Infantry of the Russian Empire: history, form, weapons. Russian infantry - the queen of the fields The tactics of the offensive of the rifle troops of the Red Army

Soon two centuries will pass since the army and the people Russian Empire entered into a deadly confrontation with the militia of Europe and in an exhausting battle scattered and destroyed the hordes of the enemy. The enemy invasion, which reached the ancient capital, once again densely littered the long-suffering Russian land with graves and the skeletons of destroyed settlements. And once again the people, driven to despair, found the strength to endure and win.

The traces of devastation have long since disappeared, the fortifications have been smoothed out and overgrown with grass, the nameless burial places have leveled with the ground, but the reflections of the fires of that distant time still stir the hearts of the current sons and daughters of the Fatherland, who are not indifferent to great history great state. In the annals of this story, the events of the immortal epic of the Patriotic War of 1812 are captured in fiery letters.

The military victory over Napoleon brought the Russian state to the head of world politics. The Russian army began to be considered the strongest army in the world and for several decades firmly held this status. The basis of the combat power of the armed forces was the oldest branch of the army is the infantry, which was recognized by all contemporaries. “... Here comes our beautiful, slender, formidable infantry! the main defense, a strong bulwark of the Fatherland...

Every time I see infantry marching with a sure and firm step, with attached bayonets, with a formidable drumming, I feel a kind of reverence, fear ... When infantry columns rush towards the enemy with a quick, even and orderly movement! .., there are no good fellows , there is no time for them: these are heroes who bring inevitable death! or those going to inevitable death - there is no middle ground! but in all his movements some kind of mercy for the enemy shines: these are all only harbingers of death! But the formation of the infantry is death! terrible, inevitable death!” - Nadezhda Durova noted in her notes.

It is about this type of troops that will be discussed on the pages of the book opened by the reader. Exploring the materials on the Patriotic War of 1812, we will consider in detail the issues of organization, recruitment, training and combat use of foot troops of the Russian army. The author dares to hope that the whole complex of information presented in the book will help the history lover to come closer to understanding the realities of hostilities and military life, and possibly even inner world of our ancestors, which, in turn, will serve to strengthen social memory - the inextricable link between generations of compatriots.

ORGANIZATION

The Russian army consisted of regular and irregular troops. The Russian regular infantry in 1812 was divided into field and garrison according to the territorial localization of service, according to the main combat functions - into heavy (linear) and light, according to elitism and degree of proximity to the ruling dynasty - into guards and army. Invalid companies and teams also belonged to the infantry.

The field infantry formed the backbone of the state's military forces and, having certain quarters in peacetime, was sent as needed to one or another theater of operations. The garrison infantry, in accordance with the name, performed the functions of garrisons of cities and fortresses and ensured the activities of state authorities in places of permanent deployment.

Heavy infantry, represented by guards grenadiers, grenadiers, infantry, naval and garrison units and subunits, was intended primarily for operations in close formation. Light infantry - guards and army regiments of chasseurs and the Guards crew - were fully trained in operations in loose formation, therefore, they tried to select relatively undersized and mobile soldiers as chasseurs. In general, by 1812, the functional features of the types of infantry were to a certain extent leveled: if the chasseurs initially studied the rules of close formation, then many linear regiments surpassed the basics of the chasseurs' doctrine.

The guard, carrying out a service directly related to the protection of the imperial family, had a number of advantages over army units in recruiting, training and supplying; the requirements for these elite units were correspondingly increased.

Emperor Alexander I Drawing by Louis de Saint-Aubin. 1812-15

M.I. Kutuzov. Miniature after engraving by F. Bollinger from the original by G. Rosentretter. 1st quarter of the 19th century

Almost all field infantry regiments had a common structure: the regiment was divided into 3 battalions, the battalion into 4 companies. From October 12, 1810, the three battalions of the regiment received a uniform organization: each battalion now consisted of one grenadier company and three companies, called “central” in France (in the grenadier regiments, these were fusilier companies, in the infantry - musketeers, in the chasseurs - chasseurs) . In the ranks of the battalion, platoons of the grenadier company - grenadier and rifle - stood on the flanks, the other three companies were located between them. The first and third battalions were considered active, and the second - reserve (only his grenadier company went on the campaign, and the other three, having sent people to resupply the existing battalions, remained in the apartments). The grenadier companies of the second battalions, as a rule, when joining regiments into a division, were two combined grenadier battalions (3 companies each), when joined into a corps - a combined grenadier brigade (4 combined battalions), when joined into an army - a combined grenadier division. In the regiments of the guards heavy infantry and in the Life Grenadier Regiment, all companies were considered grenadier, and the naming of the "centre company" was carried out simply by numbers.

Grenadiers, non-commissioned officer and chief officers of the grenadier company. I.A. Klein. 1815 City Historical Museum of Nuremberg. Germany.

The garrison infantry was divided into regiments, battalions and semi-battalions. In the Moscow garrison regiment there were 6 battalions, in 2 regiments - 3 battalions each, in 9 regiments - 2 battalions each. Each garrison battalion had 4 musketeer companies.

