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The two-circuit monetary system is the essence. The economy of the USSR under Stalin is one of the most efficient in the world!!! Stalinist economic system

Very interesting article!
Here are some excerpts from it...
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https://cont.ws/post/233303
Author: Kurman Akhmetov, source: Kazakh newspaper Svoboda Slova No. 1 (145), No. 2 (146) and No. 3 (147) - January 2008.

PARADOXICAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE USSR

Have you ever wondered, dear reader, how much money can circulate in a market economy? Surely not. Meanwhile, the amount of money in circulation is well known to science and is described by the so-called elementary identity of the quantitative theory of money: MV = PQ. (There are more complex formulas, but let's take the simplest one). Translated into human language, this formula means: the mass of money, multiplied by the velocity of circulation, must equal the mass of realized (sold) goods, expressed in prices. In other words, how much goods are sold in the economy, exactly how much money should circulate in it.

Let's say, if a billion worth of goods are sold in the economy, exactly one billion worth of money should circulate in it. And if a hundred billion worth of goods have been sold, then exactly one hundred billion worth of money should circulate. If more is drawn - this is already inflation. If less, then (to balance both parts of the identity) either a decline in production occurs, or prices fall, or the money supply increases.

Let's pay attention to one circumstance. With the exception of industries financed from the budget, the entire production sector in a market economy is paid for from the proceeds from the sale of consumer goods and redistributed upwards vertically. Let's say, if a farmer buys a tractor, then, ultimately, the cost of this tractor is paid by the consumer of bread products. And if a company produces machine tools, then the production of these machines is ultimately paid not by the one who bought them, but by the one who purchased the products made on these machines.

Everything is invested in the price of the final consumer product: the cost of energy resources, and transportation costs, and payment for raw materials, and deductions to the budget, and much more. Bank lending is designed to repay loans and interest on them from future income received, again, from the sale of consumer goods, i.e. and loans are built into the price of final consumer products. In a market economy, the consumer sector is dominant, and the entire economy is based on it. Any market economy is based on personal consumption, which is directly related to the personal income of citizens. Yes, all over the world. So it was in the USSR. But at what level? The well-known researcher Yuri Emelyanov writes: “By the end of 1924, the country's industry produced extremely little and only the most primitive products. Metallurgy could provide each peasant farm in Russia with only 64 grams of nails annually. If the level of development of industry would continue to remain at this level, then the peasant, having bought a plow and a harrow, could expect to acquire these items for himself again only in 2045. The country was faced with the task in full growth: either to reverse the economic situation, or to perish.

Revolution in the economy

It is clear that in the economy of such an underdeveloped country, an extremely small amount of money turned around. The death of the state seemed inevitable. The breakthrough in the economy began in 1929. During the first Soviet five-year plan, from 1929 to 1933, about 1500 large industrial enterprises were built and entire industries were created that did not exist before: machine-tool building, aviation, chemical, ferroalloy production, tractor building, automotive industry and others. A second industrial center was created beyond the Urals (the first in the European part of the country), a circumstance that ultimately decided the outcome of the Great Patriotic War. Large-scale transformations required huge investments. But there was no money for investments.

In the first year of the five-year plan, industrial development was financed by only 36%. In the second year - by 18%. And by the end of the five-year period, funding fell to zero. By 1937, the total industrial production had increased by almost 4 times in comparison with 1928. It turned out a paradoxical thing: investments were reduced to zero, and production increased several times. This was achieved using a method that has not yet been used in the history of the economy: the money supply was divided into cash and non-cash parts.

In fact, money is not cash and non-cash. Cash or non-cash is a form of payment or a form of savings. The splitting of money in the Soviet economy into mutually non-convertible parts meant the actual destruction of money as a universal equivalent. Non-cash money in such a system serves mainly as a means of accounting. In essence, this is not money, but counting units, with the help of which material resources are distributed. This has been pointed out by many for a long time. Cash in the Soviet economic system, as well as non-cash, had nothing to do with real money backed by the mass of commodities and served as a means of distributing material wealth, regardless of real labor productivity.

As a result of the transformation of the monetary system, the Soviet economy ceased to be dependent on the consumer sector. In a market economy, all savings and, accordingly, investments are created from profits from the sale of consumer goods and vertical redistribution, and the scale of the economy expands as the consumer sector expands. In the Soviet-type economy, on the contrary, it is the consumer sector that is in a subordinate position; beginning in 1929, the Soviet economy began to develop in a way that was directly opposite to the market. First of all, the task was to create a defense complex, then mechanical engineering, mechanization of agriculture, the creation of housing, electrification, etc. And only in the second place is the production of consumer goods.

ingenious solution

Since then, it has been that way. In 1940, 39% of all industrial output in the USSR was consumer goods. In 1980, its share was 26.2%. In 1986 it was 24.7%. The consumer sector in the USSR occupied not only an extremely insignificant place, but was also underdeveloped purely physically. This means an elementary shortage of adequate production capacity: only about 13% of all production capacity in the Soviet Union was occupied with the production of consumer products.

We know that, in general, the mass of money in an economy is equal to the mass of all goods sold, expressed in prices. In other words, everything depends on the scale of development of the consumer sector. all costs are built into the price of the final consumer product. After 1929, the backward Soviet economy made a breakthrough, and an unrelated mass of industries and infrastructure hung over the consumer sector, the simple financial maintenance of which required a money supply many times greater than that corresponding to the existing mass of commodities.

The decision to divide the money supply into two independent spheres - cash and non-cash - was, no doubt, brilliant. It allowed the country in the shortest possible time to go through a path that, with the normal development of processes, would have taken several centuries (at best). Such a solution of theoretically absolutely insoluble problems was the only possible one in those specific historical conditions, with those production resources that were available, and at that level of technical development.

This solution was not found immediately, but empirically, empirically. The financial system created in the USSR had no analogues in history. It came into such striking contrast with all the experience accumulated by economic science by that time that it took a whole ideological, and not scientific justification for its implementation. As a result, the principles of the Soviet financial system were so camouflaged with ideological constructs that they have not really been comprehended to this day. A breakthrough in the economy led to a complete change in its structure and the creation of an appropriate financial system. He set such a direction of development, in which the economy does not develop in accordance with the growth of personal consumption, but, on the contrary, consumption grows following the increase in the possibilities of the economy.

"Inverted" economy

In an economy structured "in the Soviet way", the consumer sector is not economically significant at all. Changes in personal consumption here affect the economy to a limited extent. The desperate struggle for the creation of a defense complex in the 30s, the Second World War, the need to overcome the post-war devastation and the arms race consolidated the situation. The need to forcefully raise the standard of living of the population in the 1950s and 1970s led to the same results. This is our main feature: we have an economy capable of producing the volume of consumer products equivalent to one money supply, and at the same time the amount of production, infrastructure and social security systems, the financial maintenance of which requires another, larger money supply. Moreover, the second is many times greater than the first.

In addition, the consumer sector and the rest of our economy, as a rule, are almost unrelated. The flow of finance is generally excluded here, even if more than enough money is poured into the economy. Under the Soviet system, this problem was solved by strictly separating the two sectors of the financial system and distributing cash (cash and non-cash) flows in a planned manner. And the need for this was not dictated by Marxist theory, there is nothing of the kind in it. It is predetermined by the very structural characteristics of the economic system created in the USSR after 1929.

