Development methods

The strategy of indirect action in a new form. Henry Basil Liddell Hartt strategy of indirect action Strategy of indirect action

British historian Liddell Hart is a famous and multifaceted personality. From an ordinary officer, he “evolved” into a prominent military theorist, and subsequently became one of the best British historians of the 20th century. Liddell had a major influence on the theory of strategy and the conduct of mechanized warfare. Several of Liddell's books on military theory were recognized as the best during the author's lifetime. One of them is the “Indirect Action Strategy”, which will be discussed in this article.

about the author

Liddell Hart was born on October 31, 1895 in Paris, in the family of a priest. He was educated at St. Paul's School in London and then continued his studies at Cambridge. During the First World War he served in the British Army, where he was an officer in a rifle company. Garth's experience on the front line was limited to the autumn, and in the winter of 1915, after being wounded, he went home.

He returned to the front in 1916 to take part in the Battle of the Somme. Garth was injured in a gas attack and was sent to hospital on July 19, 1916. The battalion in which Liddell served was completely destroyed on the first day of the offensive - July 1. The loss of 60,000 people in one day was the most significant in British history.

The experiences he gained on the Western Front influenced the rest of Basil Liddell Harte's life. "The Strategy of Indirect Action" (the book with which the author's name is usually associated) is the best proof of this.

Garth continued his service in the volunteer units of Stroud and Cambridge, where he trained recruits for the active army. During this time, he wrote several booklets on infantry training, which reached General Maxse. After the end of the war he was transferred to the Royal Army Training Corps and prepared the final version of the Infantry Manual.

Due to health reasons, Liddell was unable to serve in the active army, so he continued his career as a theorist and writer. In 1924 he worked as a war correspondent for the Morning Post, from 1925 to 1935 as a military correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, then until 1939 he worked for the Times. Liddell wrote a series of stories about military leaders, where he put forward his ideas on military strategy.

Liddell concept

Having experienced the senseless way of fighting, Hart, back in the twenties, thought about the causes of enormous human losses and analyzed the principles that, in his opinion, all military leaders ignored. These principles formed the basis of his theory, which he outlined in detail on the pages of “Strategy of Indirect Action.” Basil Liddell Hart condemned persistent frontal attacks, wasting manpower in fruitless attempts.

Gradually, thoughts formed into a concept published in the work “Decisive Wars in History” in 1929. The author proposed the most complete formulation of the principles in “Strategy,” published in 1941. The book gained great popularity both in military and academic circles.

The release of the fourth edition of the Strategy in 1967 was considered a major event in the Western Armed Forces. Although Liddell was considered a bourgeois historian, and far from pro-Soviet, his books were also published in the Soviet Union. The depth of analysis and truly encyclopedic coverage make Hart's work indispensable for fans of military history.

From Sparta to World War II

In “The Strategy of Indirect Action,” the writer consistently examines wars and battles, from ancient times to the Second World War. Using real examples, he proves that indirect actions bring greater effect and lower costs than attempts to defeat the enemy in a frontal attack. Hart examines bloody battles, mistakes of commanders and military disasters and connects them with violations of the basic principles of strategy.

In the first part, the author analyzes the Greek wars, analyzing the military experience of Epaminondas, who made a significant contribution to the development of military art. It also talks about Philip II, who created a strong army, the leadership of which was taken over by his son Alexander the Great. Roman generals and their art of war have also been analyzed by the military historian.

In his book “Strategy of Indirect Action,” the author also includes numerous maps of battles. The Byzantine and medieval wars, the commanders Cromwell and Turenne - in a word, everyone who contributed to the development of military art attracted Liddell's attention.

The author devotes a special place to the French Revolution and the army of Napoleon Bonaparte, analyzing and analyzing battles, troop movements and political maneuvers. In a separate chapter, he summarizes and concludes that over twenty-five centuries, the priorities of the art of warfare gradually shifted to the “science of destroying people.”

Early 20th century

In the second part, Hart shares his views on war, outlines the theory of strategy and conclusions obtained from an analysis of military experience. Liddell devoted this part to the analysis of the First World War - starting from 1914 and up to 1918, he examined in detail all the directions in which the war was fought, analyzing the mistakes and plans of the commanders. “Strategy has become the handmaiden of tactics” - this is how the author characterizes the actions of the military leaders of the First World War. And he sums it up: “Victory or defeat mainly depends on the moral state of the enemy and, indirectly, on strikes against him.”

In the third part of “The Strategy of Indirect Action,” the writer analyzes the successes, failures and collapse of Hitler. He describes in detail the war in France, Italy, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Gives dates, names of military leaders, movements of armies, role of allies. Germany contributed to its defeat, the author of the book is sure. “If the allied countries had understood the basic principles of strategy, and not fought in the old way, the destruction brought by this war would have been less significant,” the author concludes the third part.