The Guards Infantry in 1812 included the Guards Infantry Division and the Life Guards Garrison Battalion. The 1st brigade of the division consisted of the Life Guards of the Preobrazhensky and the Life Guards of the Semenovsky regiments, the 2nd brigade of the Life Guards of the Izmailovsky and the newly formed Life Guards of the Lithuanian regiments, the 3rd brigade of the Life Guards of the Jaegers and the Life Guards Finnish regiments and the Guards crew of the 1st battalion. The division included the Life Guards Foot Artillery Brigade of 2 battery, 2 light artillery companies and an artillery team of the Guards crew. All three battalions of each guards regiment were withdrawn on the campaign; thus, it was the most numerous infantry division - it had 19 battalions and 50 guns.

The army field infantry by the beginning of the war consisted of 14 grenadier, 96 infantry, 4 marine, 50 chasseur regiments and the Caspian naval battalion. In 1811, the schedule of divisions, from the 1st to the 27th, and brigades was approved; while the 19th and 20th divisions did not have a permanent brigade division. According to this schedule, two grenadier divisions (1st and 2nd) consisted of three grenadier brigades each, infantry divisions - of two infantry and one chasseur brigades (infantry - the first and second brigades, chasseurs - the third). In the 6th division, the second and third brigades included one infantry and one jaeger regiment each. In the 25th division, the first brigade included the 1st and 2nd Naval regiments, the second - the 3rd Naval and Voronezh infantry. The 23rd division consisted of only two brigades, in the second of which the infantry and chasseur regiments were brought together. Each of the first 27 infantry divisions had a field artillery brigade, including 1 battery and 2 light artillery companies. Almost all divisions, based on the schedule, had 12 infantry battalions and 36 guns each.

Heavy Infantry - GRENADERS

The grenadiers were considered the striking force of the infantry, and therefore the tallest and most physically strong recruits were traditionally selected for the grenadier units. Moreover, the total number of grenadiers united in large units in the Russian army was relatively small: only the Life Grenadier Regiment had 3 grenadier battalions, the rest of the grenadier regiments consisted of 1 grenadier and 2 musketeer battalions. In addition, to reinforce conventional infantry units in each musketeer regiment (following the French model), one grenadier company per battalion was introduced. At the same time, the grenadier companies of the reserve battalions that did not participate in the campaigns were reduced to grenadier battalions and brigades and followed the troops, being the combat reserve of infantry divisions and corps.
Grenadiers wore general army infantry uniforms; the insignia of this elite branch of the military were the metal emblems of the “Grenada with three lights” on the shako and red shoulder straps. Among themselves, the grenadier regiments differed in the initial letters of the name of the regiment, embroidered on shoulder straps.

Grenadier of an infantry regiment in dress uniform and grenadier - non-commissioned officer of the Chasseur regiment in marching uniform

Medium Infantry - MUSKETERS

Musketeers in Russian army called soldiers of rifle units; Musketeers were the main type of Russian infantry. True, in 1811 the musketeer regiments were renamed infantry, but the companies retained the name of the musketeers, and throughout the war of 1812 in the Russian army, out of habit, infantrymen continued to be called musketeers.
The musketeers wore a general army uniform, outwardly differing from other infantry branches only in a badge on a shako - “grenada about one fire”. At parades, the musketeers fastened tall black sultans to their shakos, but on the march the sultans were removed so as not to interfere in battle. Among themselves, infantry regiments differed in multi-colored shoulder straps according to seniority in the division: red, white, yellow, green, blue and flat; on all shoulder straps the number of the division, which included the regiment, was embroidered.


Odessa musketeer and non-commissioned officer of the Simbirsk infantry regiment in summer uniform, musketeer of the Butyrsky infantry regiment in winter uniform

Light Infantry - JAGER

Jaegers were a type of light infantry that often operated in loose formation and fought firefights at maximum distances. That is why some of the rangers were supplied with rare and expensive rifled weapons (fittings) for that time. The chasseur companies usually selected people of small stature, very mobile, good shooters: one of the most important tasks of the chasseurs in battles was to “knock out” officers of enemy units with sniper fire. It was also welcomed if the recruit was familiar with life in the forest, since the huntsmen often had to go on reconnaissance, forward patrols, and attack enemy guard pickets.
The jaeger uniform was like the general army infantry uniform of the musketeers; the difference was in the color of the pantaloons: unlike all other infantrymen who wore white pantaloons, the huntsmen wore green pantaloons both in battle and at the parade. In addition, the pack belts and bandages of the rangers were not whitewashed, as was done in other types of infantry, but were black.

Private of the 20th and non-commissioned officer of the 21st Jaeger regiments

Engineering Troops - PIONEERS

Often overlooked when it comes to the heroism of the infantry, this "low-key" type of troops played an extremely important role in the war. It was the pioneers who built (often under enemy fire) defensive fortifications, destroyed enemy fortresses, erected bridges and crossings, without which it was impossible to move the army forward. Pioneers and sappers provided both defense and offensive troops; without them, the conduct of the war was virtually impossible. And with all that, the glory of victory has always belonged to the infantry or cavalry, but not to the pioneer units ...
With the general army uniform, the pioneers of the Russian army wore not white, but gray pantaloons and a black instrument color with a red piping. Grenades on shakos and harnesses on epaulettes were not gilded, but silver (tin).

private and staff captain of the 1st Pioneer Regiment

Irregular Infantry - MILF

This type of troops at that time was not provided for by the charter of any of the armies of Europe. Militias appeared only in Russia, when the invasion brought a threat to the very existence of the state, when the entire Russian people rose to defend the Fatherland. The militias often did not have normal weapons at all, they armed themselves with carpenter's axes taken from home, obsolete sabers and captured guns. And, nevertheless, it was the militias that played the most important role in the Patriotic War, only they managed to raise the size of the Russian army in a short time to the level that could “crush” the large Napoleonic army of a new type. This came at a very high price: only 1 out of 10 militias who went to defend the Fatherland returned home ...
The uniform of the militias was very diverse; in fact, in each county, the organizer of the militia developed his own model of uniform, unlike the uniform of the militia of the neighboring county. However, often all these types of uniforms were based on the traditional Cossack caftan, which received different colors in different districts; common to the form of the militias was the so-called "militia cross" with the motto "For Faith and Fatherland", attached to the caps of the militias.