The Soviet financial system looks paradoxical from the point of view of Western economists. They simply could not understand it (and the "reformers" too). But in reality it worked very well. Historically, we have formed an economy structured directly opposite to the Western one, “inverted” in comparison with it. In this "inverted" economy, we are trying to introduce the Western financial system. This is absurd. It is impossible to have one structure of the economy and a financial system designed for a completely different, directly opposite structure of the economy. It is impossible to have an economic structure “like ours” and a financial system “like theirs”. Recall that the economies of all the republics of the USSR were built in exactly this "Soviet" way - jerkily and disproportionately. Therefore, they all have similar structural characteristics. Accordingly, their financial systems also have similar characteristics. Financial and economic problems in general are about the same for them. In other words, both the financial and economic policies of the CIS countries should be carried out by approximately the same methods.

As we have indicated, starting from 1929 (from the beginning of industrialization), the Soviet economy began to develop in a way that was directly opposite to the market one. The market economy is based on the personal consumption of citizens, and in the USSR the consumer sector was not the main one, but a subordinate one. In addition, the Soviet economy, of necessity, was built in such a way that no competition could arise in it: exactly as many enterprises were built as needed for the needs of the economy. Such an economy precludes all competition by its very structure. Thus, the two main defining features of the economy of the former USSR are as follows:

1) relative underdevelopment of the consumer sector;

2) the almost complete absence of duplication of production activities (competition) in the structure of the economy.

An economy structured in this way requires a specific financial system to ensure its normal functioning. Its essence is as follows. Money is divided into cash and non-cash spheres. Cash serves the purchasing power of the population. Non-cash "money" is essentially not money, but counting units, with the help of which the distribution of material resources is carried out in a planned manner.

Our advantages

During the “perestroika” period, such an economic structure became the object of heavy criticism from the “reformers”. However, the "reformers" did not present a serious analysis. As arguments, they used mostly emotions, and they presented the fact of criticality as truth. They could not offer something real either then or later. Moreover, some of them - such as, for example, Academician Petrakov, have now moved to directly opposite positions.

The physicist, Academician Yuri Kagan recalls with a caustic mockery of the “ideologists of reforms”: “In Soviet times, at the Kurchatov Institute, I led a seminar where all the leading economists spoke, who did not have a wide platform at that time - Shatalin, Aganbegyan, Zaslavskaya, Petrakov, Shmelev, Abalkin . They argued that the Soviet economy was leading to an abyss. I asked them: do you have an idea how to move from what is not needed to what is needed? They answered: we are not in demand, that's when we are in demand, we will write the necessary program in a month. So what came of it?"

In fact, the economic system built in the USSR, in addition to the well-known shortcomings, had very significant advantages over the Western (market) economy. These advantages are as follows:

1) The transition to a bifurcated financial system made it possible to free this economy from the limiting influence of the effective demand of the population, and it got the opportunity to develop independently of it. In the Western (market) economy, this is impossible. Everything there depends on effective demand: if it grows, the economy goes up; when it contracts, the economy is in recession;

2) Functioning on the basis of non-cash money (more precisely, counting units) eliminated the situation in which development could be hampered due to lack of financial resources. Here everything is determined by purely technical possibilities. And such a thing as non-payments or mutual debt simply cannot arise here; accordingly, economic paralysis cannot arise for this reason;

3) The organizational structure of the economy, which excludes competition, allowed it, on the one hand, to reach the industrial level of development, on the other hand, to avoid the monstrous energy, resource and labor intensity of the Western (market) economy. Otherwise, the USSR would never have become an industrial country: it simply would not have been able to overcome the barrier of energy and resource intensity;

4) The centralized economic management system made it possible to concentrate all efforts, resources and funds on selected areas, and to do this promptly, without waiting for this to happen as a result of an overflow of funds due to changes in market conditions, demand, etc.

In essence, the USSR developed a method for creating an economy more developed than the effective demand of the population allows. This valuable experience opens up new prospects for the economies of not only the CIS, but also other countries, and is still waiting to be studied and comprehended.

Objective assessment

In fact, a new type of economic system was created in the USSR, requiring special methods of management and special methods of reform. The fact that this is a fundamentally new, unprecedented in history and at the same time a very promising economic system was not comprehended in time either by the leaders of the state, let alone by the "reformers". Our "reformers", criticizing the Soviet economic system, only repeated and still stupidly repeat the theses thrown to them from abroad. But after all, how much time has passed, it would be time to understand what was happening. As part of the Cold War, of course, psychological warfare was also waged. It included an attack on the thinking of intellectuals, writers, publicists, scientists, not least economists. It was suggested something like this: "Your economy is good for nothing, destroy it, do as we do." And they destroyed it. Now they are sitting on the ruins of the country and still cannot understand anything. In reality, however, serious Western researchers, free from ideological prejudices, have always highly appreciated the achievements of the Soviet economic system.

Thus, the English magazine The Economist writes: “Contrary to widespread statements, the historical development of the Soviet economy is one of the greatest successes achieved in the twentieth century. The USSR turned out to be one of two countries in the world that rapidly broke through into the group of industrially developed countries: the second country is Japan. Among the largest countries in the world, only Japan exceeded the per capita income level of the USSR. This allowed the Soviet Union to eradicate extreme poverty, provide social insurance services, create one of the most comprehensive social security systems in the world, achieve one of the highest levels of education and health care, and create a powerful military potential comparable to that of the United States. In addition to the defense industry, Soviet technology has proven its ability to prove itself at the highest international level. And all this - despite the blockade in the technological field by Western countries, from which Japan, by the way, did not suffer. Under these conditions, the development of the USSR is one of the largest economic achievements in world history.

Let us pay attention, however, to the following striking fact: the USSR achieved outstanding economic successes, yielding in all respects to the West. The West (it should be considered as a single economic entity) consumes two-thirds of the resources extracted in the world. The USSR could always rely only on its own resources. Hundreds of millions of working hands are working in the West and hundreds of millions of working hands are working for it all over the world. There were only a few tens of millions of workers in the USSR. And the total industrial potential of the West exceeded the Soviet one not by hundreds, but by thousands of times. Nevertheless, the USSR managed to achieve phenomenal economic success and become the world's second superpower, although theoretically it had neither the strength nor the opportunity to do so. How did he do it? Thanks to that paradoxical (from the point of view of Western economists) structure of the economy and the corresponding paradoxical financial system. We have pointed out the advantages of the latter above.

Practice is the criterion of truth

From all that has been said, it does not at all follow that the Soviet economy was the pinnacle of perfection. Of course, it should have been reformed. But how? This question is difficult and complex. We will not consider it in its entirety. We will only touch upon the question of the financial system. The “reformers”, embarking on their destructive activities, considered it necessary to remove the barrier between the spheres of action of cash and non-cash money. It was a mistake. What should happen if such a barrier is removed in an economy structured in the “Soviet way”? In this case, the following should happen.

The bifurcated cash-non-cash financial system is liquidated, and the economy begins to work on the basis of real money backed by a mass of commodities. Since the economy, structured in the "Soviet way", creates a relatively small amount of consumer goods, the money supply immediately begins to shrink rapidly. As a result, the money supply is reduced to a level at which the normal functioning of the economy is impossible. Due to the general lack of money, financing of everything that is possible and impossible is stopped. A rapid decline in production begins, the situation immediately acquires a tendency to worsen. The effective demand of the population is constantly decreasing, which aggravates the already difficult situation. An increase in the money supply leads to an increase in prices. Strict regulation of the money supply in circulation exacerbates the general shortage of money. The budget is falling apart. The life support systems of the state are falling apart. Literally everything falls apart. "Reforms" come to a standstill.