Indirect approach

The origins of Liddell's indirect approach are twofold. From a theoretical point of view, he responds to the actions of political and military leaders who, in his opinion, misinterpreted and misused the theories of the 19th century Prussian military thinker - Liddell states that the application of Clausewitz's poorly understood strategy contributed to the bloodshed of the First World War and the slow implementation alternative options during the Second World War. The author sets out his point of view in the book “Strategy of Indirect Actions”.

All this called into question the validity of the old theory and required a reconsideration of how military force could be used to achieve political goals. In particular, the massive casualties and post-war economic depletion of the First World War, as well as the growing importance of air power, sea power and mechanized ground forces in the Second World War, suggested to Liddell that the theory proposed by Clausewitz should be revised.

In fact, aviation is now capable of striking economic and military centers without destroying the enemy on the battlefield. Mechanized warfare is not only capable of direct attacks, but can also contribute to the collapse of enemy positions without a major battle. Liddell argues that a good strategy is not about overcoming resistance, but about using the elements of movement and control to win, keeping the enemy off balance before a potential strike.

In other words, dislocation is also part of the strategy and should be used to maximize your winnings. Liddell's strategy means that the commander must take advantage of the new opportunities that a successful deployment provides and striking the enemy before he has time to recover. Liddell pointed out the nuances for updating the indirect approach, which are known as the 8 principles of the indirect action strategy.

Positive principles

Choose a goal within your means, guided by sober calculation and common sense. Don't "bite off more than you can chew." Distinguishing the possible from the impossible is the main sign of military wisdom.
Keep your goal in mind and adapt your plan to changing circumstances. It is important to remember that the goal can be achieved in different ways, but make sure that each captured object brings you closer to the intended goal.
Choose for your actions the direction from which the enemy least expects a blow. Put yourself in his place and decide which direction the enemy will consider less dangerous and therefore will not take preventive measures.
Follow the line of least resistance. And stick to this direction as long as it is possible to approach the intended object without unnecessary losses. The author dwells on each point in detail, explains and gives examples from history in “Strategy of Indirect Actions.”
Choose a direction in which a threat will be created to several objects at the same time. If you target only one object, you can probably lose, since the enemy will know the direction of the strike.
Ensure flexibility in the plan and deployment of troops, taking into account possible changes in the situation. Measures must be provided and developed for all cases: victory or defeat.

Negative principles

While the enemy occupies more advantageous positions, do not strike with all your might. As long as the enemy can parry the blow, it is impossible to strike effectively. Therefore, it is necessary to act only when the enemy is paralyzed.
Do not resume the offensive in the direction where you failed. Strengthening troops cannot serve as a basis for a new attack, since the enemy will also be able to strengthen its positions.

To ensure the success of a strategy of indirect action, two tasks must be solved: disrupt the enemy's stability and build on the success. The first task must be completed before striking, and the second - after. The blow itself is a simple act, but an effective blow cannot be delivered without creating favorable conditions for this. It is possible to bring a blow to a decisive result only by using favorable opportunities that appear before the enemy comes to his senses.

Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry

Indirect Action Strategy

Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry

Indirect Action Strategy

Publisher's abstract: The book examines the issues of the so-called strategy of indirect action. Using the example of the most important wars from ancient times to the twentieth century. inclusive, the author proves that indirect action is the most effective way of waging war. In a special section, the author outlines the theory and essence of strategy. The published book is intended for a wide range of readers, mainly officers and generals of the Soviet armed forces.

Content

Part 1. Strategy of the period: V century. BC - XX century. ad

Chapter I. History as practical experience

Chapter II. Greek Wars - Epaminondas, Philip and Alexander the Great

Chapter III. Roman Wars - Hannibal, Scipio and Julius Caesar

Chapter IV. Byzantine Wars - Belisarius and Narses

Chapter V. Wars of the Middle Ages

Chapter VI. XVII century - Gustav II Adolf, Cromwell, Turenne

Chapter VII. XVIII century - Marlborough and Frederick II

Chapter VIII. French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte

Chapter IX. 1854-1914

Chapter X. Conclusions from the experience of the past twenty-five centuries

Part 2. Strategy of the First World War

Chapter XI. Plans and their implementation in the Western Theater of Operations in 1914

Chapter XII. Northeastern Theater of Operations

Chapter XIII. Southeastern or Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Chapter XIV. 1918 Strategy

Part 3. Strategy of the Second World War

Chapter XV. Hitler's strategy

Chapter XVI. Hitler's successes at the beginning of World War II

Chapter XVII. The beginning of the fall of Hitler

Chapter XVIII. Fall of Hitler

Part 4. Basics of military strategy and grand strategy

Chapter XIX. Strategy theory

Chapter XX. The essence of strategy and tactics

Chapter XXI. State purpose and purpose of military action

Chapter XXII. Grand strategy

Notes

From the publisher

B. Liddell-Hart's book, the third in the "Biographies of Famous Battles" series, stands out in the sea of military theoretical treatises and memoirs for its encyclopedic nature.