Ordinary militias and officers of the Petersburg and Moscow militia

PARTISANS

Russians partisan detachments The Patriotic War of 1812 were of two types. Some were formed from army (mainly cavalry) units, obeyed the high command, carried out its tasks and wore their regimental uniform, used regular weapons. Other partisan detachments were created spontaneously from peasants - residents of the occupied regions. The fighters of these detachments walked in their peasant clothes, and used carpenter's axes, pitchforks, sickles and scythes, kitchen knives and clubs as weapons. Firearms in such detachments were at first very rare (mostly hunting rifles), but over time, the partisans armed themselves with captured French rifles, pistols, sabers and broadswords; some especially strong units sometimes managed to get and use 1-2 guns in battle ...

Infantry is the main and most numerous branch of the army. It can go everywhere, occupy everything and hold everything. The rest of the military branches only help the infantry in its difficult and complex combat work.

The history of the Russian infantry begins with the history of our homeland.

In 911 the prince Kievsky Oleg waged war with Byzantium. Having destroyed the enemy army, he nailed his shield on the gates of Constantinople as a sign of victory. The success of this battle was decided by the infantry, which consisted of free citizens - residents of cities and villages.

The Russian infantry was distinguished by high discipline and courage, perseverance and endurance. In 1240, Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich, with his retinue and Novgorod infantry, defeated the Swedes on the Neva. Armed with axes - the favorite weapon of the Russians - the Novgorod infantrymen split the iron helmets of the Swedes with one blow, like clay pots. The Swedes, defeated by the Russians, fled and for a long time after that did not dare to go back to our land.

In the famous battle with the Livonian knights - crusaders on Lake Peipus in 1242, the Russian infantry again showed what true military prowess means.

Under Tsar Ivan Vasilyevich the Terrible, archers first appeared in Russia. They were divided into shelves.

The archers already had a certain uniform and were armed with a squeaker (handguns), a reed (an ax in the shape of a crescent, with a long handle) and a saber. They lived in special settlements, guarded the border towns, and in wartime - in battles - they formed the backbone of the battle order of the Russian rati.

In 1700, Peter the Great formed a regular army - 27 regiments of infantry and 2 regiments of dragoons. With this army, he began the fight against Sweden, which seized Russian lands near Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland.

On November 19 of that memorable year for Russia, the enemy attacked our army, which was besieging Narva. The young Russian troops, who did not yet have combat experience, were defeated. But the new infantry of Peter, the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments - the former "amusing" ones - held their positions, repulsing all the attacks of the Swedes. They then saved the army from complete defeat.

The infantry won the war with Sweden.

1702 - Russian infantry stormed and took the Notenburg fortress. 1703 - Peter's foot soldiers, planted on fishing boats, attacked sea ​​ships Astril and Gedan. This attack turned into a brutal hand-to-hand combat, ending in a complete victory for the Russians. 1708 - Russian infantrymen and artillerymen, together with the cavalry, smash the Swedes at the village of Lesnaya, and, finally, on June 27, 1709 - the complete defeat of the enemy near Poltava.

Petrovsky infantry especially distinguished themselves in the battle of Gangut.

Planted on rowing ships - galleys - turned into sailors, the infantrymen smashed the enemy, taking even the Swedish admirals prisoner. Clinging to the tackle, in hand-to-hand combat, side by side with the Swedish ships, the Russians climbed onto the guns, not being afraid of death - neither from fire, nor from a bayonet, nor from water.

“The boarding was so cruelly repaired that from enemy cannons several soldiers were torn apart not by cannonballs and buckshot, but by the spirit of gunpowder from cannons ... in truth, it is impossible to describe the courage of ours, both initial and ordinary,” Peter wrote then about the infantrymen.

Suvorovites were the receivers of their glory.

The great Russian commander Suvorov himself began his service as a "lower rank" - in the infantry, in the Semyonovsky Guards Regiment. He believed that the study of military affairs should have begun with the infantry - the main and main branch of the army.

Suvorov's baptism of fire took place in Seven Years' War. The Russian infantry then distinguished itself in battle, inflicting one defeat after another on the Prussian army, which was considered the best in the world. Already in the battle of Zorndorf in 1758, the Prussian king Frederick was struck by the courage of the Russian infantry. Divided into small groups by the Prussian cavalry attack, the Russian grenadiers did not give up and did not flee. Standing with their backs to each other, they bristled with bayonets like hedgehogs, and resisted until their last breath.

In 1759 Friedrich was utterly defeated at Kunnersdorf. And a year later, selected Russian infantry stormed the Berlin bastions and then solemnly, with fluttering banners, entered the surrendered German capital. From that time on, Frederick no longer risked engaging in battles with the Russians, limiting himself to "maneuvering at a respectful distance."

Along with courage, the skill of Russian infantrymen also grew.