In a word, during the years of "reforms" everything that should have happened happened. Everything was quite predictable. Conclusion: the problem of lack of money in our economy cannot be overcome - it is built into the very structure of the economic system at our disposal. Why were the economists silent? And they were not silent. Simply economically illiterate "reformers" were unable to understand them.

So, the famous economist V.M. Yakushev wrote back in 1989: “In relations between enterprises, rubles play the role not of money, but of accounting units (“accounting money”), with the help of which the exchange of activities is mediated and labor costs are recorded. We have two types of money: "labor" and "accounting" and this is our reality. They cannot be mixed, and even more so, translated “countable” into “labor”. Employees of planning and financial bodies unwittingly take into account this difference and insist that money from other items of expenditure should not be transferred to material incentive funds. But this difference is not recognized by commodity-oriented economists, and instead of understanding why practitioners do this, they accuse them of thoughtlessness and ignorance, forgetting that practice is the criterion of truth. Now “accountable” money began to be abundantly transferred to the material incentive funds. And the result is that the financial system is practically disorganized.”

He was right. At that time, many wrote about it. Unfortunately, the management of economic processes fell into the hands of pseudo-economists, whose qualifications, to put it mildly, left much to be desired. They still have not understood and learned nothing. And what should have been done to stop the destruction of the economy? Bring the financial system back into line with the economic structure, that is, restore the barrier. The same Yakushev rightly wrote: “It is possible to streamline financial relations only by blocking the overflow of “accounting” money into “labor”. But this is not consistent with self-financing, which encourages such a spillover, based on the notion that we are dealing with ordinary commodity money. Recall that we are talking about the economy of the USSR as a general example. Everything that has been said about the economy of the former Soviet Union is also true for its constituent parts, since the entire Soviet economy was built according to a single scheme. It is from this that one must proceed.

So, until 1929, the USSR was an economically backward country, about 85% of whose population lived in rural areas. In 1929, the country began an economic breakthrough - industrialization. Strictly speaking, it was from this moment that the Soviet economy began to be created. Since there was no money to finance industrialization in the country, the country's leadership found a paradoxical but effective solution: money was strictly divided into two areas of use - cash and non-cash. The scope of cash in such a system serves the immediate needs of the population. Non-cash here, in fact, are not money, but serve as counting units, with the help of which material resources are distributed. When the barrier between these two spheres is removed, the money supply in circulation is compressed to such an extent that the functioning of the economic system becomes impossible. She begins to fall apart physically. This is exactly what happened during the “reforms”.

Marxist ideology confused everyone

The "strangeness" of the new economic and corresponding financial system baffled the founders of the Soviet state and economists of the 1920s and 1930s. They understood that they were building some kind of economic system unprecedented in history, the like of which had not yet been. They put a lot of effort into understanding it. The problem was that Marxism was adopted as the official ideology in the USSR. But after all, Marx himself, in the economic part of his teaching, proceeded from the realities of Western economics, moreover, of the 19th century. Marx considered such an economy the only possible one that should be created throughout the world. He saw the transformation of the world in the way of changing property relations, but precisely within the framework of a Western-type economy.

Thus, building an economy that had nothing in common with the Western one, the communists came into irresolvable contradiction with Marx himself! This, of course, could not be allowed. Therefore, throughout the entire period of the existence of the USSR, Soviet economists tried to link Soviet practice with Marxism. It turned out bad. Or rather, it didn't work at all. How difficult it was to do this can already be judged by the fact that the first political economy textbook was prepared after thirty years of discussions, only in 1954, after Stalin's death! Academician K. Ostrovityanov wrote in 1958: "It is difficult to name another economic problem that would cause so many disagreements and different points of view as the problem of commodity production and the operation of the laws of value under socialism." At the same time, I. V. Stalin himself understood that the Soviet economic system was moving further and further away from Marxism. He told his followers: “If you look for answers to all questions from Marx, you will be lost. You have to work with your head."

The well-known researcher Sergei Kara-Murza writes: “Stalin, apparently, intuitively felt the inadequacy of the labor theory of value to what really happened in the economy of the USSR. He resisted the rigid imposition of this theory on reality, but he resisted implicitly and indecisively, without having a final answer for himself. The problem is that the task of building a new economy was solved as the sum of momentary answers to current questions. The solution found had no theoretical justification either then or later. The rationale was predominantly ideological. Ideological pressure confused everyone, including economists. As a result, Soviet economic science catastrophically lagged behind Soviet reality. Now we have to reap the fruits of this lag. Nevertheless, although the theoretical views in the USSR were outdated, the practice still gave quite real results. And that's what we need to keep in mind in the first place.

Lieberman reform

For readers who are far from economic problems, such a statement may even seem strange. However, in fact, there is nothing unusual in it: in the circles of specialists, these issues have been discussed for many decades. The fact is that the Soviet economic system existed for too short a time and in too difficult historical conditions. As a result, theoretically, it was not really comprehended even in the Soviet period. And the "reformers" did not try to understand anything in it, they acted on the principle of "break - do not build." As a result, now we are dealing with an economy, in the principles of which we ourselves do not really understand anything. Our economic science has lagged behind our own reality. This abnormal situation should be corrected long ago.

However, there are serious developments in the field of studying the financial system of the Soviet type. They need to be carefully analyzed. For the first time, the principles of the operation of our financial system began to be widely discussed in the mid-1960s, during the discussion of the economic reform of 1965, the so-called "Kosygin reform". The discussion began in 1962 with an article in Pravda by Kharkov professor Yevsey Lieberman. Economists are sharply divided into supporters and opponents of the reform. On the pages of the economic press there was a real war. The discussion has stalled. In the end, Alexei Kosygin, using his power as the pre-council of ministers, simply introduced it by will. With all due respect to Alexei Nikolaevich, we must admit that this decision was erroneous.

What did the “Kosygin reform” offer (in the West it is called the “Lieberman reform”)? Prominent Russian economist V. M. Yakushev characterizes it as follows: “It was assumed that if enterprises could transfer part of their profits to their incentive funds, this would solve the problem of stimulating labor, ensure a reduction in production costs and interest teams in intense plans. But something else happened." But what happened "other"? In short, the reform of 1965 began to undermine the financial system of the country, and then the entire economy. The barrier between cash and non-cash (counting units) money, which was previously strictly preserved, began to weaken, i.e. what served exclusively for the purposes of accounting began to turn into a medium of exchange! The negative consequences were not long in coming. Unsecured money supply began to accumulate in the hands of the population and on the accounts of enterprises. Economic units turned out to be interested not in increasing output, but in increasing profits, the disorganization of the economic mechanism began to grow, and so on. As a result, by the beginning of the 1980s, the country approached an economic crisis.

Rising tariffs is not an option

It was the “Kosygin reform” that plunged the USSR into what was later called “stagnation”. “Many scientists already then warned about the negative consequences of such a decision. But their warnings were ignored” (Yakushev). When “perestroika” began, the “reformers”, instead of restoring the financial system normal for a given economic structure, on the contrary, removed the last barriers between cash and non-cash money supply. This led to disaster. That is why the "reforms" of the 90s were immediately dubbed by serious researchers as "a worsened version of the reform of the 65th year." The strategic mistake in economic policy was made as early as 1965. In the 1990s, the "reformers" only worsened the situation. If the economy has not yet completely collapsed, it is only because some fragments of the former financial system have survived - the public sector, individual government programs, and more. In addition, some sectors of the economy capable of operating on a self-sustaining basis began to operate, self-employment increased, shuttle trade appeared, and so on. But this situation cannot persist for long. If the economic policy is not changed, the collapse of the system cannot be stopped.