"The Strategy of Indirect Action" is the last chapter of the unwritten textbook of European military science, the result of four thousand years of development of the art of war. This is a brief introduction to metastrategy, a discipline that studies “operators on strategies” - those general philosophical principles that give rise to the laws of the dynamics of antagonistic conflicts.

Already in the first, in 1946, edition of his work, B. Liddell-Hart provided an appendix in which a letter from Major General E. Dorman-Smith to the author was published, dedicated to some aspects of the North African campaign of 1940-1942. Later, the English historian added to his text an article by the Chief of the Israeli General Staff, Ya. Yadin, concerning the 1948 war in Palestine.

Both of these documents, reproduced in the Soviet publication "Strategies of Indirect Action", are included in this publication. If the work of Y. Yadin, even after fifty years from the moment of its writing, does not raise any complaints, then the work of E. Dorman-Smith required a detailed critical analysis.

As always, the editorial team strives to comment and expand on the author's intent.

Appendix 1, in addition to the letter from E. Dorman-Smith, who served as the preface to the first edition of The Strategy of Indirect Action, includes three articles, completely different in form, but united by a common theme: “Decisive Wars of the Past.” This is, firstly, an essay “The structure and chronology of military conflicts of past eras”, addressed to those who, reading B. Liddell-Hart, cannot, following the author, quickly reproduce in memory all the necessary details of the hundreds of battles mentioned by the English historian, movements of troops or political maneuvers. This essay also includes critical comments on those provisions of the doctrine of B. Liddell-Hart, which now, in the 90s, seem, if not erroneous, then at least not obvious.

What follows is an analytical review, “The World War and the Crisis of European Military Art,” adjacent to the series of articles under the general title “The Fall of Ginerion.” This review, like the entire cycle opened with the essay “The World Crisis of 1914.” (in the book “August Guns” by B. Takman), is devoted to the periodization of the history of the first half of the 20th century and those paradoxes in the development of our civilization that led to the structural crisis of Europe and caused a gradual shift in priorities from the art of warfare to the science of exterminating people.

Finally, the commentary "Military Force Structure and Its Dynamics" provides factual information for research readers. Here you will find a brief background on the evolution of European army structure.

Appendix 2 is devoted to the topic “Indirect actions in regional conflicts of the second half of the 20th century.” In addition to the already mentioned work by Y. Yadin, it contains an analytical article-classification “Arab-Israeli Wars”.

Appendix 3, entitled “The Teachings of B. Liddell-Hart,” consists of four short articles. Three of them - “Indirect actions in classical Chinese strategy”, “Ethics of war and indirect actions”, “Technical progress as a form of indirect actions” - are directly related to the main axes of the inclusion of military theory in everyday life: history - ethics - technology. The fourth commentary is dedicated to the fleet - a sign of expansion, a symbol of progress and, until recently, a sign of the coherence of the economy. This is an experimental article-reasoning about the applicability of the Liddell-Hart method to global world economic processes.

Despite the significant volume of applications, many important issues had to be ignored. Thus, we do not touch upon the topic of the third world war (information or cold), which will be the subject of one of the next books in the series.

We did not clutter the book with additional maps of countless battles. Actually, the editorial team does not see the need for those maps that had to be reproduced from the previous edition, so as not to violate copyright laws.

Maps are necessary when studying strategy, because strategy generally relies on geography as its basis. But metastrategy, the science of the birth and destruction of private strategies, is abstract and relies on philosophy and mathematics. So the best illustration of B. Liddell-Hart, perhaps, would be a blank sheet on which the researcher would write down the level of understanding of the theory at which he is currently located.

The editorial team wishes you to enjoy reading this unique strategy textbook and perhaps expand your knowledge on this topic by reading the proposed Bibliography, detailed Biographical Index and Appendices to the text.

Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry

Indirect Action Strategy

Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry

Indirect Action Strategy

Content

Part 1. Strategy of the period: V century. BC - XX century. ad

Chapter I. History as practical experience

Chapter II. Greek Wars - Epaminondas, Philip and Alexander the Great

Chapter III. Roman Wars - Hannibal, Scipio and Julius Caesar

Chapter IV. Byzantine Wars - Belisarius and Narses

Chapter V. Wars of the Middle Ages

Chapter VI. XVII century - Gustav II Adolf, Cromwell, Turenne

Chapter VII. XVIII century - Marlborough and Frederick II

Chapter VIII. French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte

Chapter IX. 1854-1914

Chapter X. Conclusions from the experience of the past twenty-five centuries

Part 2. Strategy of the First World War

Chapter XI. Plans and their implementation in the Western Theater of Operations in 1914

Chapter XII. Northeastern Theater of Operations

Chapter XIII. Southeastern or Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Chapter XIV. 1918 Strategy

Part 3. Strategy of the Second World War

Chapter XV. Hitler's strategy

Chapter XVI. Hitler's successes at the beginning of World War II

Chapter XVII. The beginning of the fall of Hitler

Chapter XVIII. Fall of Hitler

Part 4. Basics of military strategy and grand strategy

Chapter XIX. Strategy theory

Chapter XX. The essence of strategy and tactics

Chapter XXI. State purpose and purpose of military action

Chapter XXII. Grand strategy

Notes

From the publisher

B. Liddell-Hart's book, the third in the "Biographies of Famous Battles" series, stands out in the sea of military theoretical treatises and memoirs for its encyclopedic nature.