In the Italian campaign of 1799, the rangers of General Bagration used one very original military technique.

Traditional military history tends to operate on a large scale - commanders-in-chief give orders, troops conduct operations that end in success or failure. The historian's gaze is rarely distracted from the map of the theater of operations and descends "down", to individual parts. In this article, we will look at the typical actions of Russian infantry companies and battalions in the Balkans in 1877-1878 and the problems faced by soldiers and officers.

More than a hundred infantry regiments and rifle battalions participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 from the Russian side. They were the main participants in such outstanding events as the crossing of the Danube at Sistovo, the first Trans-Balkan campaign of the Advance Detachment of General I.V. Gurko, the defense of Shipka, the capture of Lovcha and three assaults on Plevna. We will not analyze specific battles, but will try to give examples illustrating typical actions and problems of Russian infantry in field battles in 1877-1878.

The beginning of the battle

The battle began long before contact and even eye contact with the enemy. Troops were reorganized from marching formation to combat formation at a distance of effective artillery fire (usually about 3,000 paces). The regiment advanced with two battalions in the front line and one battalion in reserve, or vice versa - with one battalion in front. The second option made it possible to save more reserves, which means that the commander expanded his ability to fend off unexpected blows. It was more profitable for the commanders to be located along with the reserves so as not to lose control of the battle, but this was not always observed. So, Colonel I.M. Kleingauz, the hero of the first assault on Plevna on July 8, 1877, died while in the advanced units of his Kostroma regiment. General M.D. Skobelev, before the assault on the Green Mountains on the outskirts of Plevna, asked his subordinate Major General V.A. Tebekin, who commanded the Kazan regiment, was in reserve, but he could not resist the temptation to personally lead his regiment on the attack and was hit by a grenade.

Here it is worth making a digression, which will serve as a "guiding thread" in our story. Contrary to popular belief, by the 1870s, the Russian military was already well aware that rifled rifles and new artillery systems were capable of creating a formidable curtain of fire. In this regard, tactical changes became necessary - for example, the transition to rarer formations. No less clear was the question of how to protect people from fire without losing control of the battle.

The Russian infantry regiment consisted of three battalions. Each battalion was divided into five companies, one of which was called rifle. Usually it was this company that formed the rifle chain in front of the battalion formation - the fighters scattered forward at a distance of 2-5 steps from each other. The rest of the companies formed in close columns behind the skirmish line.

Ordinary formation of a battalion. Author's scheme

As a rule, four closed companies lined up in a checkerboard pattern, with a firing line in front. Thus, three battle lines were obtained - a chain, the first two companies (1st battle line) and the second two companies (2nd battle line). The intervals between columns in one battle line rarely exceeded the length of the columns along the front, and the distance between the chain and the 1st battle line was clearly specified by the charter - exactly 300 steps. Such severity was due to the concern that the 1st battle line had time to come to the aid of the chain in the event of a threat, but practice has shown that the distance was chosen unsuccessfully. Firstly, the proximity of the 1st line to the chain led to unnecessary losses; secondly, the 1st line gravitated towards the chain, which led to the concentration of the latter and the premature consumption of reserves. Colonel A.N. Kuropatkin noted this error in the Kazan regiment during the battle for Lovcha on August 20–22, 1877.

After the war in the Balkans, some Russian military leaders proposed increasing the authorized distance to 500-600 steps, but at the insistence of the then military authorities, the new instruction stated that the chain, 1st and 2nd lines should determine the distance themselves. In general, the construction of the battalion was distinguished by excessive density, and the three battle lines often "crawled" on top of each other.

Management difficulties

Specialists, including a participant in the Russian-Turkish war, Major General L.L. Zeddeler, Soviet theorist A.A. Svechin and modern American researcher B.U. Manning, criticized the scattering of just one company into a chain. From their point of view, in this case, the battalion used only 1/5 of its firepower, but in practice, even one company did not always develop its fire at full strength, since long-range shooting was not welcomed in the Russian army. “Good infantry is stingy with fire, - General M.I. Dragomirov, a prominent French theorist, Marshal T.-R. Bujo, - Frequent shooting is a means by which cowards try to drown out the feeling of fear in themselves..

Managing the infantry chain and its fire was not an easy task, so they tried to appoint the most intelligent and competent officers to the rifle company - however, their capabilities were limited. The officer could more or less control what was happening within a radius of 20 steps, the rest of the space was not covered by his voice and was often hidden from his eyes. The horns, once a symbol of the light infantry, which specialized in operations in loose formation, were declared unusable by the 1870s. On maneuvers, they tried to use whistles to give signals, but they apparently were not used in battle - commands were usually given by voice, and private bosses, ensigns and non-commissioned officers repeated it and passed it on. The difficulties of management are clearly visible from the description of the battle on Shipka on August 11, 1877, which was fought by companies of the Oryol Infantry Regiment:

“[...] a handful of those who fought every hour decreased and decreased; in some places the chain became so thin that one person occupied a space of 20 or more steps. Entire columns threatened to bypass the right flank, and therefore by six o'clock this flank began to move back, and the center behind it. It was positively impossible to control the chain on such rough terrain as the real one: the voice was muffled by the thunder of shots, and even a tenth of the chain, hidden by bushes, did not notice the given signs. Thus, an involuntary retreat began, albeit step by step.”

