people fell off their feet and literally turned off.

A.K. Misak:

I still remember asking Amin anxiously: "Maybe they put something in our food? By the way, who is your cook?" “Don't worry,” the owner replied. “Both the cook and my guards are Soviet.” But Amin himself also had a very pale appearance. Only one Panjsheri looked with amazement at our torment: he was the only one of all who ate almost nothing, because then he was on a diet.

Alexander Shkirando,
then the translator in the group military advisers:

That day I was with the Afghans in the palace. We talked and drank tea. After lunch, already at the exit, I meet my housemate Misha Shkvaryuk - he is a military doctor, he served as an adviser to the head of the Kabul hospital. "Misha, where are you going?" - "Yes, they invited me to see Comrade Amin. Something is not good for him." And with Misha, there are two more Soviet doctors and our nurses. They actually saved Amin then: they washed his stomach, made droppers, injected saline. But this "special means", apparently, and somehow hurt me: in the evening the temperature rose to 40 degrees, barely pumped out. Then I was lying in hospitals for more than three months.

Colonel General Valery Vostrotin,
then the commander of the airborne company:

Somewhere in the middle of December, our 9th company, together with the "Muslim battalion", was transferred closer to the Taj Bek palace, ostensibly to guard Amin. On December 27, General Drozdov from the KGB gathered us. "Amin is a CIA agent," he said. "Your task is to destroy him and prevent the forces loyal to him from approaching the palace." They poured us a little vodka. Time "H" was postponed several times. Finally, at 19.30 I heard the signal "Storm-333". We got into combat vehicles and began to move towards the object.

Shah Wali:

By the time of the assault, in addition to the Afghans, there were your doctors, translators, as well as KGB advisers who were responsible for Amin's security. As far as I know, one doctor was killed. My wife died. Amin's young sons were killed, and his daughter was wounded. Many more were also killed. But after all, all these people, as well as Amin himself and his entourage, could surrender without a single shot. At night, Kabul radio reported that, by decision of the revolutionary court, Amin had been sentenced to death and carried out. And in the morning they arrested me.

Alexander Lyakhovsky:

The Soviet doctors who were in the palace hid wherever they could. At first, it was thought that it was the Mujahideen or Taraki supporters who attacked. Only later, having heard Russian obscenities, they realized that they were acting on their own. The doctors saw Amin walking down the corridor, covered in reflections of fire. He was in shorts and a T-shirt, holding vials of saline in his hands, held high, wrapped in tubes, like grenades. The military doctor, Colonel Alekseev, ran out of the hiding place, first of all pulled out the needles, pressed his veins with his fingers so that the blood would not ooze, then brought Amin to the bar. But then a child's cry was heard, from somewhere in the side room, smearing tears, the secretary general's five-year-old son came out. Seeing his father, he rushed to him, grabbed him by the legs. Amin pressed his head to him, and the two of them sat down against the wall.

***

Here, at this wall, the dictator found his death. The doctors hid in the conference room. Alekseev survived, but another colonel, Kuznechenkov, was unlucky: some special forces soldier, jumping into the hall, gave a blind burst from a machine gun and struck the doctor on the spot.

The battle in the palace lasted 43 minutes. Groups "Zenith" and "Thunder" lost four killed, the "Muslim battalion" and paratroopers - fourteen people. By the way, most of them died due to a misunderstanding: the 103rd division, which came to the rescue, did not understand the situation and opened fire on its own people. It was all over when General Drozdov was told by radio: "The main thing is over."

However, everything was just beginning. But we didn’t know it yet.

Andrey Alexandrov-Agents,
then assistant L.I. Brezhnev:

On the morning of December 28, I call Andropov: "Yuri Vladimirovich, how are we going to respond to the latest requests from the Afghan leadership? What are we going to answer to Amin?" And he told me: "What Amina? Karmal has been there since yesterday night. And our troops are in Kabul."

Amina's widow and their daughter, after serving several years in a Kabul prison, then left for the USSR. They wanted to live only in this country, which their husband and father adored so much. The daughter graduated from the Rostov Medical Institute.

The headquarters of our 40th army was located in the Taj Bek palace after its overhaul. Then he suffered greatly during the internecine fighting in Kabul and especially under the Taliban. Now the palace is in the area of ​​responsibility of the Canadian troops, who promise to restore it.

There are only a few special services operations inscribed in gold in history. This operation was carried out by the forces of the KGB and the Soviet army in Taj-bek - the palace of the Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin.
On December 27, 1979, at 19:30, the power phase began - the KGB special forces, the GRU special forces and a special Muslim battalion went into battle.