As always, the editorial team strives to comment and expand on the author's intent.

The hydrogen bomb does not provide the Western peoples with the fulfillment of their dream of a complete and final guarantee of their security. The hydrogen bomb is not a panacea for the dangers looming over them. It increased their striking power, but at the same time increased their anxiety and deepened their sense of uncertainty.

To responsible Western statesmen, the atomic bomb in 1945 seemed an easy and simple means of achieving quick and final victory and ensuring world peace. They thought, says Winston Churchill, that “bringing the war to an end, bringing about world peace, laying the healing hand upon the suffering nations of the world by demonstrating overwhelming power with a few atomic explosions was, after all our troubles and misadventures, a miracle of deliverance.” However, the alarming state of the peoples of the free world at present is an indication that responsible leaders have not fully comprehended the problem of ensuring peace through such a victory.

They did not seek to go beyond their immediate strategic goal of “winning the war” and were satisfied, contrary to historical experience, with the assumption that military victory would lead to peace. The result was the latest of many lessons showing that purely military strategy must be guided by a more far-sighted and broader "grand strategy."

In the conditions of the Second World War, the pursuit of triumph inevitably had to lead to tragedy and the realization of the futility of efforts. The complete military defeat of Germany inevitably had to clear the way for the dominance of Soviet Russia on the Eurasian continent and lead to a huge spread of communist influence in all countries. It is equally natural that the remarkable demonstration of atomic weapons, soon after the use of which the war ended, should have caused the development of similar weapons in Russia.

Current page: 1 (book has 30 pages total) [available reading passage: 17 pages]

Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry
Indirect Action Strategy

Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry

Indirect Action Strategy

Content

Part 1. Strategy of the period: V century. BC – XX century. ad

Chapter I. History as practical experience

Chapter II. Greek Wars – Epaminondas, Philip and Alexander the Great

Chapter III. Roman Wars – Hannibal, Scipio and Julius Caesar

Chapter IV. Byzantine Wars – Belisarius and Narses

Chapter V. Wars of the Middle Ages

Chapter VI. XVII century – Gustav II Adolf, Cromwell, Turenne

Chapter VII. XVIII century – Marlborough and Frederick II

Chapter VIII. French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte

Chapter IX. 1854-1914

Chapter X. Conclusions from the experience of the past twenty-five centuries

Part 2. Strategy of the First World War

Chapter XI. Plans and their implementation in the Western Theater of Operations in 1914

Chapter XII. Northeastern Theater of Operations

Chapter XIII. Southeastern or Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Chapter XIV. 1918 Strategy

Part 3. Strategy of the Second World War

Chapter XV. Hitler's strategy

Chapter XVI. Hitler's successes at the beginning of World War II

Chapter XVII. The beginning of the fall of Hitler

Chapter XVIII. Fall of Hitler

Part 4. Basics of military strategy and grand strategy

Chapter XIX. Strategy theory

Chapter XX. The essence of strategy and tactics

Chapter XXI. State purpose and purpose of military action

Chapter XXII. Grand strategy

Notes

From the publisher

B. Liddell-Hart's book, the third in the "Biographies of Famous Battles" series, stands out in the sea of military theoretical treatises and memoirs for its encyclopedic nature.

As always, the editorial team strives to comment and expand on the author's intent.

Appendix 3, entitled “The Teachings of B. Liddell-Hart,” consists of four short articles. Three of them - “Indirect Actions in Classical Chinese Strategy”, “Ethics of War and Indirect Actions”, “Technical Progress as a Form of Indirect Actions” - are directly related to the main axes of incorporating military theory into everyday life: history - ethics - technology. The fourth commentary is dedicated to the fleet - a sign of expansion, a symbol of progress and, until recently, a sign of the coherence of the economy. This is an experimental article-reasoning about the applicability of the Liddell-Hart method to global world economic processes.

No world has ever brought so little security to peoples. And after eight very turbulent years, the creation of thermonuclear weapons further increased the feeling of insecurity among the “victor” peoples. But this was not the only consequence of the war.

The hydrogen bomb, even in the stage of still experimental explosions, more than any other weapon, clearly showed that "total war" as a method and "victory" as a goal of war are outdated concepts.