A lot depended on the company commander in battle - usually much more than on the battalion commander, who, after entering his battalion into the battle line, usually lost the opportunity to influence events and joined one of the companies. The commander had to manage his chain, take a lot of independent decisions, adapt to the terrain, maintain contact with other companies, take care of their flanks - all this was hindered by a lot of circumstances inevitable in any battle.

First of all, company commanders often died and were injured, so they were advised to familiarize their subordinates with combat missions and appoint several deputies in advance. If the company commander was out of order, the company faced a serious problem, characteristic of the entire Russian army. The fact is that it was its commander who ordered everything in the company (often through the heads of platoon and squad commanders). Thus, junior commanders (ensigns and staff captains) lost their initiative, authority and command skills. In different parts, this problem was dealt with in different ways - for example, in the 14th division, which became famous for crossing the Danube and defending Shipka, a strict transmission of orders throughout the chain of command and the initiative of junior officers were cultivated, and the replacement of retired chiefs was practiced. As a result, the companies of this division continued to clearly fulfill their tasks even in the event of injury or death of commanders.

Russian troops near Plevna, contemporary drawing.
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The second circumstance that added difficulties to the company commander was the problem of reinforcements. Even during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, it was noted that the injection of reinforcements into the chain often leads to mixing units and a complete loss of control over them. The best minds of the Russian army undertook to solve this problem, but the disputes did not subside either before the campaign in the Balkans or after it. On the one hand, the decision was to form a strong chain immediately, on the other hand, in this case, its density increased, and hence the losses from fire. In addition, the military, who, after many years of peaceful service, came under fire, was in for an unpleasant discovery - a real battle is much more chaotic and incomprehensible than slender lines in textbooks and on a parade ground. The injection of adrenaline into the blood, the whistle of bullets and the rumble of nuclei, the sight of falling comrades completely changed the perception of the battle.

For years, the military has tried to streamline and structure the chaos of combat. This approach can be conditionally called the “Jomini way” (G. Jomini was a Swiss theorist of the 1810s–1830s, who did not lose his authority in the 1870s). K. von Clausewitz, on the contrary, emphasized that war is an area of ​​danger, physical stress, uncertainty and chance, which is useless to fight. Russian military theorist General G.A. Leer, relying on the works of Jomini, suggested replenishing the chain strictly from the "native" part. In turn, Dragomirov, one of the most attentive Russian readers of Clausewitz, offered to put up with the mixing of units and accustom soldiers to it while still on maneuvers.

Chain actions

The chain was supposed to perform the following tasks:

• engage in a firefight;
• force the enemy to reveal their forces;
• to protect the companies following her from a surprise attack;
• if possible, prepare their attack.

In order to successfully complete these tasks, the chain had to advance as systematically as possible, observing the statutory 300 steps of the distance from the 1st battle line. At the same time, under fire, the movement of the chain slowed down, and the speed of the rear mouths, on the contrary, increased - hence the very “pressure” from the side of the 1st battle line, which Kuropatkin criticized.

A chain attack was usually carried out in sections: one section of the chain (for example, a squad) advanced, and the other supported it with fire. To conduct such an offensive, coordination and mutual support were required, the chiefs of the sections had to have a good eye so as not to fall under the fire of their neighbors and correctly calculate the run (it should not have been too tiring for the fighters, the recommended distance was no more than 100 steps). The slightest obstacle or uneven terrain served as a shelter for the chain, but the relief had to be able to use. Kuropatkin describes such an incident that occurred in the battle for Lovcha:

“It was necessary to run 500-600 steps through the valley completely openly. The first closure from enemy bullets on the way of the offensive of the regiment was a mill with several dozen trees surrounding it. Some of the people ran across the valley, as they say, in one spirit; others, using small ridges of pebbles formed by the flow of water [of the Osma River], lay down behind them, the rear ones joined the former ones, and in places dense ranks of the lying ones formed. But these closures did not protect well from enemy fire directed from two thousand paces and therefore striking at a large angle. […] Meanwhile, there was no need to run through this space. It was worth moving further through the gardens, then going through the outskirts of the city and, finally, going out to the same mill, which was mentioned above. The difference was that instead of a chord, you would have to describe an arc.”

Attack of the Pskov regiment on the Gyuldiz-Tabia redoubt in the battle on Shandornik on November 17, 1877.
andcvet.narod.ru

Fire could only be opened at the command of an officer. He usually ordered the best shooters to take trial shots to determine the height of the sight, then the height was reported to the soldiers, and the command was given to open fire. The officer had to make sure that no futile shots were fired, the soldiers correctly set the sights on their rifles, and he changed in time and correctly. To do this, it was necessary to know who could be trusted with trial shots, be able to determine the distance to the target, and finally, correctly choose the target itself.

In addition, the officer decided what type of fire to apply. At a distance of 300-800 steps, single shots were fired and quite rarely. It was recommended to open fire from a distance of 800 steps, since it was believed that from this distance there was a chance to hit a single person. Sometimes, if a suitable target was presented (for example, an artillery battery or a dense formation of enemy infantry), a volley was fired on command. If it was necessary to carry out intensive shelling, but did not want to spend a lot of rounds, they gave the command “frequent fire” and added the number of rounds to be fired. This technique was criticized, since the officer could not control the actual number of cartridges used by the soldiers. Finally, the officer could give the command to lie down. In general, one who controlled his unit even under heavy fire was considered an executive commander.