In early December, a special group of the KGB of the USSR "Zenith" (30 people each) arrived at the air base in Bagram, and on December 23, a special group "Thunder" (30 people) was transferred. They operated under these code names in Afghanistan, but at the Center they were called differently. For example, the “Thunder” group is a subdivision “A”, which later became widely known as “Alpha”. The unique group "A" was created on the personal instructions of Yu.V. Andropov and prepared for the implementation of anti-terrorist activities. They were assisted by a Muslim battalion - 520 people and an Airborne Forces company - 87 people.
The security system of the Taj Bek Palace was carefully and thoughtfully organized. Inside the palace, the personal guard of Hafizullah Amin, consisting of his relatives and especially trusted people, was on duty. They also wore a special uniform, different from other Afghan servicemen: white bands on their caps, white belts and holsters, white cuffs on the sleeves. They lived in the immediate vicinity of the palace in an adobe building, next to the house where the headquarters of the guard brigade was located (later, in 1987-1989, the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense would be located there). The second line consisted of seven posts, each of which housed four sentries armed with a machine gun, a grenade launcher and machine guns. They were changed every two hours.
The outer ring of the guard was formed by the points of deployment of the battalions of the guard brigade (three motorized infantry and a tank one). They were located around the Taj Bek at a short distance. At one of the dominant heights, two T-54 tanks were buried, which could freely fire direct fire from cannons and machine guns to the area adjacent to the palace. In total, there were about 2.5 thousand people in the security brigade. In addition, an anti-aircraft regiment was located nearby, which was armed with twelve 100-mm anti-aircraft guns and sixteen anti-aircraft machine-gun installations (ZPU-2), as well as a construction regiment (about 1,000 people armed with small arms). There were other army units in Kabul, in particular, two divisions and a tank brigade.


The main role in the initial period of the Soviet military presence in the DRA was assigned to the "special purpose" forces. Indeed, in fact, the first military action in Operation Storm-333, which was carried out on December 27 by special forces groups of the KGB of the USSR and military units of the army special forces, was the seizure of the Taj Bek palace, where the residence of the head of the DRA was located, and the removal of Hafizullah Amin from power.
The attackers were dressed in Afghan uniforms with white armbands, the password for identifying friend or foe was the shout "Yasha - Misha".


The Muslim battalion was created from soldiers and officers from Central Asia (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen). During the selection, special attention was paid to physical training, only those who had served half a year or a year were involved, the principle of voluntariness was the basis, but if there were not enough specialists, a good military expert could be enrolled in the detachment without his consent.


On the morning of 27, concrete preparations began for the storming of H. Amin's palace. The KGB officers had a detailed plan of the palace (layout of rooms, communications, power supply, etc.). Therefore, by the beginning of Operation Storm-333, the commandos from the “Muslim” battalion and the KGB special groups knew the target of capture thoroughly: the most convenient ways of approach; guard duty; the total number of Amin's guards and bodyguards; the location of machine-gun "nests", armored vehicles and tanks; internal structure rooms and labyrinths of the Taj Bek palace; placement of radiotelephone communication equipment, etc. Before the assault on the palace in Kabul, the KGB special group was supposed to blow up the so-called "well", and in fact, the central hub of secret communications with the most important military and civilian objects of the DRA. Assault ladders, equipment, weapons and ammunition were being prepared. The main thing is secrecy and secrecy.
On the morning of December 27, Y. Drozdov and V. Kolesnik, according to the old Russian custom, washed in the bath before the battle and changed their linen. Then, once again, they reported on their readiness to their own leadership. B.S. Ivanov contacted the Center and reported that everything was ready. Then he held out the receiver of the radiotelephone to Yu.I. Drozdov. Yu.V. Andropov: “Will you go yourself? I’m not risking in vain, think about your safety and take care of the people.” V. Kolesnik was also reminded once again not to risk taking risks in vain.
The detachment, which due to its size and received the name of the battalion, consisted of 4 companies. The first company was armed with the BMP-1, the second and third BTR-60pb, the fourth company was an armament company, it included an AGS-17 platoon (which had just appeared in the army), a platoon of Lynx infantry jet flamethrowers and a sapper platoon. The detachment had all the corresponding rear divisions: platoons of automobile and material support, communications, additionally the battalion was assigned a platoon of the ZSU "Shilka".