What follows from all this? The economy of the former USSR simply cannot operate on the basis of a Western-style financial system. There, in the general case, the amount of money in the economic turnover must correspond to the mass of goods sold (quantitative theory of money). Simply put, the economy there is financed from the consumer sector. Due to structural features, the Soviet-type economy cannot create the required amount of commodity mass. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the country's financial system in line with the structural characteristics of our economic system. In other words, two financial sectors should be created. One serves the needs of the population, the other - the economic system as a whole. The scope of these sectors should not overlap. Exactly the same conclusions have now been reached by economists throughout the CIS. Thus, the well-known Russian researcher Sergei Kara-Murza writes: “In the USSR there was a financial system of two “circuits”. There was non-cash money in production. In the consumer market - "normal" money. Their mass was regulated in accordance with the mass of goods. This made it possible to maintain low prices and prevent inflation. Such a system could operate only if the transfer of non-cash money into cash was prohibited. The need to reorganize the financial system is now clear to any serious researcher.

How will this work in practice? A simple example. Now everyone knows that our energy sector is in critical condition and threatens to collapse in the next two years. The authorities are trying to save the day by inflating tariffs endlessly. But the money raised is still not enough. In fact, our population will never be able to finance domestic energy - they have too little money. Therefore, tariffs should not be increased, but reduced. And the financing of the energy industry should be undertaken by the state through special financial channels, strictly isolated and intended only for specific purposes. The funds of the population should be withdrawn exclusively for the remuneration of workers in the industry.

The same applies to heat, water, gas supply, infrastructure and much more. And to shoulder all the costs on the shoulders of the population is meaningless and useless - it still will not pull them. In this case, we will not save the economy, and we will ruin the population. Of course, in reality, everything is much more complicated than it can be stated in a newspaper publication. But we hope that we have succeeded, at least in general terms, in giving readers an idea of the principles on which our financial system should function.

Modern teachings on how to do the right thing in those days long gone are more than enough. At the same time, as it were, it goes without saying that some stupid and narrow-minded people took part in the adoption of those old decisions. It is also not customary to take into account the fact that those old Soviet managers, headed by I.V. Stalin, created and implemented a unique “Stalinist economic system” during the first five-year plans, the effectiveness of which was confirmed by the Great Victory over Nazi Germany and subsequent scientific and industrial achievements of the Soviet people.

The high competence of Soviet managers is also confirmed by the powerful scientific and production potential created under their leadership. The quality and reliability of its main offspring, the Soviet strategic weapons, have so far been the only and reliable guarantee of our state sovereignty. Therefore, in order to “introduce the topic”, to better understand the structure of the Soviet Union and the logic of Soviet managerial behavior, it is necessary to realize the presence of a number of features that fundamentally distinguish Russia (USSR) from other states.

ORIGINAL PROBLEMS OF RUSSIA

The whole history of our Motherland is a continuous superimposition of negative factors on each other, no matter where you look - not a single gap. And the fact that on 1/6 of the earth's land, half of which was in the permafrost zone, and the rest in areas of eternal raids from outside, the greatest of states was created - a fact that is rather unnatural ...

For these reasons, in Russia at all times there were two main problems:
Increased energy consumption of life (domestic and industrial human activities) - the energy costs for the production of any product or service in our territories are 1.5 - 2 times higher than the corresponding indicators of Western countries only due to the cold climate. At the same time, increased transport and other infrastructure costs caused by our huge distances further increase this ratio.
Chronic lack of human resources necessary for the maintenance and development of social, economic, defense and other infrastructures under the influence of the mentioned negative factors.

It is quite obvious that the conditions for any type of material production in Russia are always initially worse than in the West, and this factor manifested itself with particular force at the time of the development of capitalist relations. The essence of capitalism is the extraction of profit from the labor of hired workers in the interests of the capitalists, the owners of the means of production. The driving force of capitalist production is competitive struggle, in which those capitalists who can produce the same product at the lowest cost win. Loss, as a rule, is followed by degradation and death of production. Thus, in the conditions of an open capitalist market, the increased cost of our production, for objective reasons, makes our products uncompetitive and leads to the degradation and collapse of the domestic economy.

SOVIET STATE CAPITALISM

Before the First World War, the tsarist government was the first in the world in terms of external debt. Among the developed countries, except for Russia, only Japan had an external public debt, the size of which was 2.6 times less than the Russian one. The total state debt of Russia on the eve of the October Revolution amounted to 41.6 billion rubles, including the external debt of 14.86 billion rubles. Not without reason, one of the first decrees of the Soviet government was the “Decree on the annulment of state loans” of January 21 (February 3), 1918, according to which all internal and external loans concluded by previous governments before December 1, 1917 were canceled. The socialist model of capitalism operated on the basis of the social form of ownership of the means of production. A prerequisite for the functioning of this economic model was the closure of the domestic market from foreign competition - by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of April 22, 1918, foreign trade was nationalized (a state monopoly was established).

Our production also developed by profiting from the labor of state-employed workers, and capitalist competition took on the form of socialist emulation. The difference was that the profit, which we called "profitability", was used in the interests of the whole society, and the loss in social competition no longer meant the destruction of production, but only caused a decrease in bonus payments. In conditions of high energy costs and shortage of labor resources, planned state capitalism, as a system of production relations, primarily solved the problem of optimizing all types of activities to ensure the vital needs of the population and the sovereignty of the country.

State planning bodies distributed the available material and labor resources, primarily for the implementation of priority tasks. Priorities were:

— military-industrial complex (weapons and military equipment);

— fuel and energy complex (coal-oil-gas production, electric power industry);

— transport complex (railway, air and water transport);

- social complex (health care, education, housing, vital food and industrial goods).

STALIN'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM (TWO-LOOP MONETARY CIRCULATION MODEL)

In 1930-32 of the last century, as a result of the Credit Reform in the USSR, the “Stalinist economic system” was finally formed, the basis of which was a unique two-circuit model of monetary circulation:

- in one of its circuits, the circulation of non-cash money (rubles) was carried out;

- in another circuit - cash (rubles).

If we omit individual accounting and banking subtleties, then the essence of the two-loop system is as follows:

Mandatory, basic conditions for the existence and functioning of the two-loop model of monetary circulation are:

- absolute inadmissibility of the transformation (conversion) of non-cash money into cash;

- the most severe state monopoly on foreign trade.

In non-cash rubles, indicators of production activity were planned, resources were distributed and mutual settlements of enterprises and organizations were carried out. In cash rubles, the “total amount of payments” to individuals (salaries, pensions, scholarships, etc.) was planned. The “total amount of payments” was the monetary equivalent of all creative work performed in the state, one part of which was paid directly to its performers, and the other part was withdrawn through the tax service and paid to “state employees” (officials, military, pensioners, students, etc. ). The "total amount of payments" has always corresponded to the "total sum price" of consumer goods and services available in the country, intended for sale to the population.

The “total total price”, in turn, was formed from its two main components:
The total price of "social", vital goods and services (health care, education, housing, vital food and industrial goods, fuel, electricity, transport services and housing and communal services).
The total price of "prestigious" goods and services that are not vital (cars, sophisticated household appliances, crystal, carpets, jewelry).