It was not easy to pick up the soldiers who lay down behind the shelter and move forward. In addition, the requirement to protect people from fire conflicted with the need to control the troops. Kuropatkin continues his story about the battle for Lovcha:

“In vain, one young officer shouted in a hoarse voice “forward”, “hurray”, and waved his saber, the crowd [hidden behind the mill] was not yet disposed to follow him, and the young man, running forward with several soldiers, did not have time to run a few steps, as has already been killed."

Save ammo

Dragomirov not in vain cited Bugeaud's aphorism about the connection between shooting and cowardice. He and other military authorities believed that the desire of soldiers to open fire from a long distance must be restrained. The standard ammunition load was a rather meager 60 shots, and the sight on the Krnk rifle could be set at a distance of no more than 600 steps (for non-commissioned officers and rifle battalion soldiers - 1200 steps). The soldier risked firing his entire ammunition load before some of it reached the so-called decisive distances (800-300 paces), not to mention the fact that firing served as a convenient excuse not to move forward. Shooting training ended at a distance of 1500 steps - from this distance it was already difficult to distinguish a single person, and in battle the fire was usually directed at the haze from enemy shots. Nevertheless, the temptation of long-range shooting was great, especially since the Turks actively used fire from long distances (from a range of 2000 steps it became sensitive).

There were also apologists for long-range fire in the Russian army. One of them, Baron Zeddeler, called for the introduction of long-range shooting into the charters as a special and effective type of combat fire. In his opinion, long-range shooting should have been carried out in areas, relying not on accuracy, but on the mass of lead released at a time. This type of shooting was occasionally used by the Russian troops, like another type of long-range fire - flip shots. Bullets, fired in a long arc, fell behind the earthen fortifications that the Turks loved so much. "Flipping, distant and, moreover, concentrated fire, perhaps, will again besiege the shovel in its proper place", - Colonel V.F. Argamakov. After the war, most military authorities recognized long-range fire as a legitimate weapon in the hands of commanders, but called for caution in its use. The instructions for training the company and battalion, published immediately after the war, required the use of "with extreme caution" and claimed that the passing fire was still "belongs to the main value in battle".

The experience of the war of 1877-1878 rather confirmed this conclusion. In the Vanguard Detachment, which successfully operated beyond the Balkans in the initial period of the war, General I.V. Gurko forbade the infantry to shoot from long distances, so as not to waste time. Colonel D.S. Naglovsky, who participated in Gurko's raids, enthusiastically described the actions of the 4th Infantry Brigade, which used to attack, "without releasing a single cartridge until they approach the Turks at half the distance of their rifle shot", that is, 600 steps. The Orlovsky regiment, which captured Mount Bedek near Shipka just at the time when Gurko's detachment was operating on the other side of the ridge, did not fire for a more prosaic reason - “they spared the cartridges, and there was little hope for their delivery due to the remoteness of Gabrov, where the cartridge boxes were located”.

Was the lack of ammo really a serious problem? Statistics compiled by the artillery department show that in the campaign of 1877-1878, the regiment rarely fired more than 30 rounds per gun in one battle. However, this is only the “average temperature in the hospital”: one company of the regiment could stand in reserve for the entire battle and not fire a single shot, while the other could be in chains, conduct intense firefight and experience an acute shortage of ammunition. Nevertheless, the statistics allow some interesting observations to be made. For example, it is striking that rifle battalions usually expended much more ammunition than infantry regiments. This is explained both by their specialization in firing, and by the fact that rifle battalions most often went ahead of infantry regiments, started a fight, and therefore remained under fire longer. A kind of record was set by the 13th Rifle Battalion of the 4th Rifle Brigade, which used up 122 shots per rifle in the Battle of Shipka-Sheinov (December 27–28), twice as much as the standard ammunition load.

General M.D. Skobelev in the battle on August 30, 1877 near Plevna.
andcvet.narod.ru

Among the infantry regiments, the Vladimir regiment had the highest consumption of cartridges in one case during the third assault on Plevna on August 30-31 - 91 shots per rifle (however, this is an exceptional case). For example, such an intense battle as the battle for Gorny Dubnyak on October 12 required the Guards regiments to spend 25–30 rounds of ammunition per rifle. The Life Guards Jaeger Regiment, which attacked the neighboring Telish on the same day, fired 61 shots per barrel, which significantly exceeded the “normal level”. During the first assault on Plevna on July 8, the Kostroma regiment was very short of ammunition (the consumption was more than 56 rounds per person), which was the reason for Colonel I.F. Tutolmin write in the report:

“The Kostroma regiment retreated, firstly because there were no cartridges, and secondly because there was no reserve”.

Getting closer to the enemy

Moving in dashes and hiding behind the folds of the terrain, the chain approached the enemy at close range, and the bulk of the battalion advanced behind it. Oddly enough, at a distance of 800-300 paces, the fire, as a rule, was felt less - many bullets were already flying over heads. This meant that the Turks felt the proximity of the enemy, they forgot to rearrange the sights on their rifles, they fired without aiming or even sticking out from behind shelters. Shooting from a rifle raised above his head was not uncommon for the Turkish infantry. The attackers, on the contrary, increased the fire, bringing it to the limit. According to peacetime calculations, from a distance of 400 steps, about half of the bullets should have hit the target.