Would any responsible government dare to use the hydrogen bomb in response to indirect aggression or any other aggression of a limited nature? What responsible government would be the first to take such a step, which the leaders of the air force themselves call "suicide"? Thus, it can be assumed that the hydrogen bomb will not be used in the event of any threat that does not entail more disastrous consequences than the bomb itself.

The faith of government officials in atomic weapons as a deterrent to aggression appears to be based on an illusion. It is likely that the threat to use these weapons may be taken less seriously in the Kremlin than in countries located on this side of the Iron Curtain, whose peoples are dangerously close to Russia and its strategic bomber aircraft. The threat to use atomic weapons to protect these peoples can only weaken their resolve to resist. The negative impact of such a threat has already caused great harm.

The hydrogen bomb is more of an obstacle than an aid to the policy of "containment." It reduces the likelihood of general war, but at the same time increases the possibility of a "limited war" arising through indirect and widespread local aggression. The aggressor may use various methods, but in such a way as to achieve his goal and at the same time cause hesitation in the enemy regarding the use of hydrogen or atomic bombs as a countermeasure.

We are now becoming more and more dependent on "conventional weapons" to "contain" the threat. However, this conclusion does not mean that we should only use old weapons. On the contrary, it should give impetus to the development of new species.

We have entered a new era of strategy, very different from the strategy pursued by the proponents of nuclear aviation, who were the “revolutionaries” of the previous era. The strategy that our adversaries are currently developing has two goals: first to evade attacks from superior air forces, and then to paralyze them with retaliatory strikes. Ironically, the more we recognize the need for massive bomber strikes, the more we help perfect this new guerrilla-style strategy.

Our own strategy must be based on a clear understanding of this concept, and our military policy needs to be restructured accordingly. Based on the enemy's strategy, we can effectively develop an appropriate counter-strategy. Here it can be noted in passing that the destruction of cities with hydrogen bombs would lead to the destruction of our potential ally - the “fifth column”.

The widespread belief that atomic weapons have abolished strategy is unfounded and misleading. By taking destructiveness to the extreme of "suicide," atomic weapons stimulate and accelerate a return to the use of indirect action, which is the essence of strategy, since in this case war is fought intelligently as opposed to the brute use of force. Signs of such a return to the use of indirect action had already emerged during the Second World War, in which strategy played a more significant role than in the First World War, although there was no grand strategy. At present, atomic weapons, which do not allow direct action, tend to encourage aggressors to develop a more flexible strategy. Thus, it becomes increasingly clear that we must counter this with a corresponding development of our strategic art. The history of strategy is essentially the chronicle of the application and development of the method of indirect action.

My first work on the "strategy of indirect action" was published in 1929 under the title "Decisive Wars of the Past." This book is the result of further twenty-five years of research and synthesis, taking into account the experience of the Second World War in the field of strategy and grand strategy.

As I studied so many military campaigns and first realized the superiority of indirect over direct action, I simply wanted to more fully explore the essence of strategy. However, upon deeper study, I began to understand that the method of indirect action had much greater application, that it is a law of life in all areas, a philosophical truth. It turned out that its application serves as the key to a practical solution to any problem in which a person is the decisive factor, when conflicting interests can lead to conflict. In all such cases the direct onslaught of new ideas produces stubborn resistance, thus increasing the difficulty of changing views. A change of opinion is achieved more easily and quickly by the imperceptible penetration of a new idea or through an argument in which the instinctive resistance of the opponent is overcome in a roundabout way. The method of indirect action is as fundamental a principle in the field of politics as it is in the relationship between a man and a woman. Success in trading will be greater if there is an opportunity to bargain than when there is no such opportunity. And in any other field, it is well known that the surest way to achieve approval of a new idea by your boss is to be able to convince him that he himself is the creator of this idea. As in war, the goal is to weaken resistance before attempting to overcome it, and this is best achieved by luring the other side out of its defensive positions.

The idea of indirect action is closely connected with all problems of the influence of one mind on another - this is the most important factor in human history. However, this idea is difficult to reconcile with the other principle that true conclusions can be reached or approached only by following the path of truth, without regard to where it may lead and what effect the truth may have on the various parties concerned.

History bears witness to the important role "prophets" have played in the progress of mankind, which proves how practically useful it is to tell the truth as you know it with complete frankness. However, it is also clear that the further fate of their revelations always depended on another category of people - on the “leaders” who had to be strategists in the field of philosophy, seeking a compromise between the truth and the ability of people to perceive it. Their success often depended on the extent to which they themselves grasped the truth, as well as on the practical wisdom they displayed in proclaiming it.

Prophets are inevitably stoned, this is their fate, and this is the criterion of the extent to which they have fulfilled their purpose. But a leader who is stoned proves that he failed in his task due to lack of wisdom or because he confused his functions with those of a prophet. Only time can tell whether the results of this sacrifice will justify the obvious failure of the leader, a failure that does him credit as a man. At least he avoids the more common sin of leaders - sacrificing truth to expediency without any benefit to the cause. For anyone who is accustomed to suppressing truth for the sake of tact produces a monster from the depths of his mind.