The “highlight” of the two-loop model was that the state set “optimal” retail prices for consumer goods and services, which did not depend on the cost of their production and reflected the principle of social and economic expediency:
Prices for "social" goods and services were set much lower than their cost or made them generally free;
Prices for “prestigious” goods and services, respectively, were set much higher than their cost in such a way as to compensate for losses from lower prices for “social” goods and services as part of the “total total price”.

To justify and maintain high retail prices for "prestigious" goods, they were produced in volumes that supported their constant shortage and rush demand. For example, the cost of a VAZ 2101 passenger car was 1950 rubles, and its retail price was 5500 rubles. Thus, when purchasing this car, the employee invested 3,550 rubles in the state piggy bank for free, but this money did not disappear anywhere in Soviet times, but was redistributed to pay workers producing cheap or free social goods and services, including:

— cheap transport services and housing and communal services;

- cheap gasoline, electricity and vital food and industrial goods;

free healthcare, education and housing.

Thus:

The main task of the functioning of the contour of the circulation of non-cash money was to organize the optimal, planned development of all sectors of the national economy, ensuring the vital needs of the population and ensuring the sovereignty of the country.

The main tasks of the functioning of the cash circulation circuit were:
Fair distribution among the population of the USSR of vital goods and services.
Material incentives for the fulfillment of established targets, high quality and labor discipline.

In organizations and enterprises there were queues for the purchase of prestigious goods and housing. Among the first to receive these benefits were the leaders of production, and among the last - lagging behind and undisciplined people.
Maintaining an optimal balance of supply and demand in the domestic market of goods and services at a level that excludes inflationary processes.

The system was very fair - no one was forced to buy "prestigious" goods, on the contrary, everyone did it with enthusiasm and pleasure, and the overpayment made when buying them was returned to everyone as part of a package of social goods and services.

Note: It should be noted that tobacco and vodka (!) were also included in the category of such goods, the demand for which, at any inflated prices, never fell, even with their absolute abundance. These goods were the object of the state monopoly - at the expense of the profits from their sale, wages were paid to the military and other government people. Taking into account the volume of its turnover and cost, this product was extremely profitable. Especially vodka. According to some reports, the cost of 1 liter of vodka was about 27 kopecks, while its retail price, on average, was about 8 rubles per liter.

THE BEGINNING OF A NEW STAGE OF WORLD HISTORY

Two significant events of the final phase of World War II marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in world history:

- On September 8, 1944, the regular shelling of London with German V-2 guided ballistic missiles began;

Thus, on our planet, viable industrial samples of fundamentally new controlled means of delivering warheads over long distances, as well as fundamentally new warheads of enormous destructive power, were created and used (still separately from each other). The combination of these two qualities in one type of weapon - a guided ballistic missile-carrier of a nuclear charge, could provide its owner with unprecedented military-strategic capabilities, as well as guarantee security from any external threat. This weapon had great prospects for development, both in terms of achieving an unlimited reach of targets, and in increasing the power of the delivered charge. It was this factor that aggravated the post-war international situation to the limit, as it served as an impetus for the beginning of the nuclear-missile arms race.

An arms race is an objective, self-sustaining process that develops according to the logic of “armor and projectile confrontation”, when a potential enemy is forced to respond to the creation of a more advanced means of destruction by creating an appropriate effective means of defense (and vice versa) and so on ad infinitum. Provided that the parties have "absolute" nuclear missile weapons, such behavior of the participants in the race is quite understandable. Everyone fears that as soon as the ratio of their combat capabilities reaches such a level when one side can guarantee to destroy the other side with impunity or with acceptable damage, it can do it at its own discretion at any time convenient for itself.

ARMS RACE LOGIC

It was the "Stalinist economic system" that provided the conditions for preparing the Soviet economy for the inevitable war. The Soviet Union won the Great Patriotic War, but as a result of the strategic arms race that unfolded immediately after its completion, they found themselves in a difficult economic situation. Half of the country lay in ruins and was chronically short of labor resources (in the war the country lost 27 million of its most able-bodied population), and the entire Western world stood against us.

Keeping up with the race was a matter of life, so the whole country had to adapt to its needs. And the "Stalinist economic system" again confirmed its highest efficiency. Namely, thanks to its unique properties, the country was able to afford the greatest scientific and technical projects and the huge economic costs necessary to create new types of weapons. Literally from scratch, it was necessary to create entire industries and scientific areas - so in the first half of the 50s, two specialized ministries were created, “sharpened” for nuclear missile topics:

- 06/26/1953 - Ministry of Medium Machine Building (MSM) - a specialized industry that was engaged in the development and production of nuclear warheads;

- 04/02/1955 - The Ministry of General Mechanical Engineering (MOM) is a specialized industry that was engaged in the development and production of rocket and space technology. The nuclear missile race also caused a sharp increase in the country's demand for aluminum and the capacities of existing aluminum plants were clearly not enough. Aluminum is the main metal used to make rockets, aircraft and spacecraft, as well as some types of lightweight armor coating, which is in demand in the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, in connection with the beginning of the mass use of aluminum alloys, the organization of its mass production has become a priority state task. The specificity of aluminum production is that it is very energy intensive - to produce 1000 kg of rough aluminum, it is necessary to spend about 17 thousand kWh of electricity, therefore, first of all, it was necessary to create powerful sources of electricity.

The country tensed up, "tightened its belt" and in the center of Siberia were built:

Powerful hydroelectric power plants (HPPs):

- Bratsk HPP (4500 MW) - in 1954-67;

- Krasnoyarsk HPP (6000 MW) - in 1956-71;

- Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP (6400 MW) - in 1963-85.

Large aluminum smelters:

- Bratsk aluminum plant - in 1956 - 66;

- Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant - in 1959 - 64;

- Sayan aluminum plant - in 1975 - 85

In connection with the urgency of the tasks facing us in the creation of strategic nuclear missile weapons, the issue of ensuring their fulfillment with the necessary material and labor resources has become particularly acute. There were no free people and they could only be withdrawn from other, less important at that time, areas - that is why shipbuilding programs were curtailed, mass reductions in the Armed Forces and other similar events were carried out. Some of the branches and scientific directions, for objective reasons, pulled ahead, some lagged behind, but the inexorable laws of the arms race dictated their conditions.

It was once and impossible to wait for the moment of proportional development of all industries and directions, sufficient to create an ideal weapon. At least some kind of deterrent weapon was needed now and immediately - and it was created from what was, relying on already achieved (not always yet perfect) scientific, design and technological capabilities. Thus, the arms race is, first of all, a race of real economic, organizational, scientific and technological capabilities of the racing states ...

COLLEGIATION AS A BASIS FOR ANY DECISIONS ON MILITARY TECHNICAL ISSUES

The need to create strategic weapons led to a multiple complication of the structures and technologies used, in connection with which, the main distinguishing feature of this new stage was a proportional increase in co-executors of defense work at all levels:

At the top level - dozens of organizations and enterprises - co-executors representing various ministries and departments - are involved in the creation and production of specific types of strategic weapons.

At the lower level - in the creation and production of even an insignificant structural element of a specific sample of V and VT, as a rule, a significant number of various narrow specialists from various departments (designers, technologists, chemists, etc.)