Although the excitement also affected the attackers, a distance of 400–200 paces was considered decisive. At this stage of the battle, the "game of nerves" began, which most often determined the winner. It was possible to increase your chances of success by covering the flank of enemy positions, and this technique was actively used. Thus, the 4th Infantry Brigade carried out a partial coverage of the Turkish position in the battle near the village of Uflani at the southern foot of Shipka on July 4, 1877. Having fallen under the crossfire, the Turks faltered and began to randomly retreat - the battle did not have to be brought to a bayonet fight.

The coverage of the flank had its own characteristics. Getting the chain involved in the shooting to change front was not easy. Therefore, more often coverage was carried out by approaching reinforcements, which were attached to the flank of the chain and occupied a covering position. The enemy could do the same - in this case, the tactics textbooks recommended not to pull the front of the chain back, but to send reinforcements, which should not be attached to the side of the threatened units, but stand in a ledge behind them. Then already the enemy units, covering the Russian flank, fell under indirect or even longitudinal fire - as General Leer said, "he who bypasses is bypassed".

Receiving coverage and countering it by turning the front and sending reinforcements.
Dragomirov M.I. Tactics textbook. SPb., 1879

It was when the chain approached the enemy at 400–200 steps that the 1st and 2nd lines had the legal right to catch up with it, pour into the chain and increase its fire, preparing, if necessary, to strike with bayonets. In practice, this often happened by itself, against the will of the superiors. The chain stopped, and the 1st and 2nd battle lines approached it, forming one or two dense masses of fighters (the second - if it was possible to observe the offensive order).

In the 1870s, it was believed that fire alone could not force a staunch enemy to retreat. However, the Turks were not classified as stubborn opponents - indeed, they often retreated during the shelling, and it did not come to a bayonet fight. For example, General Skobelev, when crossing the Imitli Pass in December 1877, used a rifle company armed with captured Peabody-Martini rifles, and she forced the Turks to leave their positions. Of course, the Russian troops also had to retreat - in such cases they suffered the heaviest losses. The soldiers lost their self-control and rushed back headlong, the officers could no longer stop the confusion, and sometimes they themselves fled. During the unsuccessful second assault on Plevna on July 18, 1877, the Serpukhov regiment suffered terrible losses - the regiment commander, two of the three battalion commanders, many officers and lower ranks were killed or wounded. Only a handful of several dozen soldiers, two officers and one banner remained in the ranks - apparently, the Serpukhovites suffered most of the losses during the retreat.

Putting it all together, it is worth noting that the basis of successful infantry combat tactics was a reasonable balance between keeping the fighters from fire and controlling the unit. Company commanders and other commanders were required to have good tactical training, initiative, the ability to make decisions in extreme situations, and personal authority in front of the soldiers.

Sources and literature:

1. "Military collection", 1878-1900
2. Dragomirov M. I. Textbook of tactics. SPb., 1879
3. Collection of military stories. T. I-VI. SPb., 1879
4. Svechin A. A. The evolution of military art. M.-Zhukovsky, 2002
5. Collection of materials on the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Issue. 5, 10, 88, 93
6. Argamakov V. F. Memories of the war 1877-1878. // Journal of IRVIO. - Book 6, 7. - 1911
7. Prisnenko, lieutenant colonel. The First Plevna and the 19th Kostroma Infantry Regiment in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. SPb., 1900
8. Sobolev L.N. The last battle for Shipka. Regarding the memoirs of VV Vereshchagin. 1877-1878 // Russian antiquity. - 1889. - No. 5
9. Vereshchagin VV Memoirs of the artist. Crossing the Balkans. Skobelev. 1877-1878 // Russian antiquity. - 1889. - No. 3

The Russian army in 1812 consisted of several branches of the military. The main and most numerous of them was the infantry. IN Russia XIX For centuries it has often been called infantry.

Infantry general

Types of infantry
In the 19th century, there were several varieties of infantry troops. The basis of the land army was line infantry, or, as it was called in Russia until 1811, musketeer. She was supposed to fight in close formation, armed with smooth-bore muzzle-loading guns - fuses. There was also light infantry, which in the Russian Empire was represented by rangers. She fought in loose formation and was equipped with the best small arms. Heavy infantry- grenadiers - initially included specially selected soldiers trained in throwing grenades.

Composition of the infantry
The main tactical unit was regiment. Each infantry regiment consisted of three battalions. The exception was the Preobrazhensky Infantry Regiment, which included four battalions. And each battalion in turn consisted of four mouths.

• The infantry (line) battalion consisted of a grenadier company and three musketeer companies.
• The grenadier battalion consisted of a grenadier company and three fusilier companies.
• The chasseur battalion consisted of a grenadier company and three chasseur companies.

Each company was divided into two platoons. In the grenadier company - the 1st platoon was from the grenadiers, the 2nd platoon - from the shooters. The company commander was at the head of the company.

The two regiments were brigade: jaeger, grenadier or infantry. Four brigades formed division. The infantry division consisted of various genera troops. It has become a permanent combined-arms unit, including a certain number of units, according to the state. Two divisions made up one infantry corps.

According to To the highest rescript of October 12, 1810 Russian infantry had the following composition: "Guards: 4 regiments and 2 battalions (Life Guards Finnish and Guards crew) - 15 battalions. Army: 141 regiments and 2 training battalions - 425 battalions." There were 440 battalions in total. In 1810 and 1811, the armed forces were replenished with newly formed units of the troops. The army infantry was strengthened by 23 regiments.

At the beginning of 1812, the Russian army already had 514 infantry battalions. Among them - 19 guards battalions, 492 army battalions consisting of 164 regiments, 3 training grenadier battalions.