An interpreter was attached to each company, but, given the ethnic composition, their services were almost never used, all Tajiks, half of Uzbeks and part of the Turkmen knew Farsi, one of the main languages ​​of Afghanistan. The curiosity came out only with the vacancy of an anti-aircraft officer, it was not possible to find the necessary person of the required nationality, and the dark-haired Russian captain Pautov was hired for this position, who, when he was silent, did not stand out in total mass... The detachment was led by Major Kh. Khalbaev.


During the lunch, the PDPA General Secretary and many of his guests suddenly felt unwell. Some have passed out. H. Amin also completely “switched off”. His wife immediately summoned the commander of the presidential guard, Jandad, who began calling the Central Military Hospital (Charsad Bistar) and the Soviet embassy's polyclinic to call for help. The products and pomegranate juice were immediately sent for examination. The suspected chefs have been detained. Enhanced security mode. However, the main performers of this action managed to escape.
H. Amin was lying in one of the rooms, stripped down to his underpants, with a drooping jaw and rolling eyes. He was unconscious, in a severe coma. Died? We felt a pulse - a barely perceptible beat. Dies? Quite a considerable time will pass before H. Amin's eyelids tremble, and he will come to his senses, then he will ask in surprise: “Why did this happen in my house? Who did this? Accident or sabotage? "


At the command of Captain Pautov, the ZSU-23-4 "Shilki" self-propelled anti-aircraft guns were the first to open fire on the palace at the command of Captain Pautov, unleashing a sea of ​​shells on him. Automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 began to fire at the location of the tank battalion, preventing the crews from approaching the tanks. Subdivisions of the "Muslim" battalion began to move to the destination areas. According to the plan, the first company to move to the palace was the company of senior lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov, on ten infantry fighting vehicles of which there were several subgroups of special forces from “Thunder”, headed by O. Balashov, V. Yemyshev, S. Golov and V. Karpukhin. Major Mikhail Romanov was in charge of them. Major Y. Semyonov with his “Zenith” on four armored personnel carriers had to move to the end of the palace, and then make a dash along the pedestrian staircase that led up to the Taj Bek. At the façade, both groups had to connect and act together.
Rocket infantry flamethrower "Lynx".


However, at the last moment the plan was changed and the first to move to the palace building on three armored personnel carriers were the Zenit subgroups, the elders of which were A. Karelin, B. Suvorov and V. Fateev. The general management of them was carried out by Ya. Semenov. The fourth subgroup of “Zenith”, headed by V. Shchigolev, ended up in the column of “Thunder”. The combat vehicles knocked down the outer security posts and rushed along the only road that steeply climbed the mountain with a serpentine road, leaving the site in front of the palace. The road was heavily guarded, and other approaches were mined. As soon as the first car passed the turn, heavy machine guns struck from the building. All the ears of the armored personnel carrier that went first were damaged, and the combat vehicle of Boris Suvorov was immediately knocked out, it caught fire. The subgroup commander himself was killed and the personnel were wounded. Jumping out of the armored personnel carriers "Zenith" were forced to lie down, and began to shoot at the windows of the palace, and with the help of assault ladders began to climb up the mountain.


At a quarter past seven in the evening, violent explosions thundered in Kabul. It was a subgroup of the KGB from “Zenith” (the head of the group Boris Pleshkunov) blew up the so-called “well” of communications, disconnecting the Afghan capital from the outside world. The explosion was supposed to serve as the beginning of the storming of the palace, but the commandos began a little earlier.


The Thunder subgroups also immediately came under heavy heavy machine gun fire. The breakthrough of the groups was under heavy fire. The commandos quickly rushed out to the area in front of the Taj Bek. The commander of the first subgroup of "Thunder" O. Balashov was pierced by shrapnel with shrapnel, but at first he did not feel pain in a fever and rushed along with everyone to the palace, but then he was sent to the medical battalion. Captain 2nd Rank E. Kozlov while still sitting in the BMP, barely had time to put his leg out, as she was immediately shot.


The first minutes of the battle were the most difficult. KGB special groups went to the assault on Taj Bek, and the main forces of V. Sharipov's company covered the outer approaches to the palace. Other units of the "Muslim" battalion provided the outer ring of cover. Shilki hit the Taj Bek, 23-mm shells bounced off the walls like rubber. Hurricane fire continued from the windows of the palace, which pressed the commandos to the ground. And they got up only when “Shilka” suppressed a machine gun in one of the windows of the palace. This did not last long - maybe five minutes, but it seemed to the fighters that an eternity had passed. Ya. Semyonov with his soldiers rushed forward to the building, where at the entrance to the palace they met with a group of M. Romanov.