Thus, the creation and production of samples of strategic naval weapons is a very complex joint work of numerous teams representing various industries and departments (missile scientists, nuclear scientists, shipbuilders, metallurgists, various military specialists, etc.). The specified feature of the creation of new weapons caused an objective need to develop mechanisms for making joint decisions that take into account a mutually acceptable balance of the capabilities of numerous co-executors of this work and the interests of the Customer (USSR Ministry of Defense). Since joint collective work was impossible without such a mechanism, such a mechanism was worked out, created and ideally spelled out in numerous regulatory documents.

In general, a joint decision is any organizational and technical document that defines the methods and procedure for solving any technical, organizational or financial problem, sealed with the consenting signatures of interested parties. The established mechanism for making joint decisions on military-technical issues was mandatory for any level of competence - from solving an intra-shop problem of an enterprise - a manufacturer of military equipment (at the level of a military representative) and ending with decisions at the national level, by which the strategic desires of military leaders were brought into line with real-life opportunities. branches of Soviet industry.

From the first post-war years, under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, subdivisions were created and operated in various forms to coordinate the work of the branches of the defense industry. Finally, on December 6, 1957, a Commission on Military-Industrial Issues was created under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It was the main collegial body of the country, which coordinated the activities of the military-industrial complex, until the end of the Soviet period. The main and most effective form of making collegial decisions on military-technical issues was the SCC - the Council of Chief Designers, introduced into permanent practice back in 1947 by S.P. Korolev.

This body was created under the General Designer and under his chairmanship. The SGC consisted of the Chief Designers of the composite products of the complex and carried out interdepartmental coordination and technical coordination of the work of all enterprises and organizations - co-executors. The decisions of the JCC became binding on all bodies. Questions on the models of military equipment being adopted for service were finally settled in the course of the work of interdepartmental commissions (MVK). Any decision at the government level has always been based on dozens of joint decisions of lower levels, which were taken by qualified specialists on the components of a common problem. And each of these numerous decisions had its own truth and logic. As a rule, this was the only possible and optimal solution for that period of time, based on numerous objective factors and taking into account the interests and capabilities of all parties involved, some of which are simply impossible to discern or realize “at a glance” from our present time ...

Trying to evaluate the activities of predecessors using textual documents, it must be borne in mind that the adoption of those distant organizational and military-technical decisions was influenced by many “for granted” considerations and factors characteristic of that time, which were equally understood and meant by all the “signatories” , but, due to their obviousness, they were not even mentioned in the documents. It must always be remembered that not every thought taken out of the context of a historical period can be understood at another time without additional explanations.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE DEATH OF THE STATE

As already mentioned, the double-circuit financial system was created in the 30s of the last century by smart people, headed by I.V. Stalin, and this was the only possible option for the further development of the Soviet economy, providing the vital needs of the population and the sovereignty of the country. These people proved their professionalism and high business qualities back in the years of the Revolution and the Civil War, and in the most difficult years of the first five-year plans and the Great Patriotic War, they provided the necessary technical and organizational conditions for the Victory over Nazi Germany.

The life resource of these people, unfortunately, was not unlimited - in 1953 I.V. Stalin passed away, in 1980 - A.N. Kosygin, in 1982 - L.I. Brezhnev, in 1984 - D.F. Ustinov , in 1984 - Yu.V. Andropov, in 1985 - K.U. Chernenko. These were also those Soviet leaders who understood how the unique mechanism of the Soviet economy works and what it is absolutely impossible to touch in it.

In 1985, a person entered the highest party and state post of the Soviet Union, as a personality formed in post-Stalin times, in the course of an “undercover” struggle and party and apparatus intrigues - this was the beginning of the end of the Soviet economy and state.

It all started with a thoughtless struggle with alcoholism ...

According to the memoirs of the former chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR N. Baibakov: “According to the plan of 1985, adopted before the anti-alcohol resolutions, it was planned to receive 60 billion rubles from the sale of alcoholic beverages. arrived". It was precisely the cash at the expense of which the wages of the military and other government people were paid. After the implementation of anti-alcohol regulations, the state treasury received 38 billion rubles in 1986, and 35 billion rubles in 1987. Then the collapse of economic ties with the CMEA countries began, from where the retail trade network in 1985 received consumer goods worth about 27 billion rubles. In 1987, they received already in the amount of 9.8 billion rubles. For these items alone (vodka and imports), an excess of cash rubles not covered by goods was formed on the domestic market, in the amount of more than 40 billion rubles ...

In 1987, the basic foundations of the Soviet economy were finally destroyed:

- "The Law on the State Enterprise (Association)" of 1987 opened the contour of non-cash money - it was allowed to turn it into cash;

- the state monopoly of foreign trade was actually abolished - from January 1, 1987, such a right was given to 20 ministries and 70 large enterprises.

Then it went off and on - there was not enough goods, prices went up and inflation began. Mass strikes of miners began in 1989... Quite predictably, August 1991 came, when the actions of overgrown and unshaven capital people destroyed the last foundations created in the interests of all the working people, the Soviet state...

Note: The notorious “oil needle”, which the “democrats” are so fond of talking about, did not have any decisive influence on the destruction of the domestic consumer market, since only consumer goods from capitalist countries were purchased with petrodollars, whose share in the total volume of consumer imports was is small - about 17% (the decrease in their volume in the total volume of the consumer market in 1985 - 87 amounted to about 6 to 2 billion rubles). In settlements with the CMEA countries, where the bulk of consumer imports came from, the internal collective currency of the CMEA, the "transferable ruble", was used.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS:
The October Revolution of 1917 occurred due to the impossibility of further economic development of Russia in the conditions of an open capitalist market. Its final result was the creation, the only possible for our further existence, of the "Stalinist economic system", based on a two-circuit model of monetary circulation, with the obligatory condition of closing the domestic market from external competition. This model of the economy proved its effectiveness in the pre-war five-year plans, in the Great Patriotic War and in the era of the nuclear-missile arms race.

From the heights of modern historical experience, we can safely say that it is precisely the presence of nuclear missile weapons in a state that is the most important component of the system for ensuring its real sovereignty. And now there is no doubt that the military-political leadership of the USSR in those distant years, at least, was not mistaken in concentrating all available resources on the creation and development of this particular type of weapon. It is this type of armament, inherited from the USSR, that is currently the only guarantor of Russia's state sovereignty.

There were no objective reasons and prerequisites for the destruction of the Soviet state system. The reason for the death of the USSR is the forcible bringing of the Soviet economic system into a non-working state.

In an open capitalist market, Russia has no economic future. The further sovereign existence of our Motherland can only be ensured by its return to the basic foundations of the Stalinist economic system (by the way, the technology of returning to the Stalinist economic model can be “tested” in Novorossiya beforehand).

Or how to quadruple the economy in 10 years with zero investment

Look at the paradox of the capitalist economy: in the country of X there are bricks, concrete, land, working hands, smart heads, in a word, there is everything to build many, many residential buildings that the population needs. At the same time, almost no houses are being built. Ask why? And there is no investor! - they will answer you.

Guys, to build a house you don't need money, but bricks. Since you have bricks and the houses you need are not being built, it means "something is wrong in the conservatory."

But what about market investments? - you ask.

The answer to this question is in our history. In Stalin's times, industrialization was carried out with the almost complete absence of market investment. Domestic opportunities for market financing were very meager and foreign countries were in no hurry to help. As wrote A. Zverev in the book "Notes of the Minister" (finance) : "The Communist Party rejected the possibility of obtaining foreign loans on extortionate terms, and the capitalists did not want to give us "human" loans." According to some estimates (1, 2), Western loans accounted for about 3-4% of capital investments during the first five-year plan (and later it was no longer necessary), so they did not play a special role.