Is there a practical way to combine the process of understanding the truth with the process of accepting it? A possible solution to this problem is suggested by certain strategic principles, which point out the importance of constantly keeping a definite goal in mind and applying the means to achieve it, judging by the circumstances. Opposition to the truth is inevitable, especially if the truth takes the form of some new idea, but the force of resistance can be reduced by paying attention not only to the goal, but also to the method of approach. Avoid a frontal attack on a long-fortified position; try to outflank it so that the more vulnerable side is exposed to the onslaught of truth. However, whenever choosing such a roundabout path, one must be careful not to deviate from the truth, for nothing can be more destructive to its affirmation than to slide into lies. The meaning of all this reasoning can become clearer if you look at your own experience. Looking closely at the stages through which various new ideas passed before they gained acceptance, we are convinced that this process was facilitated in cases where the ideas were able to be presented not as something completely new, but as a revival in a modernized form of time-honored but forgotten principles or practices. To do this, there was no need to resort to deception, it was only necessary to take the trouble to discover such a connection, for “there is nothing new under the sun.” For example, objections to mechanization became easier to overcome when it was proven that a mobile armored vehicle, i.e. The fast tank is essentially the successor to the knightly cavalry and is therefore a natural means of restoring the decisive role played by cavalry in past centuries.

B. H. Liddell-Hart

Liddell Hart, Sir Basil (Henry) - English military theorist and military historian.

At the outbreak of the First World War, 19-year-old Liddell-Hart left his studies at Cambridge and joined the army. Already in 1920, he published the textbook “Infantry Training,” which included several of his own developments. During the interwar period, Liddell-Hart actively put forward ideas for restructuring the British army through the primary development of aviation and tank forces, since it was these types of troops that most closely corresponded to his ideas about “indirect actions.”

In 1924, Liddell-Hart fell ill, as a result of which he became unfit for military service, and in 1927 he retired with the rank of captain. In 1925-1935 he is a war correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, and in 1935-1939. - "Time". In 1937-1938 Liddell-Hart becomes an adviser to the Minister of War and tries to carry out some of the reforms he had previously conceived. However, his efforts to mechanize the army and equip it with air defense systems met resistance from most senior officers.

In 1941-1945, Liddell-Hart again became a war correspondent, this time for the Daily Mail. After the war, he criticized the idea of using strategic nuclear weapons, believing that there could be no winning side in a nuclear conflict.

In 1966 he was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain.

Works of B. Liddell-Hart, translated into Russian:

1. Basics of infantry tactics. – M., 1923.

2. New ways of modern armies. – M., L., 1930.

3. The truth about the war of 1914-1918. – M., 1935.

4. Colonel Lawrence. – M., 1939.

5. Revolution in war. – M., 1947..

6. Strategy of indirect actions. – M., 1957.

7. Intimidation or defense. – M., 1962.

8. Second World War. – M., 1976.

Besides:

9. Greater Than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus. – London, 1926; 1971.

10. Foch: The Man of Orleans. – London, 1931; 1980.

11. Reputations, Ten Years After. – London, 1928; 1968.

War is the path of deception. Therefore, even if you can do something, show your opponent that you cannot; if you use something, show him that you don’t use it; even if you are close, show that you are far away; even if you are far away, show that you are close; lure him with benefits; upset him and take him; if he has plenty of everything, be ready; if it is strong, avoid it; by arousing anger in him, bring him into a state of frustration; Having assumed a humble appearance, arouse conceit in him; if his strength is fresh, tire him out; if he is friendly, separate him; attack him when he is not ready; perform when he doesn't expect it. It has never happened before that a war lasted for a long time and it would be beneficial to the state... Therefore, anyone who does not fully understand all the harm from a war cannot fully understand all the benefits from a war. The best of the best is to conquer the desired army without fighting... Therefore, the best war is to defeat the enemy’s plans; in the next place - to break his alliances; in the next place - to defeat his troops. The worst thing is to besiege a fortress. In general, in battle, one engages the enemy with the right kind of combat, but wins by maneuver... Having set out where he will certainly go, oneself go where he does not expect. When they move forward and the enemy is unable to prevent it, this means that they are striking into his emptiness; when they retreat and the enemy is unable to pursue, this means that the speed is such that he cannot overtake. All people know the form through which I won, but they do not know the form through which I organized the victory. The form of the army is like water; shape near the water - avoid heights and strive downwards; the form of an army is to avoid fullness and strike at emptiness... Water sets its course depending on the place; the army determines its victory depending on the enemy. The difficult thing in fighting a war is to turn a roundabout path into a direct one, to turn a disaster into a benefit. Therefore, the one who, taking a movement along such a roundabout path, distracts the enemy with advantage and, having set out later than him, arrives before him, understands the tactics of the roundabout movement... Whoever knows in advance the tactics of the direct and roundabout path wins. This is the law of struggle in war. Do not go against the enemy’s banners when they are in perfect order; not attacking the enemy’s camp when it is impregnable - this is change management. If you surround an enemy army, leave one side open; if it's in a bind, don't press it. In war, the most important thing is speed: one must master what he did not have time to achieve; to follow a path that he does not even think about; attack where he is not careful.