When the soldiers moved to the main entrance, the fire intensified even more, although it seemed that it was already impossible to do this. Something unimaginable was happening. Everything was confused. On the outskirts of the palace G. Zudin was killed, S. Kuvylin, A. Baev and N. Shvachko were wounded. In the first minutes of the battle at Major M. Romanov, 13 people were wounded. The group commander himself was concussed. Things were no better at Zenit. V. Ryazanov, having received a through wound in the thigh, himself bandaged his leg and went on the attack. A. Yakushev and V. Yemyshev were among the first to break through to the building. Afghans from the second floor threw grenades. Barely starting to climb the stairs, A. Yakushev fell, struck by shrapnel of a grenade, and V. Emyshev, who rushed to him, was seriously wounded in right hand... Later she had to be amputated.


The battle in the building itself immediately took on a fierce and uncompromising character. A group consisting of E. Kozlov, M. Romanov, S. Golov, M. Sobolev, V. Karpukhin, A. Plyusnin, V. Grishin and V. Filimonov, as well as Ya. Semenov with soldiers from Zenit V. Ryazantsev, V. Bykovsky and V. Poddubny burst through the window with right side palace. G. Boyarinov and S. Kuvilin at that time put out of action the communication center of the palace. A. Karelin, V. Shchigolev and N. Kurbanov stormed the palace from the end. The commandos acted desperately and decisively. If they did not leave the premises with their hands up, then the doors would break open, grenades were thrown into the room. Then they fired indiscriminately from machine guns. Sergei Golov was literally "chopped" by shrapnel of grenades, then as many as 9 were counted in him. During the battle, Nikolai Berlev was smashed by a bullet from an assault rifle magazine. Fortunately for him, S. Kuvylin turned out to be next to him, who in time managed to give him his horn. A second later, the Afghan guardsman who jumped out into the corridor would most likely have had time to shoot first, but this time he was late with the shot. P. Klimov was seriously wounded.


In the palace, officers and soldiers of Kh. Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100 - 150 people) fiercely resisted, not surrendering. “Shilki” again transferred fire and began to beat on Taj Bek and on the area in front of him. A fire started in the building on the second floor. This had a strong moral impact on the defenders. However, as the special forces moved to the second floor of the Taj Bek, gunfire and explosions intensified. The soldiers from Amin's guards, who at first took the special forces for their own rebellious unit, having heard Russian speech and obscenities, surrendered to them as the highest and just force. As it turned out later, many of them were trained at the airborne school in Ryazan, where, apparently, they remembered Russian swearing for the rest of their lives. Ya. Semenov, E. Kozlov, V. Anisimov, S. Golov, V. Karpukhin and A. Plyusnin rushed to the second floor. M. Romanov, due to a strong concussion, had to stay downstairs. The commandos attacked fiercely and brutally. They fired indiscriminately from machine guns and threw grenades into all the rooms that came across on the way.


When a group of special forces consisting of E. Kozlov, Y. Semenov, V. Karpukhin, S. Golov, A. Plyusnin, V. Anisimov, A. Karelin and N. Kurbanov, throwing grenades and firing continuous fire from machine guns, burst into the second floor of the palace , then we saw H. Amin lying near the bar in Adidas shorts and a T-shirt. A little later V. Drozdov joined this group.


The battle in the palace did not last long (43 minutes). “Suddenly the shooting stopped,” recalled Major Yakov Semyonov, “I reported on the Voki-Toki radio station to the leadership that the palace had been taken, many people were killed and wounded, and the main thing was over.”


In total, five people were killed in the KGB special groups during the storming of the palace, including Colonel G.I. Boyarinov. Almost everyone was injured, but those who could hold weapons continued to fight.


The experience of storming the Taj Bek Palace confirms that in such operations only highly trained professionals can successfully complete the task. And even for them it is very difficult to act in extreme conditions, and what can we say about untrained eighteen-year-old boys who really do not know how to shoot. However, after the dissolution of the FSB special forces and the departure of professionals from the civil service, it was the untrained youths who were sent to Chechnya in December 1994 to seize the so-called presidential palace in Grozny. Now only mothers mourn their sons.


By a closed Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a large group of employees of the KGB of the USSR (about 400 people) were awarded orders and medals. Colonel G.I. Boyarinov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) for his courage and heroism in providing international assistance to the fraternal Afghan people. Colonel V.V. Kolesnik, E.G. Kozlov and V.F. Karpukhin. Major General Yu.I. Drozdov was awarded the order October revolution... The commander of the “Thunder” group, Major M.M. Romanov was awarded the Order of Lenin. Lieutenant Colonel O.U. Shvets and Major J.F. Semyonov was awarded the Order of the Battle Red Banner.