Private Odessa and non-commissioned officer of the Simbirsk infantry regiments

Soldier training
Great importance was attached to the training of soldiers. The commander of the regiment himself was obliged to collect officers from himself or from the battalion commanders, "as often as he considers it necessary to interpret all the rules of the recruiting school, the teachings of the company and battalion." It was also necessary to teach all this to non-commissioned officers and “require that they themselves be able to accurately do everything that relates to soldier rifle techniques for firing and marching.”

All these rules and lessons were spelled out in Military regulations on infantry service, published in 1811. Each soldier must be able to stand properly, to wield and operate a gun, to wield a sword, to march and "to make turns and in general all movements." Constant lessons and training were to consolidate these skills.

Chief officer and private of the Butyrsky infantry regiment

The training concerned not only military skills, but also the state of mind of a soldier: “The composure and calm appearance of the boss should serve as an example to subordinates; order in the ranks can be maintained only when the soldier acts in cold blood and freely, ”the Charter prescribed.

Initially, soldiers were trained at a recruiting school. It was divided into three parts. The first part included everything "what a recruit without a gun should teach." The soldier had to learn to stand correctly, improve bearing, make turns and learn to march. The second part contained rifle techniques and caricature. The third part concluded "the rules of the march in front and rows, the rules of alignment and crossings."

Special attention was paid to shooting: “For the most successful training to shoot wholeheartedly, it is prescribed in each battalion to have several wooden shields painted with black paint, two arshins and three quarters high, an arshin wide, in the middle of which a white stripe four inches wide and the same strip along the upper end of the shields. Having put such a shield, the soldiers had to learn to shoot at 40 fathoms (about 85 m), then at 80 fathoms (about 170 m) and finally at 120 fathoms (about 256 m).

Chief officer of the Belozersky infantry regiment

Russian infantry tactics
As for the tactics of the Russian infantry during the war of 1812, there is a tendency to move away from the customary until then building on the battlefield in a deployed formation - a “line”. It is replaced by a battalion "column from the middle", or "column in attack"(this term was borrowed from the French military vocabulary).

This new combat tactic had many advantages and strengths. First of all, it had a narrower front (compared to the usual "deployed" formation), which made it easier for the "column" to maintain order when the battalion moved across the battlefield and maneuver faster. She could also almost freely take other forms of construction: turn around in a line or curl up in a square. And, finally, the deep close formation that this “column” formed increased the feeling of mutual support for its people.

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Chronicle of the day: The French retreated from the Dinaburg fortress

First Western Army
The French stopped trying to capture the bridge fortification of the Dinaburg fortress. The patrols of the combined hussar regiment and the team of Colonel of the Don Cossack regiment Rodionov had a skirmish with the retreating French rearguard.

Third Observation Army of General Tormasov
The commander of the vanguard of the Third Observation Army, Count Lambert, decided to conduct a reconnaissance of the troops that were against him in the Duchy of Warsaw. For this purpose, two squadrons of the Alexandria Hussars crossed the river. Western Bug and attacked the village of Gorodok. While these demonstrations were taking place fighting, General Lambert crossed the Western Bug near the town of Ustilug and occupied the city of Grubeshov. From the documents found in Grubeshov, Lambert established that there were few enemy regular troops in the Duchy of Warsaw and withdrew to Brest-Litovsk.

Person: Karl Osipovich Lambert

Karl Osipovich Lambert(1773-1843) - count, cavalry general. He was one of the most prominent cavalry generals of the Alexander era. Karl Osipovich belonged to an old French aristocratic family. His father was a major general, inspector cavalry divisions in French service. Catherine II herself invited their family to Russia. In 1793, Karl Lambert was accepted as a second major in the Kinburn Dragoon Regiment. Soon he took part in the battles at Kholm, Maciovitsy and in the storming of Prague, for which he was awarded the Order of St. George 4th grade. Already in 1796, he commanded a Cossack regiment, was promoted to colonel, but two years later he was forced to retire due to illness.

In 1800, Lambert even left the Russian service and returned to France, but with the accession of Alexander I he returned to Russia. He took an active part in the military campaign against Napoleon in 1806-1807. In the battle near Charnov on December 11, 1806, Lambert “encouraged his subordinates with an example of fearlessness, and courageously repelled the enemy several times with jaeger posts, and he was wounded in the leg.” For this he was awarded the Order of St. George 3rd degree. Later he received the Order of St. Vladimir 3rd degree and St. Anna 1st degree.

In 1812, Lambert commanded a cavalry corps as part of Tormasov's 3rd reserve observational army. He proved himself in the battle near Kobrin, for which he was awarded a golden saber with diamonds, which was awarded to the military as a sign of special distinction, for personal courage and dedication. After the battle of Gorodechno, Lambert was promoted to lieutenant general. He drove the enemy out of Nesvizh, Novosverzhen and Minsk, took Borisov from the battle. In this battle, he was seriously wounded, but refused to leave the battlefield: “I’m staying with you here,” he said to the rangers who removed him from the horse, “either I die, or I wait until you take me an apartment in Borisov.” The injury was serious and he had to be treated for two years.

He returned to the army at the beginning of March 1814 and was awarded the Order of St. for participating in the capture of Paris. Alexander Nevsky.

On May 30, 1843, Karl Osipovich Lambert died "of bullet exhaustion and old age," as his epitaph says.

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