Sun Tzu, Treatise on the Art of War

The most complete and successful victory is to force the enemy to abandon his goal without harm to himself.

Belisarius

Through a crooked path we find the right path.

Shakespeare. Hamlet, act II, scene 1.

The art of war is to conduct a well-founded and thought-out defense, followed by a quick and decisive offensive.

Napoleon

Reason is at the heart of warfare.

Clausewitz

A smart military leader will in many cases be able to take such defensive positions that the enemy will be forced to attack.

These soldiers are brave guys: they always climb where the wall is thickest.

Admiral de Robeck

Part one.

Strategy of the period: V century. BC – XX century. ad

History as practical experience

"Fools say they learn from their own experiences. I prefer to learn from the experiences of others." This aphorism, attributed to Bismarck but by no means his own, has a special significance for military problems. Unlike people of other professions, a career soldier cannot continuously perform his service. Indeed, one could even argue that, in the literal sense, the military profession is not a profession at all, but just an occasional job, and, paradoxically, it has ceased to be a profession since mercenary troops, used and paid only in time of war, were replaced regular armies, which continued to be paid even when there was no war.

If the assertion that, strictly speaking, there is no “military profession” is not fair in relation to most modern armies from the point of view of their permanent employment, it is still not without foundation, given that wars are fought less frequently now compared to past times, although their scale has become larger. Even the most intensive training in peacetime is more theoretical than practical.

However, Bismarck's aphorism helps us to more correctly approach solving practical problems. It enables us to understand that there are two types of practical experience - direct and indirect - and that indirect experience can be much more valuable because it is infinitely broader. Even in the most rewarding fields of work, especially in the military, the scope and opportunities for gaining direct experience are extremely limited. Unlike the military, the medical profession has a large practice. However, the greatest advances in medicine and surgery have been the work of researchers rather than practitioners.

Direct experience is by its nature too limited to serve as a sufficient basis for both theory and practice. At its best, it creates an atmosphere that is valuable for scientific generalizations. The greater value of indirect experience lies in its great variety and breadth. “History is a universal experience,” the experience not of one person, but of many people acting in a variety of conditions.

The advisability of using military history as a basis for military education is explained by its outstanding practical value in the training and development of a soldier. However, the value of this experience, like any other, depends on how closely it approaches the above definition, and also on the method of studying it.

Generals usually recognize the truth of Napoleon's oft-quoted aphorism that in war "the moral factor is to the physical as three to one." Whether this arithmetic relationship is correct is difficult to say, for morale will decline if the weapons do not meet the requirements, and the greatest willpower will be of little use if its owner turns into a corpse. But, despite the fact that the moral and physical factors represent a unity and cannot be separated from each other, this provision is extremely valuable, since it expresses the idea of the predominant influence of the moral factor in all military actions. The outcome of the war and battle depends on it. In military history it represents the most constant factor, varying only to a small extent, while the physical factor varies in almost every war and in every military situation.

Understanding this circumstance will help the study of military history from the point of view of its practical use. In the past, military training and military theory were built on the careful study of just one or two campaigns. On such a limited basis, the constant changes in military means which took place in every war created a danger that our views would be too limited and our conclusions erroneous. In the physical field, the only constant factor is that the means and conditions are constantly changing.

In contrast, people react to danger in much the same way. Some people, due to natural abilities, hardening and special training, are less sensitive than others, but the difference between them is not too great. The more specific the setting and the more limited our analysis, the more difficult it is to determine the moral factor. In this case, it may be difficult to determine exactly how much resistance the troops will offer in any particular situation, but this does not prevent the conclusion that they will offer less stubborn resistance if they are surprised or if they are tired and hungry. The more complete the psychological analysis, the better basis it provides for conclusions.

The superiority of the psychological factor over the physical and its greater constancy lead to the conclusion that the basis of any military theory should be as broad as possible. A careful study of one campaign, unless based on a good knowledge of the entire military history, may lead to incorrect conclusions. But if a certain pattern is noticed, characteristic of different eras and under different conditions, there is every reason to include this pattern in military theory.

The thesis advanced in this book is the product of precisely such in-depth research. In fact, it may be defined as the cumulative consequence of certain experiences acquired by the author of this book during his work as military editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Whereas the author had previously studied various periods of military history at random, the task assigned to him in the encyclopedia forced him to undertake a general survey of all periods. The topographer, even the tourist, if you like, has a wider perspective before his eyes and can form a general idea of the terrain, while the miner sees only the face in which he works.