At the same time, industrialization took place at a fantastic pace.

Market investments (received by the state at the expense of the grain monopoly) during industrialization: the first five-year plan, the first year = 38%, the second year = 18%, the third year and beyond = 0%! Industrial growth: the first five-year plan = +1500 new factories and enterprises, the second five-year plan = +4000 new factories and enterprises. This is some kind of nightmare for a liberal market economist: investment is reduced to zero, while the economy grows and grows.

How did the financial system work at the same time, how did the financiers manage to build a system without an “almighty investor”.

During the credit reform of 1929-30, a two-circuit monetary system was built in the USSR.

Non-cash and cash were mutually non-convertible. Non-cash money ensured the functioning of construction, industry, and agriculture, regardless of market supply and demand. Cash provided market transactions.

In fact, it was an economy with two different types of money, the functions of which were different. Cash could perform all the generally accepted functions of money within the country, but the applicability of this money was actually limited to retail trade. The functions of non-cash money have been cut - they have been taken away from the function of accumulation and the function of creating treasures. In the conditions of a socialist economy, which does not aim at making a profit, these functions turned out to be simply harmful. Deprived of these functions, non-cash money could only work within the framework of the socialist segment of the economy. Outside this segment, non-cash money simply did not exist. They were useless to steal because they could not be spent on the market. They cannot be bribed for the same reason. This money could be used only for its intended purpose - to ensure economic transactions between enterprises.

Due to the fact that the industrial (non-cash) and market (cash) monetary circuits were isolated from each other, the country could invest in its own development as much non-cash money as needed and as far as physical capabilities allowed. Non-cash money was simply poured into the economy when it was needed and withdrawn from the economy when it was no longer needed. At the same time, there could be no inflation, no rise in prices, in principle, because non-cash money could not flow into the market circuit where cash was used.

Stalin's unbuilt economy. When liberals say that the Stalinist economy was built and within its framework the USSR bought grain from the West, they are lying. Grain began to be purchased only under Khrushchev, who destroyed what Stalin was building. Therefore, Stalin's economy is "Terra incognita". First, the difficult pre-war five-year plans, the relatively short rest before the war. Then terrible destruction and deprivation. Recovery. Annual price cuts. Golden ruble, refusal to trade for the dollar. And then Stalin was poisoned, and his economy was destroyed.

The material of a retired captain of the 1st rank, a member of the Military Scientific Society of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, a Sevastopol resident Vladimir Leonidovich Khramov, will help us understand what it was like - the Stalinist economy.

"Apologetics of economic Stalinism

Dedicated to the Stalinist economic system.

The high competence of Soviet managers is also confirmed by the powerful scientific and production potential created under their leadership. The quality and reliability of its main offspring - the Soviet strategic weapons - are the only and reliable guarantee of our state sovereignty to date. Therefore, in order to “introduce the topic”, to better understand the structure of the Soviet Union and the logic of Soviet managerial behavior, it is necessary to realize the presence of a number of features that fundamentally distinguish Russia (USSR) from other states.

ORIGINAL PROBLEMS OF RUSSIA

Our entire Motherland is a continuous superposition of negative factors on each other, no matter where you look, there is not a single gap. And the fact that on 1/6 of the earth's land, half of which was in the permafrost zone, and the rest in areas of eternal raids from outside, the greatest of states was created - a fact that is rather unnatural ...

For these reasons, in Russia at all times there were two main problems:

Increased energy consumption of life (domestic and industrial human activities) - energy costs for the production of any product or service in our territories are 1.5 - 2 times higher than the corresponding indicators of Western countries only due to the cold climate. At the same time, increased transport and other infrastructure costs caused by our huge distances further increase this ratio.
Chronic lack of human resources necessary for the maintenance and development of social, economic, defense and other infrastructures under the influence of the mentioned negative factors.

SOVIET STATE CAPITALISM

Before the First World War, the tsarist government was the first in the world in terms of external debt. Among the developed countries, except for Russia, only Japan had an external public debt, the size of which was 2.6 times less than the Russian one. The total public debt of Russia on the eve of the October Revolution was 41.6 billion rubles, including external - 14.86 billion rubles. Not without reason, one of the first decrees of the Soviet government was the “Decree on the annulment of state loans” of January 21 (February 3), 1918, according to which all internal and external LOANS concluded by previous governments before December 1, 1917 were canceled. The socialist model of capitalism operated on the basis of the social form of ownership of the means of production. A prerequisite for the functioning of this economic model was the closure of the domestic market from foreign competition - by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of April 22, 1918, foreign trade was nationalized (a state monopoly was established).

State planning bodies distributed the available material and labor resources, primarily for the implementation of priority tasks. Priorities were:

Military-industrial complex (weapons and military equipment);

Fuel and energy complex (coal-oil-gas production, electric power industry);

Transport complex (railway, air and water transport);

Social complex (health care, education, housing, vital food and industrial goods).

STALIN'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM

(TWO-LOOP MONETARY CIRCULATION MODEL)

In one of its circuits, the circulation of non-cash money (rubles) was carried out;

In another circuit - cash (rubles).

If we omit individual accounting and banking subtleties, then the essence of the two-loop system is as follows:

Mandatory, basic conditions for the existence and functioning of the two-loop model of monetary circulation are:

Absolute inadmissibility of the transformation (conversion) of non-cash money into cash;

The most severe state monopoly on foreign trade.

The “total total price”, in turn, was formed from its two main components:

The total price of "social", vital goods and services (health care, education, housing, vital food and industrial goods, fuel, electricity, transport services and housing and communal services).

The total price of "prestigious" goods and services that are not vital (cars, sophisticated household appliances, crystal, carpets, jewelry).

Prices for "social" goods and services were set much lower than their cost or made them generally free;
- Prices for "prestigious" goods and services, respectively, were set much higher than their cost in such a way as to compensate for losses from lower prices for "social" goods and services as part of the "total total price".

To justify and maintain high retail prices for "prestigious" goods, they were produced in volumes that supported their constant shortage and rush demand. For example, the cost of a VAZ 2101 passenger car was 1,950 rubles, and its retail price was 5,500 rubles. Thus, when purchasing this car, the employee invested 3,550 rubles in the state piggy bank for free, but this money did not disappear anywhere in Soviet times, but was redistributed to pay workers producing cheap or free social goods and services, including:

Cheap transport and utilities services;

Cheap gasoline, electricity and vital food and industrial goods;

Free healthcare, education and housing.

Thus:

The main tasks of the functioning of the cash circulation circuit were:

Fair distribution among the population of the USSR of vital goods and services.
-Material incentives for the fulfillment of established targets, high quality and labor discipline.
- In organizations and enterprises there were queues for the purchase of prestigious goods and housing. Among the first to receive these benefits were the leaders of production, and among the last - lagging behind and undisciplined people.

Maintaining an optimal balance of supply and demand in the domestic market of goods and services at a level that excludes inflationary processes.
The system was very fair - no one was forced to buy "prestigious" goods, on the contrary, everyone did it with enthusiasm and pleasure, and the overpayment made when buying them was returned to everyone as part of a package of social goods and services.