It has never happened before that a war lasted for a long time and it would be beneficial to the state... Therefore, anyone who does not fully understand all the harm from the war cannot fully understand all the benefits from the war.

The best of the best is to conquer the desired army without fighting... Therefore, the best war is to defeat the enemy’s plans; in the next place - to break his alliances; in the next place - to defeat his troops. The worst thing is to besiege a fortress.

In general, in battle, one engages the enemy in the right way, but wins by maneuver... Having set out where he will certainly go, oneself go to where he does not expect.

When they move forward and the enemy is unable to prevent it, this means that they are striking into his emptiness; when they retreat and the enemy is unable to pursue, this means that the speed is such that he cannot overtake.

All people know the form through which I won, but they do not know the form through which I organized the victory.

The form of the army is like water; shape near the water - avoid heights and strive downwards; the form of an army is to avoid fullness and strike at emptiness... Water sets its flow depending on the place; the army determines its victory depending on the enemy.

The difficult thing in fighting a war is to turn a roundabout path into a direct one, to turn a disaster into a benefit. Therefore, the one who, taking a movement along such a roundabout route, distracts the enemy with advantage and, having set out later than him, arrives before him, understands the tactics of the roundabout movement... He who knows in advance the tactics of the direct and roundabout route wins. This is the law of struggle in war.

Do not go against the enemy’s banners when they are in perfect order; not attacking the enemy’s camp when it is impregnable - this is change management.

If you surround an enemy army, leave one side open; if it's in a bind, don't press it.

In war, the most important thing is speed: one must master what he did not have time to achieve; to follow a path that he does not even think about; attack where he is not careful.

Sun Tzu. Treatise on the Art of War

The most complete and successful victory is to force the enemy to abandon his goal without harm to himself.

Belisarius

...by a crooked path we find the right path.

Shakespeare. Hamlet, Act II, Scene 1

...the art of war consists of conducting a well-founded and thoughtful defense, followed by a quick and decisive offensive.

Napoleon

Reason is at the heart of warfare.

Clausewitz

A smart military leader will in many cases be able to take such defensive positions that the enemy will be forced to attack.

Moltke

These soldiers are brave guys: they always climb where the wall is thickest.

B.H. Liddell Hart

STRATEGY: THE INDIRECT APPROACH

Homo Strategicus, or The Works and Days of Captain Liddell Hart

“Strategists are not born, they become strategists...”

The written tradition has preserved for humanity a certain - by definition small - number of works that, with careful study of them, make it possible, if not to become a strategist (this still requires innate talent), but to master the methodology and acquire the skills of strategic thinking. Of course, the term “strategic thinking” should be understood as broadly as possible, not at all limited to the field of military art - or politics, the continuation of which, according to the famous statement of K. von Clausewitz, is war. If we accept such an “all-encompassing” interpretation and take a mental look at the variety of books written over the three and a half thousand years of the existence of writing, it turns out that there are no more than a dozen “textbooks” of strategic thinking, with the majority created in the East (treatises “Sun Tzu” and “Wu Tzu”, stratagems, Book of Changes, etc.).

It should be noted here that it is precisely the Eastern mentality – to a much greater extent than the Western one – that is characterized by stratagem thinking, which, according to ancient Chinese teaching, is the art of psychological confrontation. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the classical Chinese canon of military-strategic works (“Wu-ching”) became known in Europe, the thoughts contained in it turned out to be in demand and are still used to this day both in everyday life and in the professional sphere - in politics, diplomacy, business and even in intelligence operations: as former CIA Director A. Dulles said, the authors of ancient Chinese treatises were the first to draw up recommendations for organizing intelligence activities, including counterintelligence methods, outlined the theory and described the practice of psychological warfare and the ability to manipulate the enemy, were the first to formulate a coherent concept of operations to mislead the enemy and ensure one’s own security.

The European tradition has given the world only two - two and a half, if you count Clausewitz's unfinished book - works that are recognized as classic instructions on the ability to think strategically and act accordingly; the first is the ageless “The Prince” by the great Florentine Niccolo Machiavelli, a reference book for politicians, diplomats, businessmen and all kinds of “management gurus”, and the second is “The Strategy of Indirect Action” by the outstanding English military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart.

Perhaps, here we need to dwell on the biography of this man in order to understand why the theory he formulated had and continues to have such a noticeable influence on minds. The most important event in life for Liddell Hart himself and many, many representatives of his generation was the First World War, a tremendous upheaval in the foundations of a world that had hitherto seemed unshakable. After this war, nothing could remain the same as before; the time had come to rethink previous values - in particular, if we talk about the art of war, the values of analytical strategy, which resulted in colossal human losses at the fronts. (By the way, due to the inertia inherent in human thinking, in order for the analytical strategy to finally prove its inconsistency in new conditions, it took another world war, after which all doubts about the unacceptability of previous approaches disappeared.) The result of the rethinking for Liddell Hart was the book “ Strategy of Indirect Action", published in 1941.