THE BEGINNING OF A NEW STAGE OF WORLD HISTORY

Two significant events of the final phase of World War II marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in world history:

On September 8, 1944, the regular shelling of London with German V-2 guided ballistic missiles began;

Thus, on our planet, viable industrial samples of fundamentally new controlled means of delivering warheads over long distances, as well as fundamentally new warheads of enormous destructive power, were created and used (still separately from each other). The combination of these two qualities in one form - a guided ballistic missile carrier of a nuclear charge could provide its owner with unprecedented military-strategic capabilities, as well as guarantee security from any external threat. This weapon had great prospects for development, both in terms of achieving an unlimited reach of targets, and in increasing the power of the delivered charge. It was this factor that aggravated the post-war international situation to the limit, as it served as an impetus for the beginning of the nuclear-missile arms race.

ARMS RACE LOGIC

06/26/1953 - Ministry of Medium Machine Building (MSM) - a specialized industry that was engaged in the development and production of nuclear warheads;

04/02/1955 - The Ministry of General Mechanical Engineering (MOM) is a specialized branch that was engaged in the development and production of rocket and space technology. The nuclear missile race also caused a sharp increase in the country's demand for aluminum and the capacities of existing aluminum plants were clearly not enough. Aluminum is the main metal used to make rockets, aircraft and spacecraft, as well as some types of lightweight armor coating, which is in demand in the context of the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, in connection with the beginning of the mass use of aluminum alloys, the organization of its mass production has become a priority state task. The specificity of aluminum production is that it is very energy intensive - to produce 1000 kg of rough aluminum, it is necessary to spend about 17 thousand kWh of electricity, therefore, first of all, it was necessary to create powerful sources of electricity.

The country tensed up, "tightened its belt" and in the center of Siberia were built:

Powerful hydroelectric power plants (HPPs):

Bratsk HPP (4500 MW) - in 1954-67;

Krasnoyarsk HPP (6000 MW) - in 1956-71;

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP (6400 MW) - in 1963-85

Large aluminum smelters:

Bratsk aluminum plant - in 1956 - 66;

Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant - in 1959 - 64;

Sayan aluminum plant - in 1975 - 85

In connection with the urgency of the tasks facing us in the creation of strategic nuclear missile weapons, the issue of ensuring their fulfillment with the necessary material and labor resources has become particularly acute. There were no free people and they could only be withdrawn from other, less important areas at that time - that is why shipbuilding programs were curtailed, mass reductions in the Armed Forces and other similar events were carried out. Some of the branches and scientific directions, for objective reasons, pulled ahead, some lagged behind, but the inexorable laws of the arms race dictated their conditions.

It was once and impossible to wait for the moment of proportional development of all industries and directions, sufficient to create an ideal weapon. At least some deterrent weapon was needed now and immediately - and it was created from what was, relying on already achieved (not always yet perfect) scientific, design and technological capabilities. Thus, the arms race is, first of all, a race of real economic, organizational, scientific and technological capabilities of the racing states...

COLLEGIATION AS A BASIS FOR ANY DECISIONS ON MILITARY TECHNICAL ISSUES

At the top level, dozens of organizations and enterprises are involved in the creation and production of specific models of strategic weapons - co-executors representing various ministries and departments.

When trying to evaluate the activities of predecessors using textual documents, it must be borne in mind that the adoption of those distant organizational and military-technical decisions was influenced by many “for granted” considerations and factors characteristic of that time, which were equally understood and meant by all the “signatories” , but, due to their obviousness, they were not even mentioned in the documents. It must always be remembered that not every thought taken out of the context of a historical period can be understood at another time without additional explanations.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE DEATH OF THE STATE

It all started with a thoughtless struggle with alcoholism ...

In 1987, the basic foundations of the Soviet economy were finally destroyed:

- “The law on the state enterprise (association)” of 1987 opened the contour of non-cash money - it was allowed to turn it into cash;

The state monopoly of foreign trade was actually abolished - from January 1, 1987, such a right was given to 20 ministries and 70 large enterprises.

Then things went off and on - there were not enough goods, prices went up and inflation began. Mass strikes of miners began in 1989... Quite predictably, August 1991 came, when the actions of overgrown and unshaven capital people destroyed the last foundations created in the interests of all the working people, the Soviet state...

Note: The notorious “oil needle”, which the “democrats” are so fond of talking about, did not have any decisive influence on the destruction of the domestic consumer market, since only consumer goods from capitalist countries were purchased with petrodollars, the share of which in the total volume of consumer imports was is small - about 17% (the decrease in their volume in the total volume of the consumer market in 1985-87 amounted to approximately from 6 to 2 billion rubles). In settlements with the CMEA countries, where the bulk of consumer imports came from, the internal collective currency of the CMEA, the "transferable ruble", was used.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS:

The October Revolution of 1917 occurred due to the impossibility of further economic development of Russia in the conditions of an open capitalist market. Its final result was the creation, the only possible for our further existence, of the "Stalinist economic system", based on a two-circuit model of monetary circulation, with the obligatory condition of closing the domestic market from external competition. This model of the economy proved its effectiveness in the pre-war five-year plans, in the Great Patriotic War and in the era of the nuclear-missile arms race.

There is little information on the topic of dual-circuit monetary systems. Below is a selection of theses by Andrey Devyatov on the Asian mode of production from this speech of his at the School of Common Sense on February 17, 2017:

Economic development is not necessarily guaranteed by a credit economy (Western model). This model is based on the Newtonian understanding of time as a duration or a linear sequence of events (progress). In this model, future demand is monetized, and credit is the main development tool.

The Chinese model of economic development is based on a cyclic understanding of time as a sequence of events, and the key concept is timeliness (which is not in the Newtonian model, where all periods of time are equivalent). This model is built on the law of change, which in the economic part is based not on credit, but on dividing the monetary system into two circuits.

The Asian mode of production is the two-circuit monetary system. It was invented in China in the 12th century during the Song Dynasty, but this system was used in the Yuan Dynasty during the unified state of Genghis Khan. It was thanks to this model that a single state (Yi Guo) from sea to sea could exist. The collapse of the model occurred after the introduction of Western elements into it.

The essence of the model is the division of monetary circulation into natural and non-cash money. The consumption of an individual is provided with natural money (gold, silver), which can be used to buy food or a cow there.

Long-term infrastructure projects (dams, canals, roads) are financed from another circuit, which operates on debt securities issued by the state. In China, paper money was invented specifically for this.

Two circuits - cash and non-cash - are separated, the borders between them are protected by the state through money changers, where you can exchange coins for paper and vice versa.

The fundamental difference from the European way of financing is the understanding of time as a cycle. Therefore, infrastructure projects are not financed by credit, i.е. under the future demand, but under the return of time in a new cycle. Because in the next cycle of life, investments will not pay off with a profit (Western model), but will be used by the next generation of people for a new cycle of life.

In the USSR, a two-circuit system was introduced by Stalin (golden ruble for the population and cashless payments for infrastructure projects). Therefore, after the war, the main priority for Stalin was the nuclear and missile projects as guarantors of the survival of future generations. The main non-cash resources from the second monetary circuit were thrown at them.

Capitalization in the understanding of Stalin - in happiness. The subject of capitalization is the happiness and dream of the people, and not the interest on the loan. It is a dream that can provide a colossal economic breakthrough, which was demonstrated by the USSR.

The collapse of the double-circuit monetary system in the USSR occurred as a result of the Kosygin reform, when planning in pieces was abandoned and they switched to monetary statistical equivalents.

With a planning system in kind, innovation is the main indicator. After the Kosygin reform, the introduction of innovations turns out to be unprofitable, because it is possible to ensure the growth of "monetary" statistical indicators in more "efficient" ways: by accelerating costs, increasing costs, etc.